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PART ONE 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: Land (Property) Rights and Economic Development 
Property rights is a crucial step in any attempt to stimulate business activities and generate economic 
growth. As Alston and Mueller (2008: 254) puts it “property rights matter because they determine 
resource use”. For instance, Hartwell (2015: 171) argues that when the administration of property 
rights is effective, it helps in promoting long term investments without fear of confiscation or violation 
from contractual agreement. A good administration can therefore incentivise businesses by signalling 
a credible commitment to protect property rights such as enforcing contractual obligations or it could 
conversely de-incentivise businesses if it allows for cumbersome procedures, whimsical decisions, rent 
seeking behaviour, and predation. The latter is especially more evident in the quality of property rights 
administration in developing countries, where institutions are generally characterised as weak or 
dysfunctional. For long, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have been advising developing countries on the relevance of a sound framework 
governing land property rights. 
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In his pioneering work on how formalization of private property ownership generates wealth, 
Hernando de Soto (2000) argues that the first step towards generating wealth is to turn what he 
termed as ‘dead asset’ or ‘dead capital’ (which lies dormant all around us) into an entity of value by 
transforming such asset into a security, contract or title record. De Soto regards land formalization (in 
form of registers or titles) in developing countries as the key to lifting people out of poverty: 
Even in the poorest nations the poor save…the value of savings among the poor is in 
fact, immense – forty times all the foreign aid received throughout the world since 
1945…but they hold these resources in defective forms: houses built on land whose 
ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated businesses with 
undefined liability, industries located where financiers and investors cannot 
adequately see them. Because the rights to these possessions are not adequately 
documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded 
outside of narrow local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be 
used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a share against an investment (p. 
6)  
De Soto argues further that formal property forces an individual to go beyond seeing his property such 
as a house as a “mere shelter and thus a dead asset and to see it as a live capital” (p. 48). To show how 
crucial property ownership is in the advancement of humanity, De Soto notes that: 
Formal property is more than a system for titling, recording, and mapping assets—it 
is an instrument of thought, representing assets in such a way that people’s minds can 
work on them to generate surplus value. That is why formal property must be 
universally accessible: to bring everyone into one social contract where they can 
cooperate to raise society’s productivity (p. 231) 
One of the major reasons why the west is wealthier than the rest of the world according de Soto was 
because it has succeeded in integrating much of the private assets held by its citizens into a single 
unified system - a feat which developing countries are yet to attain. For example, formalization has 
enabled individuals in the west to use property titles as collateral in obtaining loans for investment or 
formalization could also be used by the government for planning purposes such as debt collection, 
payment of taxes and provision of social services. However, this didn’t happen overnight argues de 
Soto - it took several years of careful planning by politicians, legislators and judges of the 19th C 
western countries to “put together the scattered facts and rules that had governed property 
throughout cities, villages, buildings and farms and integrated them into one system” (p. 50-51).  
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Over time this integrated system has been perfected such that citizens in the west can now obtain 
information with regards to economic value, legal status or geographic characteristics of any asset or 
property of interest from the comfort of their homes. In addition, this integrated system has 
entrenched accountability by unmasking anonymity around who owns what or does what. For 
instance, individuals could be identified and sanctioned for engaging in undesirable conduct (such as 
not honouring obligations entered) and thereby induce compliance to rule of law. De Soto tries to 
demonstrate how a formalized property system entrenches accountability by contrasting what 
obtains in the advanced countries with that of developing countries:  
a great deal of its power [formalization] comes from the accountability it creates, from 
the constraints it imposes, the rules it spawns, and the sanctions it can apply. In 
allowing people to see the economic and social potential of assets, formal property 
changed the perception in advanced societies of not only the potential rewards of 
using assets but also the dangers. Legal property invited commitment. The lack of legal 
property thus explains why citizens in developing countries cannot make profitable 
contracts with strangers, cannot get credit, insurance, or utilities services: They have 
no property to lose. Because they have no property to lose, they are taken seriously as 
contracting parties only by their immediate family and neighbours. Meanwhile, 
citizens of advanced nations can contract for practically anything that is reasonable, 
but the entry price is commitment. And commitment is better understood when 
backed up by a pledge of property, whether it be a mortgage, a lien, or any other form 
of security that protects the other contracting party (p. 53) 
Rationalist institutional scholars of economic development also argue that one of the major ways 
through which development can be attained is through the effective and efficient institutionalization 
of property rights (Demsetz, 1967; North and Thomas, 1973; North 1981; De Long and Shleifer 1993; 
Hall and Jones 1999; Platteau 2000; Acemoglu et al 2001; Johnson et al 2002; Ho and Spoor 2006; 
Goldstein and Udry 2008; Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010; Janvry et al 2014; Wang et al 2015; Leight 
2016). However, within the rationalist school thought opinions differ on how best institutions and 
policies could be designed and implemented such that the benefits accruing from private ownership 
rights are translated into overall economic development. Anaafo (2015) synthesized these arguments 
into four (4) major approaches; first, there are those who argue that optimal productive use of private 
property or land is best achieved through securing individual rights (Cooter 1982; de Soto 2000; 
Demsetz 1967; The World Bank 2002; 2013). Secondly, others argue that land is more productive when 
the “benefits” and “burdens” is distributed among the members of society by the government through 
its “bureaucratic machinery” (Banik, 2008; Morsink, 1999). The third plank within the literature are 
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those who view land as better utilized when its governance is determined by “communally defined 
structures and institutions” (Dolsak and Ostrom 2003; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al 2002). And finally, 
others argue that rather than approaching property or land governance from a “silo” perspective as 
suggested by the three approaches above, instead, the benefits from land can best be realized through 
an “integrated, contextualized, organismic and poly-rational” way (Anaafo 2013; Chigara 2004; Davy 
2009, 2012; Deininger 2003; Manji 2006 cited in Anaafo 2015: ibid). Anaafo’s empirical study in a 
municipality of Ghana shows that both ‘domestic’ and ‘external’ pressures shape the demand as well 
as the direction of land reforms. 
Statement of Research Problem 
The land administration system in Nigeria has over the years been perceived as grossly ineffective and 
inefficient such that government officials are often accused of capitalizing on the ‘gaps’ in the system 
to enrich themselves through illegal allocations of (or selling) land or property titles (Atilola 2010, 
Deininger 2003). The Nigerian economy has also been characterised as highly risky for investment 
because people lack confidence on the institutions of land governance. For example, revocations or 
confiscations of private land or property by officials of land agencies is a common occurrence and so 
also are land disputes which are not uncommon in Nigeria (Resnick and Okumo 2016, OECD 2015:78).  
The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EoDB) index which relies on a number of factors (starting a 
business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, 
protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving 
insolvency) to measure the quality of a country’s regulatory environment shows that Nigeria has over 
the years consistently ranked at the bottom of the rankings (DB 2018). More interesting is when some 
of the measurements (such as starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering 
property and enforcing contracts) were replicated at the sub-national level in Nigeria (2008, 2010, 
2014). The results show that it is easier to do business in some states than others and a major reason 
given as responsible for this disparity is that some states have improve the quality of their regulatory 
environment through reforms. This reform efforts had made them consistently ranked above others 
(DB 2014). 
Research Question 
How do some states succeed in implementing and sustaining a policy change, while others are less 
able to do so? 
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Objective of the Study 
This study seeks to further our understanding of the factors that are critical to the success of policy 
change and durability by extending the portability of standard theories on the policy performance of 
‘policy regimes’ beyond the usual boundaries of the European and American countries. Through a 
comparative analysis of the variations in the performance of the different policy designs adopted by 
some Nigerian states at the subnational level, it seeks to explore how implementation ‘gaps’ lead to 
unintended consequences.  
Scope and Focus of The Study 
This study focuses on the implementation of the land titling (registration) project implemented by 
three Nigerian states (Nasarawa, Cross River and Niger). It is divided into three parts; the first part lays 
the groundwork of the study, it discusses the background of the study, state of the policy 
implementation research, the relevant implementation theories that constitute the theoretical 
framework and a review of relevant literature on land titling (registration). The second part deals with 
the methodology of empirical enquiry employed during fieldwork to gather data at the three (3) study 
locations - which includes the stories about processes leading up to the reforms of institutions of 
property (land) governance and subsequently the different institutional designs of the land titling 
projects adopted by the cases. And the final part is composed of the comparative analysis of the cases, 
the conclusion as well as recommendations of the study. 
Political Structure of Nigeria 
Nigeria operates a federal system of government, it is made up of 36 states divided into sic (6) 
geopolitical regions (3 regions in the south and 3 in the north) respectively. Like the United States, 
Nigeria has three (3) arms of government (the executive, a bicameral legislature and a judiciary). The 
1999 constitution (as amended) defines the powers, jurisdiction as well as competence of the federal, 
state and local governments viz a viz three levels; the exclusive list which is the sole preserve of the 
federal government (such as the control of the military, police, immigration and custom forces), the 
concurrent list which is a shared competence between the federal and state governments in areas 
such as education, and health and the residual list which is exercised at the state level (Baba 2015).  
Figure 1 below shows the map of Nigeria with the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Fig 1: 
Map of Nigeria 
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Source: Wikipedia 
Land Administration in Nigeria: A Historical Journey  
Adeniran (2013) argues that a sound system of land administration entrenches an equitable 
distribution of wealth and according to him land administration is simply about the making of and 
applying the rules of land or property ownership that serves to stimulate economic growth and 
development. Adeniran defines land administration as the process of determining, recording, 
disseminating and valuing information about the ownership of land when implementing a land policy 
management. It is both a process as well as an instrument used by government to offer security of 
tenure, regulate the land markets, and implement land reforms (p. 7). 
Before the advent of the British colonial rule, land use and management practices vary with the 
traditions and customs of the different tribal groups that inhabit present day Nigeria. In many 
communities’ lands were mostly held in trust by either the head of a family or a traditional ruler who 
in turn allocates, manages or transfers such lands to individuals on the basis of inheritance (Lewis v 
Bankole 1908; Craigwell Hardy E. S. 1939; GB Coker 1966; Famoriyo, S 1973; CO Olawoye 1974; 
Otogbolu v Okeoluwa and Ors 1981; Nwosu A. C. 1991 cited in Adeniran 2013). However, gradually 
these practices began to wane with the introduction of land reforms in some parts of Nigeria especially 
in the north. For instance, the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate saw the replacement of the 
existing “indigenous” ownership of land with that of the “Maliki” version of Islamic law. The newly 
created system vested “ownership and control” of all lands in the hands of the ruling class while those 
living on the land were only given “right of use”. And even the British colonial administration 
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conquered the north, the it did not abolish this existing customary arrangement, but simply use the 
British laws alongside the Islamic ones.  
In 1910, the caliphate system made a “land and native proclamation” which lays the foundation of the 
modern-day system of land governance in Nigeria. The proclamation effectively turned all lands into 
common resource (public) and henceforth held in trust and administered by the Governor General of 
the then colonial administration. But in the southern Nigeria the story was different, the customary 
tenure system of ownership subsisted and was recognized by the then colonial administration except 
in cases where “alien” (individuals not belonging to the community) indicates interest in which the 
Governor General’s approval for ownership must be sought. However, especially in south western 
Nigeria, the customary system of land administration was the subject of incessant abuse by traditional 
rulers (who often disposes individuals of their land rights) for personal gratifications and that even 
when a law was passed to strip traditional rulers of powers to administrate lands, this malpractices 
still persisted since there was no mechanism put in place to ensure compliance with the newly passed 
law (ibid; see also Adalemo I. A. 1993; Meek, C. K. 1957 ibid). 
Creation of a Uniform System of Land Administration in Nigeria: The Land 
Use Act (1978) 
Shortly after Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960, the colonial “ordinances” and the 
‘customary’ laws continue to remain the main instruments of land administration in Nigeria (Adelemo 
1993). However, as Nigeria’s population increased over time, the demand for land went up and in turn 
this led to frequent land disputes among individuals since boundaries between privately owned lands 
and community owned lands were not clearly defined. In response, the then military government 
sought to address this and host of other land issues and in 1977 inaugurated a committee of land 
experts to proffer solutions, especially those that will result in a uniform land policy framework for 
whole the country. The result was the passage of a decree that eventually became the Land Use Act 
(LUA) in 1978 and was enshrined into the 1979 constitution. The LUA among other things sought to 
address the persistent issue of maladministration of land that bedevilled the customary system in the 
south. The idea was to extend the model of land administration existing in northern Nigeria to the 
south (ibid). Another different but related explanation for the reforms of the customary system of 
land administration to a statutory one was that the third (3rd) Nigeria National Development Plan of 
1975-1980 identified lack of government’s ownership of lands was a barrier to achieving national 
development. For instance, Rasak (2011) argues that the second (2nd) National Development Plan of 
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1970-1974 failed because the then government could own lands to be use for development purposes 
because of the exorbitant amount of compensation claims made by land owners. 
Towards addressing the persistent issue of misuse of land, a further three different expert panels were 
inaugurated by the government to study the situation and come up with recommendations. First the 
“Anti-inflation Task Force” was set up in 1975, and then followed by the “Rent Panel in 1976” and 
finally the “Land Use Panel of 1977 all of which culminated in the conception and design of the LUA. 
The passage of the Land Use Act (LUA) of in 1978 ushered in a new instruments of land administration 
in Nigeria, the LUA domiciled all lands under the control of the state governments that made up the 
federation (IPPA 2015). For example, Section 1 subsection 1 of the act states that: 
all land comprised in the territory of each state in the federation are hereby vested in 
the Governor of the state and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the 
use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of this act 
(S 1(1))  
Under the LUA, (unless if delegated) only the governor has the final authority to issue the main 
instruments of land ownership such as the Certificate of Occupancy (CO) or Right of Occupancy (RO). 
Also, tenure over land is given to individuals on a lease hold basis with a tenancy period ranging from 
50 to 99 years but with the option of renewal. In Nigeria, land is administered through two major 
ways; statutory (in both urban or non-urban areas) or customary right of occupancy (in non-urban 
areas). While the state governors are mandated by law to issue statutory rights of occupancy for the 
urban and non-urban areas, the local government are to issue customary rights of occupancy in rural 
areas. The LUA also requires that each state establishes an “ad-hoc” body known as the Land Use 
Allocation Committee (LUAC) that advises the state governor on land management issues including 
compensation claims and thus effectively ending the role of traditional rulers in administering 
communal lands. The LUA also mandated the “State High” courts to preside over land matters of 
statutory nature while the “Customary” courts in the south and “Area” courts in the north to preside 
over land matters of customary nature. Together with other support agencies, the act also mandates 
the Federal Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development (FMLHUD) to regulate land 
administration at the federal level (Adeniyi 2013: 9).  
In some quarters, the LUA was widely commended and seen as a useful instrument that brought 
together the disparate land laws in the country under a unified framework, which could easily be 
applied across the entire federation (Nweke 1978; Yakubu 1986; N Tobi 1989 cited in Razak 2011). As 
Smith (1995) argues: 
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the conception of Land Use Act as a piece of legislation is far from being an 
emasculation of the pre-existing system of customary land tenure rather, it is meant 
to solve the various socio-economic problems associated with it, establish a uniform 
land policy to cater for the need of the society, eradicate the multifarious problem 
associated with the issue of title to land in Nigeria and ensure availability of land for 
agricultural and industrial development (ibid: 11) 
In other quarters, the act was criticised on the grounds that the act has deprived many citizens of their 
over land ownership rights, by transferring all land rights to the government. As Nnamani (1989) tries 
to describe the LUA: 
 “I cannot think of any statute which has produced so many ambiguities, 
contradictions, absurdities and confusions as this Act has done” (ibid: 8).  
Shortcomings of the Land Use Act (1978) and the demands for Change 
The LUA has now been in existence for over 40 years, the act has now been regarded as obsolete and 
flawed. First, it is argued that act has failed to achieve the purpose for which it was originally set up 
to do as over 80% of lands in Nigeria are still administered under the “community-based customary 
laws”, which is largely based on “un-codified system of norms and principles”. Secondly, it has also 
been criticised as restrictive since it only gives partial (lease hold) ownership of lands to individuals 
and also citizens are only allowed a holding of 0.5 hectares of undeveloped urban land, 500 hectares 
of non-urban land and 5,000 hectares of grazing land respectively (IPPA 2015: 8; OECD: 74). Thirdly, 
most provisions of the act were seen as vague and susceptible to misinterpretation and manipulability 
by agencies tasked with land administration (Mabogunje 2007). Fourthly, some of the LUA clauses 
such as the “governor’s consent” has also been considered as causing gross inefficiency and thus 
causing huge delays and backlog of land applications which in turn discourages the public and 
investors from formalizing land property (OECD 2015: 74). For example, citing the case of Savannah 
Bank Ltd v. Ajilo, Obaseki (1990) tries to make a case against the ‘governor’s consent’ clause when he 
argues: 
In my view and I agree with Chief Williams expression of anxiety over the 
implementation or consequences of the implementation of the consent provisions or 
clauses in the Act. It is bound to have a suffocating effect on the commercial life of the 
land and house owning class of the society who use their properties to raise loans and 
advances from Banks…These areas of the Land Use Act need urgent review to remove 
their problem nature (cited in Rasak 2011: 84)  
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Inducing Change from Above: Establishment of The Presidential 
Technical Committee on Land Reforms (PTCLR) at the Federal Level  
Thus, following calls and pressure from both international (multilateral institutions) and domestic 
(citizens) for the reform of land institutions in Nigeria, the federal government initiated some policies 
aimed at strengthening the land governance framework. In 2007, a road map policy document titled 
the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was launched, with its 
medium-term implementation plan (the 7 Point Agenda) (OECD 2015). One of the major objectives of 
the 7-point policy agenda was the reform of the land tenure system to free up the vast expanse of 
lands held by government to private owners (Gadzama 2013). At the federal level, relevant agencies 
were brought together under one umbrella referred to as the ‘’One Stop Shop’’ to codify and simplify 
the procedures on land registration for the public as well as investors. The Nigeria Company and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990 (the main instrument of regulating property registration at the federal 
level) was reformed to make it more business friendly. Administrative procedures that were 
considered obsolete or unnecessary in the CAMA act were either eliminated or merged, and land 
records and registrations forms that were in paper formats were digitized and made available online 
(OECD 2015). 
In 2009, an eight-member panel of known as the Presidential Technical Committee on Land Reform 
(PTCLR) was inaugurated by the government of president Umaru Musa Yar’adua and given the 
mandate to collaborate and provide technical assistance to State and Local Governments in the 
following areas: (a) to undertake land cadastral nationwide (b) to determine individuals’ “possessory” 
rights using best practices and most appropriate technology to determine the process of identification 
of locations and registration of title holdings (c) to ensure that land cadastral boundaries and title 
holdings are demarcated in such a way that communities, hamlets, villages, village areas, towns, etc 
will be recognizable (d) to encourage and assist State and Local Governments to establish an 
arbitration/adjudication mechanism for land ownership conflict resolution (e) to make 
recommendations for the establishment of a National Depository for Land Title Holdings and Records 
in all States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (f) to make recommendations for the 
establishment of a mechanism for land valuation in both urban and rural areas in all parts of the 
Federation and (g) to make any other recommendations that will ensure effective, simplified, 
sustainable and successful land administration in Nigeria (Mabogunje 2007; OECD 2015: 78) 
These efforts culminated in the drafting of a roadmap to transform how land is administered in the 
country. The advocates the reforms argue that an effective way of realizing an efficient, transparent 
and secure way of capturing and storing all land data is through the deployment of technology. To do 
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this they suggest transforming the old system (the manual system) of land administration into a 
modern one (using the Geographic Information System (GIS)). For instance, using aerial photography, 
satellite imageries, Global Positioning System (GPS), digitalization of data using geographical 
information systems (GIS), vast expanse of land can be efficiently captured and mapped out. Towards 
this end the PTCLR established a technical sub-committee that comprises of experts specializing in 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Geomatics and Geoinformation to advise on technical issues 
that may arise during the execution of the mandate (Mabogunje 2007). The committee was mandated 
to work closely with the states and local governments in order to identify potential constraints that 
may impede the implementation of the proposed changes and to also legitimise the process. The 
PTCLR also recommended the establishment of the National Land Reform Commission (NLRC) which 
will replace the PTCLR. A bill titled ‘’National Land Reform Commission Bill’’ was re-represented to the 
national parliament for passage (having failed to pass into law in its first attempt in 2010) (OECD 2015: 
77). 
Establishment of the Federal Land Information System (FELIS) 
At the federal level the implementation of the land policy changes first began with the establishment 
of the Federal Land Information System (FELIS). The FELIS project was a pilot project that sought to 
among other things improve the system of “land transactions and administration” in the Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT). The Abuja Geographic Information System (AGIS) Agency was created and 
given the mandate to implement the FELIS project under the Electronic Data Capture Scheme (EDCS). 
The Federal government envisaged the replication of the FELIS project to the rest of the country by 
proceeding with the reforms in an incremental way. For instance, the project was further extended to 
two other states (Kano and Lagos). The federal government anticipated that the institutional and 
policy changes that will be implemented under the FELIS will help to entrench good governance in 
land administration in the country and thereby help accelerate development (Adeoye and Mensah 
2008; Oboli and Akpoyoware 2010: 3). The project was designed to digitize and centralise all land and 
property records (especially those having survey information and title documents) in the country. The 
idea is to have information who owns what land or property, the location of such property, the type 
of tenure (commercial or residential) as well as any transactions carried out on such property 
(Adeniran 2013). 
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Responses from Below: The Reform of Land Institutions at the Sub-
National Level and some Unintended Consequences  
The structural characteristics of Nigeria with (a) a single legal framework (such as the Land Use act of 
1978) shared by the states in the regulation of land property rights, but also (b) a federal system of 
governance that allows for states to adapt and implement national laws that suit their contexts and 
therefore characterised by different institutional features of the regulatory environment. With this 
kind of institutional arrangement, the success or failure of the proposed policy changes depends on 
the states themselves. This is because the land use act vested all powers of land administration on the 
state governors (Mabogunje 2007). Thus, while some states simply ignore the federal government’s 
overtures for the proposed land reforms, others responded positively to the federal government’s call 
by making changes to their land administration systems. For instance, most of those that implemented 
the reforms created new or amended existing land laws and also created specialized autonomous 
agencies that will drive the proposed reforms using modern system of land administration such as the 
GIS. 
Furthermore, even among those states that implemented the land reforms there were differences in 
in terms of how they proceeded with the implementation. This was mainly due to contextual 
conditions within those states as well as the behaviour of organisations tasked with the 
implementation of the reforms. Though an important fact shared by all the cases covered in this study 
is the initial opposition to the reforms. For example, the newly created agencies met stiff resistance 
from their parent ministries. Officials in the parent ministries opposed this shift, and therefore not 
cooperating with the government’s in the implementation of the new policy changes. While this 
resistance coming from the parent ministries fizzled out in some of the states such as in the case of 
Nasarawa and Niger states, in states like Cross River the resistance persisted. Some of the reasons for 
the resistance according officials interviewed at both the ministries and the agencies was that (a) the 
old system of land administration (characterised by all sorts of questionable practices) was beneficial 
to entrenched interests who often enrich themselves at the government’s expense (b) fear of the 
unknown by some officials over the outcomes of the reforms such as loss of jobs. For instance, with 
regards to concerns over possible job losses, most of the core civil servants in the ministries were used 
to the manual system of land administration and thus the newly created (computerized) system as 
envisaged by the reforms may render them irrelevant in the new arrangement. In response to the 
opposition of the reforms, the states adopted different strategies to weaken the resistance and 
sabotage coming from the parent ministries. In some states for instance, staff were recruited and 
trained to work in the newly created agencies, and those staff of the parent ministry that cooperated 
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with the management (such as the commissioners of the ministries) were deployed to the newly 
created agencies and recalcitrant ones were either deployed to other ministries or disengaged.   
Inter-agency rivalry was also rife among the relevant implementing bodies, especially between the 
parent ministries of lands and the newly created geographic information agencies. The problem of 
coordination between the parent ministries and the agencies posed a huge challenge to the reforms 
in some states. For example, problem of coordination played a key role in the set-backs experienced 
by the land reforms in Cross River state - to the extent that a crisis of mandate ensued between the 
state’s ministry of lands and the Cross-River Geographic Information Agency (CRGIA). Closely following 
coordination problems was also the lack of funding and commitment. This severely curtailed the 
capacity of the implementing bodies to effectively carry out their mandate. Problem of funding and 
political commitment was a dominant view among officials interviewed and cited as responsible for 
the ineffective performances of the newly created land agencies. Furthermore, low technical capacity 
and in some cases non-compliance to the provisions of the regulations were also commonly cited by 
officials as issues that affected the implementation of the land policy changes at the sub national level.  
CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Framework 
We often hear people mention words like the policy was ‘successful’ or was a ‘failed’ one, we often 
hear politicians or citizens say the agency just implemented what they simply like and not what we 
asked or want them to do. We also hear things like had the policy been done or implemented in this 
way or had we introduced some elements it will have been a different story entirely. This is the murky 
world of policy implementation where the designs of policies do not often gets translated into the 
intentions of their designers. The primary focus of this chapter is to explore relevant theories of policy 
implementation to answer our research question. We first employ theories of delegation or more 
specifically the principal agent theory to understand how policy implementation gets delegated in the 
first place. That is how elected officials issue instructions in form of policy (legislations or executive 
orders) to government departments or agencies (bureaucracy) to carry out or implement. Then we 
move to the domain of policy implementation research to trace developments in the field. We also 
look at how policy design, intentions, interorganizational relations and the political environment 
shapes policy implementation. All these are important consideration because the way delegated 
policies get implemented has profound effects on the outcomes of such policies 
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There is no single or unified framework in the field of policy implementation research that captures 
all the complexities of policy implementation (May 2012). This is especially problematic when we try 
to use a single framework such as the Principal Agent (PA) theory to explain or understand policy 
implementation problems in developing countries contexts (Huber and Shipan 2006) or try to use the 
PA theory in analysing autonomous or independent agencies where due to their features (supposed 
independence), agencies are mostly characterised as having ‘interdependent’ or ‘horizontal’ 
relationships in relating with other governmental bodies as opposed to having a ‘hierarchical’ or 
‘vertical’ one (Maggetti and Papadopoulos 2018). As Bach et al (2012) argue “a further confounding 
factor for an unambiguous principal–agent view of the policy process is that there are layers of 
principals and agents, not just one relationship” (p. 188). As they put it “we argue that rational choice 
institutionalism and principal–agent accounts of delegation offer only limited insights into de facto 
bureaucratic autonomy” (p. 191). 
To this end, we therefore assembled and incorporated different theories within the literature that are 
relevant to our work such as the policy regime framework (PRF), the principal agent theory (PA) of 
delegation, the New Public Management (NPM), and theories on agencification. We then narrow 
down to a comprehensive empirical review of relevant literature on the implementation of land titling 
reforms in developing countries. The aim is to examine (with the aim of uncovering) key factors that 
lead to the differential implementation of the land policy changes in the study locations. Thus, drawing 
on these theoretical frameworks, we carefully considered the intersection of policy design and 
implementation. Using empirical data, we look at whether policy design matter in shaping policy 
implementation in a developing country context. We applied these concepts to the different 
institutional designs of the land titling systems adopted by the cases under study, compare and 
analyse their similarities as well as their differences. The ultimate objective is to uncover which policy 
design features or factors (if any) matter for a successful and sustained implementation of the land 
policy changes introduced by the states under study. But first, we start with the fundamentals to 
understand how all these components tie together, that is we begin with how policy implementation 
gets delegated in the first place and then move on to the complexities of policy implementation. 
Delegation Theories: Politico-Administrative Relations  
At a more general level, the first thing to note is that in most formal organisations, institutional 
arrangement influences both the direction and content of delegation (Huber and Shipan 2002; Strom 
2003; Lupia 2003). For instance, federal and unitary systems of governments differ considerably in 
terms of how policies are delegated and the channels through which accountability is communicated. 
In parliamentary systems, this relationship entails a ‘’single chain’’ of delegation, while presidential 
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systems are characterised by “multiple chains” of delegation (Strom 2003). Furthermore, institutional 
arrangements also reflect the nature of the delegation relationship; for example delegation can be 
within an arm of government such as the legislature delegating policy task to its sub-committees, the 
presidency delegating to its agencies or delegation between arms of government such as the 
legislature delegating to executive ministries (Strom 2003: 65). Differences in institutional 
arrangements also structure how various levels of government relate with each other. For example, 
Huber and Shipan (2002) argue that since the powers of appointment resides with the executive, a 
governor or a president commands enormous influence over agencies. This therefore creates 
incentives for the legislature to write statutes (laws) to constrain the actions of the bureaucrats. 
Delegation theories offer researchers a useful analytical tool in mapping and understanding the often 
conflictual as well as cooperative relationship in policy making and implementation. This relationship 
may revolve around accountability, informational, capacity and commitment issues. A prominent 
model that captures this complex relationship is the agency theory; the theory models this 
relationship as that between decision makers (principals) and bureaucrats or administrators (the 
agents). Though initially restricted to the economics literature (where it is used in insurance studies 
to analyse contractual obligations), the PA framework has evolved over the years and is now widely 
applied in the social sciences especially in the study of policy making in the political and public 
administration fields (Maggetti and Papadopoulos 2016; Sobol 2016; Kerwer 2005; Miller 2005; 
Waterman and Meier 1998).  
Prior to the 1980s much of the classical principal agent theories on bureaucratic delegation (especially 
in the United States) mainly focus on studying relationship between autonomy and accountability of 
bureaucratic agencies. Specifically, the debates revolve around whether bureaucrats adhere to policy 
instructions as laid down by the congress in statues in what is referred to as the ‘’congressional 
dominance school’’. Or whether the congress has abandoned its traditional role of oversighting 
agencies - the ‘’congressional abdication school’’ (Pollack 2003:175).  However, the early 1980s saw a 
notable turning point in these debates, where McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) published a seminal 
reply to critiques of the congressional dominance school. They argue that contrary to the dominant 
view, the legislature has not abdicated on its responsibility, but has rather simply found a better 
strategy of controlling the bureaucracy. They refer to this strategy as a congressional preference for 
‘’fire alarm’’ over ‘’police patrol’’ as mechanism of controlling the bureaucracy (p. 165). The idea 
behind this intuition is that congress’s choice of the former over the latter is to find the most cost-
effective control instrument (see also Damonte et al 2014; Huber and Shipan 2013; McCubbins, Noll, 
and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989; Romzek and Dubnik 1987).  
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These marked a significant shift in the underlying assumptions of the classical delegation theories 
within the discipline and thus second and third generation PA models emerged. These studies focus 
on investigating why and how principals design legislation to limit agency loss (Pollack 2003). This new 
school especially the ones concerned with bureaucratic politics argue that discretion and 
accountability should be seen as a means of realizing policy outcomes. This shift towards outcomes-
based theorising brought back the importance of control in realising policy objectives – that is 
successful policy outcome(s) is regarded as a function of context conditioned by control, monitoring 
and reporting mechanisms (Bertelli 2012:11; Ora-orn Poocharoen 2013; Epstein and O’halloran 2006; 
Huber and Shipan 2002).  
The Principal Agent Theory of Policy Delegation 
Lupia (2003) defines delegation as ‘’an act where one person or group, called a principal, relies on 
another person or group, called an agent, to act on the principal’s behalf’’ (p. 33). Delegation provide 
policy makers the mechanism of addressing a wide range of social problems concurrently – varied 
reasons are advanced by scholars as to why principals (the legislature or executive) delegate authority 
to bureaucrats. These reasons range from the principal lacking the time, information, and the requisite 
technical capacity or even to solve collective problems (Epstein and O’Halloran 1997; Strom 2003; Fox 
and Jordan 2009). Yet still, delegation could also occur because the leadership may seek credibility or 
legitimacy regarding certain policies and/or to avoid blames in case of an unpopular policy (Ross 1973; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Pollack 1997; Tallberg 2002 cited in Sobol 2016; Huber, Shipan and Pfahler 
2001; Bertelli 2012).  
This suggests that it is in the principal’s interest to grant the agent some form of authority to carry out 
an assigned mandate – yet delegation entails costs. For instance, as it is well established in the 
literature of the tendency for the principal to select the wrong agent “adverse selection” or the agent 
to shirks on his responsibility known as ‘’moral hazard’’ (Sobol 2016:338; Rensick and Olumo 2016; 
Miller 2005:209; Strom 2003: 62). As Strom (2003) puts it  
Any delegation of authority entails the risk that the agent may not faithfully pursue the 
principal’s interests. If the agent has preferences and incentives that are not perfectly 
compatible with those of the principal, delegation may generate agency problems’’ (p. 62).  
In what is referred to as ‘agency loss’ in the literature, this cost is simply the “difference between what 
the principal wants and what the agent delivers’’ (Strom, Muller and Bergman 2006: 34). What is the 
principal to do in this case?  McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987) argue that the often-problematic 
relationship between the principal and the agent is essentially that of ‘’imperfect compliance’’. In 
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other words, like Strom et al (2006), they argue that the problem for the principal is how to induce 
compliance by the agent in order to balance the ‘’costs’’ and ‘’benefits’’ of delegation (p. 247). One 
possible mechanism of realizing bureaucratic compliance argued the authors is through the 
“administrative procedure statues”. This limits the range of policy actions an agency can take, for 
instance, the principal may design procedural guidelines that limit the informational advantage the 
agent enjoys over the principal. He may also “stack the deck’’ by enfranchising various interests such 
as the public, interest groups or courts in an agency decision making process (p. 244-255). Epstein and 
O’Halloran (2006) however add that politicians must allow for a certain level of agency loss ‘’since 
[they] have neither the time nor the expertise to micro-manage policy decisions, and by restricting 
flexibility, politicians limit the agency’s ability to adjust to changing circumstances’’ (p. 84).  
Control of the bureaucracy through administrative acts can either be done “ex ante” such as through 
“police patrol”, where the principal relies on traditional control instruments such as screening, 
selection, contract design, investigations and reviews to directly oversight the activities of the 
bureaucratic. Or could be done “ex post” or through “fire alarms” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) in 
which case the principal “enfranchises” third party such as interest groups, the public, courts, or a 
forum ‘’to monitor the decisions of the bureaucracy and ring the alarm in case of drift’’ (Damonte et 
al 2014: 3; Brandsma and Schillemans 2012). There is no agreement within the literature as to which 
of the control instruments is more effective, it is a matter of design or trade-off between the two. For 
example, while some scholars argue that the fire alarm strategy is less costly and more effective than 
police patrol because the principal can rely on others such as the courts, investigative agencies, NGOs 
or the public to report on agency violations (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Others argue that ex post 
control instruments may not necessarily be better than ex-ante instruments, especially if we consider 
that when fire alarms detect policy drift, the costs of quelling the fire is so huge that the principal is 
better off if he had put in place mechanisms that prevents the fire from starting in the first instance 
(McNollgast 1987 cited in Wiseman and Wright 2015).  
Accountability in Principal-Agent Relationship 
Similarly, accountability is also central to understanding the outcomes of a delegated mandate. 
Accountability and discretion can be likened to two sides of a coin. In that ‘’delegation involves 
endowing another party with the discretion to act…and accountability is meant to ensure that the 
exercise of discretion is checked’’ (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012). Accountability is conceptualized 
and modelled in diverse ways within the social sciences. For instance, some perspectives focus on the 
individual as primary unit of analysis, while others especially in the administrative and policy sciences 
mostly focus on institutional or systemic accountability such as the provision or regulation of public 
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goods by the government. From a broader perspective two major approaches can be discerned in the 
literature; one approach conceptualised accountability in normative terms - that is accountability as a 
“virtue’’, which implies focusing on accountability as an outcome of interest (dependent variable) such 
as how individuals ought to conduct themselves. The second approach sees accountability as a 
‘’mechanism’’ or as a casual factor on the outcome (dependent variable) – this approach places 
emphasis not so much on the normative content of accountability, but on whether individuals were 
held to account following their action is what makes a difference in the outcome of interest. This latter 
approach (which is the focus of this project) suggests that although agencies may be allowed some 
form of discretionary powers in policy implementation, they may also be required to provide an 
explanation to a ‘’forum’’ usually in form of superior(s) or a third party for actions taken in respect of 
a domain assigned to them (Bovens et al 2014: 6).  
Similarly, Lupia (2003) argues that the term accountability has also found usage as a measure of 
‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ in public sector governance, accountability in this regard is 
conceptualised as a ‘’process of control’’ where the agent is said to be accountable in so far as the 
principal can influence his ‘’actions”, this argues Lupia happens when the principal can sanction the 
agent behaviour (such as contract termination) due to incompetence or incapacity to achieve a stated 
goal. Thus, he defined accountability as: 
An agent is accountable to a principal if the principal can exercise control over the agent and 
delegation is not accountable if the principal is unable to exercise control. If a principal in 
situation A exerts more control than a principal in situation B, then accountability is greater in 
situation A than it is in situation B (p.35) 
Both perspectives offered by Bovens et al and Lupia are somewhat similar. Therefore, drawing on both 
perspectives, this project views accountability in delegation from a ‘’control’’ perspective. Lindberg 
(2013) conceptualised the relationship between delegation and accountability as a simple set of 
assumptions that condition the interactions between the principal and the agent:  
an agent or institution who is to give an account (A for agent), An area, responsibilities, or 
domain subject to accountability (D for domain); An agent or institution to whom A is to give 
account (P for principal); The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions 
regarding D; and the right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform or explain/justify decisions 
regarding D (p. 8). 
Aside from identifying ‘’who’’ is accountable (accountee) and ‘’to whom’’ is he accountable to 
(accountor or forum), Bovens et al (2014) further added three (3) dimensions; first, the ‘’what’’ of 
accountability, that is the nature of what is to be accounted for such as policy decision or compliance, 
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secondly, the ‘’standards’’ such as rules and regulations by which to judge an actors actions and finally 
‘’why’’ which explains the nature of the relationship between the  ‘’actor’’ and the ‘’forum’’ such as 
‘’mandatory accountability’’ found in most formal institutions or ‘’voluntary accountability’’ where 
there is no formal obligation to be accountable to action and ‘’quasi voluntary accountability’’ which 
lies somewhere between the two extremes. Furthermore, they argue that for accountability to qualify 
as an account rendering mechanism, it must contain at least 3 elements; (1) obligations on the actor 
to ‘’inform’’ the forum by justifying and explaining on procedures followed, tasks performed or results 
of a given policy implemented, (2)‘’answerability’’ the ability of the forum to ‘’question’’ on whether 
the actor’s action (or explanation) is adequate or legitimate and (3) by sanctioning or rewarding him, 
in which the forum ‘’judge’’ the actor’s action as satisfactory through offering commendation and or 
rewards or undesirable by denouncement and sanctioning his behaviour (P. 9-12) 
In short, the whole essence of institutional design of delegation argues Huber and Shipan (2006) is to 
devise the right kind of mechanism that addresses the ‘’twin problems of preference divergence and 
information asymmetry’’ between the policy makers and policy implementers. In other words, the 
task for decision makers is to find the optimal strategy that leads to the ‘’selection of the right type of 
agent and ensure that the agent exerts effort, utilizes expertise, and implements policy in keeping 
with political preferences of principals’’ (cited in Berry and Gersen 2010: 3).  
Policy Delegation to Autonomous Agencies  
Maggetti and Papadopoulos (2018) provide a refined view of the Principal Agent (PA) framework to 
understand delegation from politicians to autonomous agencies. Specifically, the authors argue that 
for the PA framework to be applied and properly understood in the context of autonomous agencies 
such as Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRA), there is need for refining some of the original 
postulations of the PA framework. They argue that evidence suggests that some of the practices of 
the IRAs tends to deviate from the normal expectations or assumptions of the PA framework. For 
example, the complexities of delegation may lead to other factors other those of the principal(s) that 
may “structure” the behaviours of regulators. And that as time goes on these independent agencies 
can acquire enormous political powers that may eventually “subvert the logic of delegation”. 
However, the authors suggest that this should not be misconstrued as “anomalies” of delegation, but 
a result of “systemic features” arising from post delegation relations between principals and their 
agents (p. 173). 
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Agency Autonomy and Control in Policy Implementation 
The era of the New Public Management (NPM) which began in the 1980s (Bach et al 2012) ushered in 
what scholars in policy and administrative sciences referred to as “decentralisation” of the 
bureaucracy. In other words, large bureaucracies such as ministries were disaggregated into smaller 
“semi-autonomous” and “single purpose” entities independent of their parent bureaucratic 
organisations (Verschuere and Vancoppenolle 2012: 249). Decentralisation or disaggregation of 
bureaucracies according to Christensen and Lægreid (2007: 18) means that ‘‘authority and 
responsibility are delegated or transferred to lower levels, organisations or positions in the civil 
service’’ (cited in Verschuere and Vancoppenolle 2012: ibid). The idea behind this new kind of policy 
making arrangement is to ‘‘increase efficiency and effectiveness, enhance the autonomy of managers, 
place services closer to citizens, reduce political meddling and enable ministers to concentrate on the 
big policy issues’’ (Pollitt et al. 2005: 3 cited ibid). From a rational perspective for instance, Taliercio 
(2004) argues that the establishment of agencies may enhance efficiency such as raising the revenue 
generating capacity of developing countries (cited in Pollitt et al 2005). As Verschuere and Bach (2012) 
puts it “the main reform elements were hiving off executive organizations from ministerial 
bureaucracies (headed by a politically accountable minister), granting extended levels of managerial 
freedom, and introducing some kind of performance management” (p. 184). Thus, began a 
proliferation of autonomous or independent organizations commonly referred to as “agencification” 
in the literature – where tasks traditionally handled by government departments are now increasingly 
being transferred to agencies (Pollitt et al 2005; see also Verhoest et al. 2012; Pollitt and Talbot 2004). 
In the NPM literature, these decentralized or disaggregated governmental ‘executive’ organisations 
have been given different names and meanings such as autonomous agencies, semi-autonomous 
agencies, Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs), or Quasi Non-Governmental Organisations 
(Quangos) (see Majone 1997; Maggetti 2009; Bach et al. 2012; Maggetti and Papadopoulos 2018). 
However, within the context of this research study, like Bach and his colleagues we simply refer to 
these governmental executive organizations as ‘agencies’, where Pollitt et al (2004: 10) defines them 
as “structurally separated from the government offices but ‘‘close enough to permit 
ministers/secretaries of state to alter the budgets and main operational goals of the organization’’” 
(cited in Bach et al 2012: 184). As Thynne (2004: 96) puts it, agencies are ‘‘executive bodies, as well as 
those statutory bodies which are not incorporated and do not have responsibilities that rightly 
distance them from ministerial oversight and direction…They are all public law, non-ministerial 
organisations which relate to ministers or the government as agents to a principal’’ (cited ibid). 
Similarly, Majone (1997) refers to them as “quasi-independent” governmental bodies and defines 
25 
 
them as “specialized agencies that are independent of the central administration and not bound by 
civil service rules. Often such agencies combine legislative, judicial, and executive powers in more or 
less narrowly defined areas of policy making” (p. 140). Lægreid and Verhoest (2010) argues that to 
make an agency more autonomous involves “shifting decision-making competency from external 
actors to the agency itself by delegation, devolution, or decentralization” (p. 4). 
Bach et al (ibid) argued that agencies are primarily engaged in “some form of policy implementation, 
such as service delivery, regulation or exercising different kinds of public authority (see also Pollitt et 
al., 2004; Van Thiel, 2012; Thynne, 2004). These activities range from carrying out inspections, issuing 
licenses, paying benefits, carrying out scientific research and development programmes, regulating 
public utilities, maintaining public infrastructure, developing and operating databases, adjudicating on 
applications, to administering museums, protecting the environment, offering information services, 
running prisons, collecting taxes and many other functions (Pollitt et al 2005). Bach et al (ibid) argues 
that normally policies for these agencies are formulated at the “ministerial departments” which the 
authors refer to as the “parent ministries”. The ‘chief executives’ of these agencies are usually sourced 
from within the civil service, and are usually appointed by the government or the minister in charge 
of the relevant ministry. Although these agencies “operate at arm’s length from their political 
principals [i.e. ministries] and enjoy some degree of autonomy” in certain areas of their operations, 
but they have very little or no policy autonomy argued the authors.  
However, the parent ministries under the direction and control of the ministers are responsible for 
supervising the activities of these agencies (ibid). Here we define ‘control’ as the “constraints which 
ministers/departments can impose to influence the actual use of this decision-making competency, in 
order to influence the decisions made” Lægreid and Verhoest (2010: 4). As Dan (2017: 13) argues 
“regardless of the type of public sector organization, autonomy is never absolute in a democratic 
society”. According to him therefore, “a more realistic term is to describe agencies in terms degree of 
autonomy such as semi or partial autonomy just like the literature suggests”. For instance, when an 
agency is privatized, which is often seen as having a significantly higher autonomy than other forms 
of organizational reforms - its autonomy is not absolute since it operates within a certain regulatory 
framework established and monitored by governmental regulatory agencies (see also Chawla et al., 
1996; Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, and Lægreid, 2012). 
Bach (2012) argues that “policy autonomy” is a highly important dimension of ministry–agency 
relations because of its potential effect on the agency’s policy mandate” (p. 212). Although in the 
broadest sense, the concept of policy autonomy may refer to the “capacity to act independently from 
the control of other actors” (ibid). However, we are aware that ‘policy competences’ varies across 
roles and organisations, therefore like Bach et al, we focused on a narrow aspect of policy autonomy, 
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which the authors defined as the “degree of policy-making competency enjoyed by an agency in 
relation to its parent ministry” (p. 185; see also Verhoest et al 2004). Similarly, Pollitt et al (2005) 
defines agencies in terms of their degree of autonomy as “public organizations which have greater 
autonomy than the ‘normal’ divisions and directorates in the core of the ministry. This could be greater 
freedom with respect to finance, personnel, organization or any combination of these” (p. 9). The 
emphasis here argues Pollitt et al is the degree of “disaggregation or structural separation from the 
core of the ministry” and the degree of “autonomy or discretion or freedom in the use of finance or 
personnel or organization” are both defining features of agencies (ibid). Lægreid and Verhoest (2010) 
further distinguished between “managerial autonomy” which involves the “choice and use of 
financial, human, and other resources” and “policy autonomy” which involves the “objectives, target 
groups, policy instruments, quality and quantity of outputs, processes and procedures, issuing of 
general regulations, or decisions in individual cases”, carried out at the strategic or operational levels 
(p. 4). Figure 1 below depicts the how agencies differ from ministries and other fully autonomous 
government bodies.  
Figure 1 degree of disaggregation and autonomy  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Pollitt et al 2005 
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(2011) see agency autonomy from an “instrumental” perspective, in which he suggests that its 
emergence and thus the degree of its independence depends on the “conflict between different actors 
involved in the process of [its] creation, who may have differing preferences” (p. 38). Valdes measured 
agency autonomy vis-a-vis its oversight ministry from two dimensions; the “legal status” of the agency, 
which he depicts as a continuum of formal legal rights (ibid). Table 1 below shows this continuum of 
formal legal status of the agency. 
 Table 1 Degree of formal-legal autonomy  
 
 
Source: Valdes 2011: 39 
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can be achieved by influencing the agencies’ decisions through hierarchical and accountability lines 
through the agency head (chief executive or minister) or the supervisory board (2) financial control 
which is achieved by changing the level of budget granted to the agency, the composition of its 
income, and the level of risk-turnover to influence agency decisions (3) control achieved by making 
the agency compete with other organizations; (4) control achieved by creating cooperation networks 
of which the agency is part of (p. 5). Coordination especially in ‘inter-organizational context’ is another 
important concept in the governance of the public sector. Lægreid and Verhoest defines coordination 
as the “purposeful alignment of tasks and efforts of units in order to achieve a defined goal” (ibid). Its 
aim according to the authors, is to “create greater coherence in policy and to reduce redundancy, 
lacunae, and contradictions within and between policies (Peters 1998 cited ibid). They suggest that 
Inter-organizational coordination can be “vertical” or “horizontal” and is usually achieved by means 
of “hierarchical mechanisms, market incentives, contracts, network-like bargaining mechanisms and 
multi-level governance approaches” (Thompson et al. 1991; Peters 1998; Bouckaert et al. 2010 cited 
ibid). However, as the activities that governmental organizations handle becomes more complex 
problems of coordination grow because of information asymmetry. For instance, relevant 
organizations that are supposed to coordinate to solve problems may not know about what their other 
counterparts are doing. So also are the individuals involved, they may not or care very little about the 
actions of their counterparts elsewhere (Bouckaert et al 2010: 14). 
In summary, this new kind of management system or agencification came with its own problems. For 
instance, Lægreid and Verhoest argued that the proliferation of agencies which in most cases lacks 
proper “coordination mechanisms”, was perceived to have resulted in the fragmentation of 
government around the world (p.3, see also OECD 2002a; Verhoest et al. 2007b; Bouckaert et al. 
2010). Furthermore, Majone (2010) suggest that instead of focusing on “why” agencies are created in 
the first place, we should focus on the “consequences” arising from delegating authority to agencies 
(p. 196). For example, there is a growing body of literature on the “unintended” consequences of 
agencification, which shows the “unintentional effects, the delays, and the frequent implementation 
problems occurring in public sector reforms” (ibid, see also McGowan and Wallace 1996; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004). Therefore, a relevant question to ask is whether autonomous or independent 
agencies especially those dealing with regulation “can really deliver what they promise, in terms of 
credibility and efficiency, through a systematic comparative empirical perspective” (ibid). This, argues 
Majone is because powers are delegated to these agencies for “credibility” and “efficiency” reasons. 
For instance, in terms of credibility, agencies are perceived (by stakeholders) to be more consistent 
than politicians when it comes to delivering policies (such as services) in a timely manner because the 
latter are often seen as slow in decision making. On “efficiency” grounds they are perceived to be 
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“faster and more proficient than democratic institutions in producing policy outputs [that favours] the 
‘public interest, and thereby help in reducing “decision-making costs” (p. 199). 
Policy Implementation Research: Old to New 
The field of implementation research is roughly divided into three (3) generations: the early (often 
generally referred to as the “pioneers, with a research tradition that usually focuses on ‘exploratory’ 
case studies. The second-generation studies often referred to as the “top-down” and “bottom-up” 
perspectives to policy implementation, where the bottom uppers view policy implementation as 
flowing from a hierarchical authority and the bottom uppers who see policy implementation as a 
diffused or network centric endeavour. And finally, the third-generation theories which basically 
synthesizes the earlier approaches and employ more sophisticated techniques such as comparative 
and statistically oriented research designs to systematically analyse policy implementation (Winter 
2012). 
First-Generation Theories of Policy Implementation 
Beginning in the 1990s with the seminal work by Pressman and Wildasky (1973), researchers on policy 
implementation in this period mainly focused on understanding some common policy problems such 
as ‘barriers’ and ‘failures’ associated with policy implementation (ibid: 266). For instance, Pressman 
and Wildavsky in their famous book ‘How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed’, which is a 
case study on the implementation of a federal program to reduce unemployment among ethnic 
minorities in the United States called the Oakland Project - noted that the complex nature of the 
program due to its many implementing structures constituted a barrier to its implementation. For 
example, the presence of several actors such as the federal, regional, state, local governments, the 
courts, affected interests’ groups, private firms and the media not only “amplified” the problems, but 
also created many “decisions” and “veto” points that further complicated the program. In Winter’s 
words: 
Pressman and Wildavsky convincingly showed that merely slightly different perspectives, 
priorities and time horizons among multiple actors with different missions in repeated and 
sequential decisions could cause delays, distortions and even failures in policy implementation 
(ibid.266). 
Pressman and Wildavsky note further that implementation failures not only results from ‘bad’ 
implementation but also from the choice of ‘policy instruments’. Again using the implementation of 
Oakland project, the authors show that despite policy makers optimisms of having put in place all 
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recipes for a successful implementation of a policy, the choice of implementation strategies or 
modalities could still jeopardize such a policy. For example, in the Oakland project the authors argue 
that failure of the project’s implementation could have been mitigated or minimized had its designers 
chosen an “ex-post instruments” such as tying public expenditure spending to the actual number of 
minority workers employed instead of using “ex ante” instruments which relies on pre-negotiations 
with those affected and authorities involved in the implementation (ibid). 
The first-generation theories were according to Winter mostly “explorative” and “inductive” case 
studies aimed at generating middle theories, these theories focus on very few variables such as the 
“number of actors” and “decisions points” and ties them with the “validity of the causal theory”. 
Among these first-generation theories, one of the most important contributions is the work of Eugene 
Bardach (1977) titled “The Implementation Game”. Bardach’s work views policy implementation from 
a game theoretic perspective in which ‘conflict’ takes a central place in policy implementation. In other 
words, Bardach argued that when policies are implemented, actors play different kinds of games as 
they “pursue their own interests” (ibid). Other important contributions to the first-generation theories 
are the works of Hargrove (1975) who coined the “missing link paradigm” in policy implementation, 
as well as a host of other contributions such as Williams and Elmore (1976) (ibid). 
Second Generation Theories: Top Down and Bottom Up Theories  
The second-generation theories began in the early 1980s with the seminal work of Sabatier and 
Mazamian (1981; 1986). The Sabatier and Mazamian framework focuses on three (3) key aspects of 
implementation: (a) the tractability of the policy problems addressed by legislation (b) the social 
problems addressed by the legislations and (c) the ability of the legislations to structure the 
implementation process. Together these three key aspects of policy are further decomposed into 17 
variables (Winter 2012: 267). The top-top down approach to studying policy implementation usually 
focused on a specific policy decision such as a law, and thus view policy implementation from a 
“control” perspective. This perspective on policy implementation argues that the objectives of a 
“legislation” are best achieved when conflicts arising from the number of “decision” or “veto” points 
are “minimized” from “above”. Therefore, a “structured” hierarchy of “authority” is usually 
established to drive implementation (ibid). 
However, this view of implementation has been criticized especially the bottom uppers as “naive” and 
“unrealistic” due to its over reliance on the ability of the “proponents” of a policy to solely determine 
how it is implemented, and thereby ignoring the ability of its “opponents” that also interfere to 
structure the process (Moe 1989 cited ibid). The top-down approach has also been criticized as 
ignorant of the crucial role played by “front line staff” or “field workers” as they carry out policy 
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instructions, such as with regards to when they deliver social services, income transfers or enforcing 
the law to citizens or firms (ibid). For example, the theory of “street-level bureaucracy” advanced by 
Lipsky (1980) focused on the “discretionary” decision making that is common among street-level 
bureaucrats when delivering policies to citizens. And that it is the ‘discretion’ enjoyed by bureaucrats 
that makes them important actors in influencing the course of policy implementation. Winter suggests 
that Lipsky turned the policy process “upside-down” by claiming that the street level bureaucrats are 
the real policy makers. As Winter puts it: 
Although trying to do their best, street level bureaucrats experience a gap between the demands 
made on them by legislative mandates, managers and citizens on the one hand, and their limited 
resources on the other. In this situation, they apply a number of coping mechanisms that 
systematically distort their work in relation to the intentions of the legislation. They could for 
example, ration services or prioritize tasks or clients… As time goes by, street level bureaucrats 
develop more cynical perceptions of clients and modify the policy objectives (p. 267-268) 
The bottom-up model approaches policy problem from a network centric perspective by identifying a 
constellation of actors around a policy problem and then maps out the relationship between these 
actors. For example, Hull and Hjern (1987), utilized a combination of “snowball” and “socio metric” 
methods, to study the role of local networks in influencing policy implementation. Using this 
technique, the authors begin with the identification of the actors closest to the policy problem at hand 
and then gradually identify more and more actors that interact with the first set of actors that were 
initially identified. In the process, it enabled them map out both formal and informal network of 
implementing actors around the policy problem. Similarly, the “Backward Mapping Strategy” model 
developed Richard Elmore (1982) was also central to the development of the bottom-up approach to 
implementation. Though the model is often seen as more of a ‘prescriptive’ rather than a contribution 
to theory development (ibid). 
Especially those following the tradition of Hull and Hjern (1987), the bottom up scholars focus their 
analysis on “actors” and “activities” starting from the bottom to the top. In what they referred to as 
an “inductive” approach to matching “outcomes” of politics and the” intention” of politics. Thus, the 
bottom up scholars following the footsteps of Hull and Hjern conduct “systematic analysis” where 
relevant stakeholders from the bottom to top are interviewed to elicit their opinions on the ‘purposes’ 
of relevant laws and their ‘achievements’, as well as their evaluation of where things went wrong or 
how different policies contributed in solving a given policy problem. Hull and Hjern further suggest 
mapping of ‘activities’ and implementation ‘structures’, although it is argued that this research 
strategy requires enormous resources to conduct (ibid). 
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Third Generation Theories: The Synthesizers  
The debates on the various approaches to policy implementation has never really settled with each 
approach tending to “ignore the portion of reality explained by the other”. It is why for instance, 
Elmore (1985) later suggests combining the “forward mapping” or top-down with the “backward 
mapping” or bottom-up perspectives since each offer “valuable” insights into policy making. For 
example, policy makers need to consider both the “policy instruments” and the “resources” at their 
disposal as well as a consideration of the “structure” of the incentives facing target groups and staff 
working in the field who can tip the balance of these incentives (ibid: 269). 
Other scholars tried to resolve these arguments through specifying the conditions under which one 
approach might be more relevant than the other on specific policy problems. For instance, Sabatier 
(1986) argues that the top down perspective is more suitable in policy areas with specific legislation 
or in situations that the policy problem is at least moderately structured. While the bottom up 
approach will be more relevant to situations where different policies are aimed at addressing a 
particular policy problem or where one is interested in understanding the dynamics of different local 
contexts (ibid). Further attempts aimed at synthesizing or unifying the previous theories of 
implementation includes that of Matland (1995) who argues that the “relative value” of the models 
especially the bottom-up and top-down perspectives depends on the degree of “ambiguity” and 
“conflict” in goals as well as means of achieving those goals. Matland for example argues that the top-
down model is more appropriate when the policy is “clear” and conflict is “low”, it is also (the top-
down) relevant when conflict is “high” and “ambiguity” is low such as in the case of the Sabatier-
Mazamanian framework. This as suggested by Matland makes the “structuring” of the policy 
implementation the more important (ibid). In the case of the bottom-up approach, a more accurate 
account of the implementation process according to Matland is when the policy is “ambiguous” and 
the conflict is “low”. Matland concludes that when both ‘conflict’ and ‘ambiguity’ are present i.e. high-
high or low-low, then both approaches apply (ibid). 
Sabatier (1986) also attempt to synthesize the literature by developing the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF). The ACF starts with a mapping of all actors (both public and private) actors involved 
with a policy problem at hand which also includes their concerns (both proponents and opponents). 
The framework then combines this starting point with top-downers focus on how socio-economic 
conditions and legal instruments constrain implementers behavior (ibid). Sabatier conceptualizes 
policy change as governmental action such as a legislation in form of a program through which its 
operation produces policy outputs (usually over a long-term period) that results in various impacts.  
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Winter (1990) and Winter and Nielsen (2008), in what they referred to as the “integrated 
implementation model” also made valuable contributions towards the further development of the 
implementation literature. The idea of their model was to bring together the most “fruitful” elements 
of the various strands of the implementation research into a unified framework. These elements 
include policy formulation, policy design, inter organizational relations, management, street level 
bureaucracy, will and capacity, target group behavior, socio-economic conditions and feedback 
mechanism as factors in explaining implementation outputs and outcomes. The first and second 
generation theories were also criticized as mostly focused on single case studies and often suffered 
from the problem of “too few cases and too many variables” or “over determination”. This is a 
situation where a few variables (usually one or two) explains all the variations in the outcome variable. 
Therefore, a call was made for more sophisticated and systematic approaches that test theories based 
on comparative case studies and statistical research designs. It has also been suggested researchers 
should focus on the ‘processes’ rather than on the ‘outputs’ or ‘outcomes’ of policy implementation 
(ibid:270; see also Goggin 1986; Lester and Goggin 1998). 
Understanding the Complexities in Policy Implementation 
A key tenet in policy studies maintains that the quality of policy performance depends on 
policymakers’ decisions (Lasswell 1951). A later literature emphasizes how these key decisions are 
often diffused along the whole policy-making cycle (Weiss 1982), and the special power of those 
policymakers who operate in the administrative domain closer to the intended recipients (Elmore 
1979, van Meter and van Horn 1975, Hjern and Porter 1981). The administrative domain indeed is 
where regulations, expenditure, taxation, information are set and put into action, thus actually 
determining “who gets what, when, and how” (Salamon 2002). For example, Lipsky (1980) argues that 
the actions of bureaucrats most often than not diverge from the stated policies (or intentions) of those 
(principals) who design such policies (cited May 2007). Recent studies have begun to recognise the 
complexities involve in policy implementation which goes beyond simply seeing implementation as 
just following laid down policy instructions. As May (2015) puts it: 
implementation is [the] recognition that governing entails far more than enacting policies and 
watching the chips fall as they may. Much rests after policy enactment on how policymakers and 
others advance the ideas that are central to a given policy approach, how institutional 
arrangements reinforce policy cohesion, and whether the approach engenders support or 
opposition among concerned interests (p. 280) 
For the purpose of this research project, we define policy implementation from a federal system of 
governance perspective, where a implementation is viewed as a “series of subnational decisions and 
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actions directed toward putting a prior authoritative federal decision into practice” (Lester and Goggin 
1998 cited in Winter 2012: 272). With this conceptualisation in mind, Lester and Goggin warned 
against conceptualising policy implementation in terms of ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’ or dichotomising 
implementation into ‘success’ or ‘failure’. Here implementation outputs is defined in terms of “policy 
content at a much more operational level than a law - it is a policy as is being delivered to the citizens” 
and he defines implementation outcome as the “consequences of implementation outputs or delivery 
behaviours” (ibid). 
Although Winter agree with Lester and Goggin that defining policy implementation in terms of 
success-failure may be problematic, he however suggest that attention should be focused on 
“processes” leading to the outputs (i.e. delivery behaviours of implementers) and outcomes (such as 
change in behaviour or conditions of target populations). According to Winter, in so doing researchers 
will align themselves with the classical traditions of public policy research where policies are casted in 
terms of their “content”, their “causes” as well as their “consequences” (ibid, see also Dye 1976). 
Winter argues that a common practice among policy researchers is conceptualising the outcome (or 
dependent variable) in terms of the “degree of goal achievement” and that this often pose problems 
in theory building. For example, the policy formulation process may likely account for variations in 
policy goals and the implementation process is likely to be explained by the variations in delivery 
behaviours (ibid). As he puts it: 
Any attempt to make generalisations about goal achievement based on analysis of the 
behaviour or outcome of the implementation is dependent on the goal variable having a certain 
value. The generalisation may become invalid if policy goals changes. Therefore, generalisations 
about policy outputs are extremely relativistic because statements are conditioned by the goals 
that are formulated (ibid) 
This according to Winter poses a serious problem especially if we consider that most policy makers 
are often more interested in making decisions on the “means” or “instruments” than on “goals”. goals 
argued Winter are often “invented” after the decisions on means have already been made to 
legitimize the means that were adopted and that “goals are not always expected or even intended to 
be achieved” (ibid). Winter further argues that using goal achievement as the outcome variable is 
difficult to operationalize because the concept of “goals” is vague and ambiguous and so is the 
difference between “official” and “latent” goals. For instance, he argues that while most policy 
legislations or statements comes with certain kind of goals to be achieved, many such policies often 
fail to specify these goals or standards of conduct for expected of the behaviour of the implementers. 
He cited the example of the Danish Agro environmental regulation where the goal was to generally 
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reduce the nitrate pollution of the aquatic environment to a certain level. While the regulation gave 
specific rules on how aquatic farmers should behave, it only required the implementers to inspect for 
compliance purposes. In this case, it is hard to measure the success of the policy since it must rely on 
implementation outputs such as changes in farmers’ behaviour as a measure of success and thus 
ignoring other factors than outputs that may affect policy outcomes or effects (p.273 see also Rossi 
and Freeman 1989). 
Winter noted that scholars of implementation research especially political scientists have for too long 
paid little attention to explaining policy implementation in terms of variations in outcomes. In his 
words, “Implementation studies can play an important role in seeking to explain these variations by 
various implementation factors such as the role of policy and organizational design” (p. 273 see also 
Hill 2006; Beer et al 2008; Winter et al 2008a). Though he also noted that new developments in the 
field of implementation research beginning from the 1990s especially those scholars studying law and 
society or regulation have examined some important aspects of implementation such as explaining 
variation in compliance (see Tyler 2006), firms (Parker and Nielsen 2012) and enforcement (Winter 
and May 2001; 2002; 2012), organizational performance (Boyne 2003; Meier and O’Toole 2007), 
interorganizational collaboration (Meier and O’Toole 2003, Lundin 2007, May and Winter 2007), 
Management behaviours and attitudes and capacity of street level bureaucrats (Riccuci 2005; Winter 
et al 2008b; May and Winter 2009; Schram et al 2009). 
In all these different perspectives and arguments, the problem argued Winter is on how to 
“conceptualise and categorise the behaviour of implementers at different or generational levels”. For 
example, one way of doing this according to winter is to assess the variations in the extent to which 
legislations (or statutes) that sets goals and/or standards for implementation practices have been met 
(p.274). Another way is to use “behavioural” concepts such as the role of street level bureaucrats in 
influencing the outcomes or outputs of policy (ibid, see also Lipsky 1980; Meier and O’Toole 2007; 
Winter 2002). Yet another way argued Winter, is to use a set of concepts that apply to very broad 
areas of policies. For instance, May and Winter (1999; 2000;2001; 2012) developed some concepts on 
regulatory enforcement at both the agency as well as the street bureaucrats’ levels. They 
conceptualized these agency enforcement concepts as (a) Tools: which is the use of different 
enforcement measures such as sanctions, information and assistance and incentives (b) Priorities: 
which specifies whom to target and what to inspect for (c) Effort: which leverages on enforcement 
resources (ibid). The principal agent theory has also been extensively used by scholars to study 
“control problems” especially bothering on “information asymmetries” that often exists between 
political leaderships (principals) or designers of the mandate and the implementers of the mandate 
(agents or agencies) (ibid, see also Brehm and Gates 1997; Winter 2003; Winter et al 2008b).  
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Policy Design and Implementation 
May (2012) argues that public policies “set forth courses of action for addressing problems or for 
providing public goods and services to segments of society” (p. 279). Policies, suggest May, comes in 
different forms such as through legislations, executive orders or other official acts. May defines policy 
design as: 
a means of attaining or accomplishing a public policy goal contains a set of “intentions or goals”, 
a mix of “instruments” or “means” for accomplishing the intentions, a designation of 
governmental and/or non-governmental entities charged with carrying out the intentions, and 
an allocation of resources for the requisite task (ibid). 
These deliberate “choices” made about the relevant policy instruments, the entities that carry out this 
task, the resources available to them as well as the kind of action(s) that are to be taken establishes 
the “blueprint” for policy implementation. And that the “path” taken is further signalled by the 
“labelling” of the policy, the “language” of communication employed to advance the policy goals and 
the choice of “monitoring” mechanism used by politicians after the policy has been enacted. Because 
of these actions taken, the link between politics and policy making spills into the arena of policy 
implementation (ibid, see also Bardach 1977; Nakamura and Smallwood 1980; Brodkin 1990).  
This politics-policy nexus argues May, continue to puzzle both policy and public administration 
scholars in trying to understand “how the implementation of a policy is shaped by both the design of 
the policy and the forces that influence the way the policy is carried out” (ibid). Apart from the general 
understanding of how policies work, very little is known about what constitutes a well-designed policy. 
For example, within the literature, while one school of thought focuses on the “assumptions” and 
“values” behind policy designs to understand how policy implementation unfolds (Bobrow and Dryzek 
1987; Ingraham 1987; Linder and Peters 1984 cited ibid). Another set of scholars “catalogues” policy 
instruments which together constitutes elements of policies (Hood 1983; McDonnell and Elmore 1987; 
Salamon 1989; 2002; Schneider and Ingram 1990 cited ibid). Yet, a third set of scholarship looks at the 
way politics drives policy implementation and send “signals” about the desired courses of action 
(Elmore 1987; Goggin et al 1990; Smith and Ingram 2002 cited ibid). Still yet a fourth group of scholars 
considers how choices about policy targets and instruments shape the reactions to policies and 
eventually how durable they become (Patanashik 2008; Schnieder and Ingram 1997).  
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How Policy Design Influences Policy Implementation 
To craft policies entails a long process of analysing the policy problem at hand, looking at different 
options available as well as the authoritative decisions taken to enact it (May 2012). Dryzek (1983: 
346) defines policy design as the “the process of inventing, developing and fine tuning a course of 
action with the amelioration of some problem in mind” (ibid: 280). May argues that the from a design 
point of view the contents of a given policy are matched to the political environment from which the 
said policy is formulated and implemented (see also Linder and Peters 1984; 1989; May 1991; 
Schneider and Ingram 1997). Although it is a widely-shared view among policy implementation 
scholars that policies “signal desired courses of action and structure implementation”, but what 
remains contentious argued May are the ways in which different designs of policies may “hinder” or 
“facilitate” implementation (p. 280). For instance, several implementation studies found that most 
implementation problems arose from a lack of or inadequate specification of the desired course of 
actions as well as a failure to include features capable of overcoming conflicts that may arise among 
those tasked with implementation. Similarly, other studies within this tradition further suggest that 
policy implementation may further be limited by the presence of “unclear” and “inconsistent” goals, 
‘complex implementation structures’ such as multitude of actors, decision points and levels of actions 
and other non-statutory factors like intractability of the policy problem and an unsupportive political 
environment (ibid). 
May argues that while some scholars within the policy implementation research calls for a “statutory 
coherence” in terms of clarity of goals and simple implementation structures (see Sabatier and 
Mazmanian 1981; 1983). He however noted that this line of thinking fails to consider the realities of 
the political environment which calls for policies with “multiple goals, vague language and complex 
implementation structures”. For instance, most preambles contained in many statutes are often found 
to be very vague such that they provide little or no guidance on actions to be taken. In addition, policy 
goals can be framed “broadly” or “narrowly”, they could be “opaque” or “symbolic” or even 
“hortatory” (Schneider and Ingram 1997 cited ibid). This according to May gives room for diverse 
groups to renegotiate goals during implementation. These renegotiations could take the form of 
“trimming”, “distorting”, “preventing” or even “adding” to the initial policy to an extent that the said 
policy becomes “unsupportable” or a “political burden” (Bardach 1977: 85 cited ibid). 
To ameliorate these problems of policy ambiguity and complexities, other scholars within the 
implementation literature suggests three (3) sets of policy provisions. One set deals with those 
provisions that sought to build the ‘capacity’ of those tasked with policy implementation. These 
capacity building ‘instruments’ include funding, education, training and technical assistance. Another 
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set are those policy provisions that induces commitment to the basic goals of the policy among policy 
implementers, this commitment building instruments include publicizing the policy goals, 
enfranchising citizens to complain or report against poor implementation, sanctions against 
insubordination, cost sharing and incentives. And a final set of policy provisions that aid in signaling 
desired courses of action, which includes oversight mechanisms, and informing about best practices. 
Together these mechanisms constitute what Howlett (2000) referred to as “procedural” policy 
instruments aimed at policy implementers, rather than “substantive” instruments aimed at targets of 
policy (ibid: 281). However, May suggest that putting the above provisions in place does not guarantee 
a successful policy implementation since many policies are often characterized by “overlapping 
structures of authority and responsibilities”. Therefore, “shared governance is the norm rather than 
the exception”. Moreover, these challenges could be compounded by the well-known problems of 
implementation such as poor incentives structures, incapacity and mistrust that impedes 
implementation (Mcdermott 2006: 45 cited ibid). 
How the Political Environment Affects Policy Design And Implementation 
The political environment is crucial in understanding the design, implementation and outcome(s) of 
policies (May 2012). In depicting how different political environments impact on policy 
implementation May draws on an earlier work of his (May 1991), in which he suggests that it is 
important to conceptualize policy design and implementation as a continuum of two extremes of the 
political environment. He labels one extreme as “policies with publics” and the other as “polices 
without publics”. In so doing, he argues, it allows for understanding the differences in policy 
implementation as a matter of “degree” rather than on the presence or absence of relevant publics 
and related policy subsystems. For example, in ‘policies with publics’ May argues that there are “well-
developed” coalitions of interest groups surrounding a particular issue, while in the case of ‘policies 
without publics’ the development of interest groups is “limited”, and it is usually restricted to 
technocrats and scientific communities. The absence of ‘publics’ in the latter in policy making is to 
ensure a “greater degree of autonomy” in implementation, so that target groups do not influence the 
course of implementation (p. 283). 
May argues that rather than seeing policy design from a “technocratic” point of view, such as looking 
for the “best” design to address a policy problem. It is more fruitful to see policy design from a political 
perspective. According to May the political view sees policy design as an “art” of directing the energies 
of different implementers with the aim of fostering ‘agreement’ to work together towards achieving 
a ‘similar’ goal and to ‘mobilize’ constituencies in support of this goal. The latter according to May is 
very important in ensuring the “durability” of policies (ibid). For instance, recent researchers in the 
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field of implementation have begun to consider how ‘interests’ as well as the broader political 
environment affects the ‘durability’ of policy reforms’ (see Patashnik 2008 cited ibid) and of policy 
regimes (Jochim and May 2010 cited ibid). As May puts it: 
The process of policy design and implementation is not simply one of assembling parts and 
plugging in implementation machinery. The compromises that are necessary to gain support for 
a given policy explain why policy designs and implementation are often messy. Recognising 
these facts, however, does not negate the value of considering how choices made when 
designing policies potentially shapes implementation (p. 286) 
This is because policies take different forms as they respond and adapt to the demands from the forces 
that shapes their implementation. These forces include those interests that have been mobilized to 
strongly support the policy and its implementation on the one hand, and those interests that seek to 
undermine the implementation of the said policy on the other hand. Which of these forces prevails 
depends on their “relative political power, their perceptions of benefits and burdens, and their 
resources” (p. 285). May therefore argues that how durable a policy becomes partly depends on the 
“degree to which a constituency is mobilized in support of the policy while limiting opposition” (ibid). 
He cited the reduction of pollution policy during the 1970s in the U.S. as an example of a strong 
implementation regime based on the strength of its pro environmental groups as well as the 
determination of the Environmental Protection Agency’s to enforce the policy. As he puts it “the 
powerful forces behind this regime and their ties to political power, provided a basis at least initially 
for warding off opposition during implementation”.  
However, May further argues that as these forces “weaken” or get “altered”, the durability of the 
regime behind the policy becomes “undermined” or “destabilized”. For example, within the broader 
political environment new developments might be going on such as political realignments, or 
configuration of interests’ groups may change that now have privileged access to political power. This 
was indeed the case with the pollution reduction policy where the emergence of a new coalition of 
pro-business interests found support during the Reagan administration and thus tipped the balance 
of power in their favor and thereby gradually weakened the influence of the pro-environmental 
regime that was in place since the 1970s (ibid, see also Andrews 1999:238-261).  
How Policy Intentions Affects Implementation 
May (2012) posed the following question: how does a policy intention affect its implementation? For 
example, is the intention of a policy to prevent harmful behaviors by restricting individuals from 
causing harm to themselves or others? Is the intention about providing benefits to a section of the 
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society? Or is it about a call to action in order to solve a problem? Policy intentions according to May 
“establish the goals and type of policy that is to be put in place” and that intentions also “establish the 
contours of political debate that shape the eventual politics of policy adoption and implementation” 
(p. 286). The latter definition is important in understanding the “dual” relation between politics and 
policy. For example, in a seminal work on typologies of policies, Lowi (1964; 1972) argues that “politics 
affect the design of policies but also the choice of policy affects the associated politics”. To 
demonstrate this Lowi classified different politics based on ‘distributive’, ‘redistributive’, and 
‘regulatory’ policies and later added ‘constituent’ policies. Wilson (1973) further builds on Lowi’s 
framework by showing that perceptions on how the costs and benefits of a given policy are to be 
distributed poses different challenges to policy formulation and implementation. This can be seen for 
example in the different policy styles countries adopt that tend to reflect cross-national differences 
and approaches to policy implementation (ibid see also Greitens and Joaquin 2010). Beginning from 
the 70s and 80s scholars have since modified Lowi’s original typologies to have different mixes of 
policy types such as for instance regulatory policies that may also contain elements of redistribution 
in them. These developments in the field of policy sciences further help scholars in understanding 
policy differences across areas, organizations or even countries (Greitens and Joaquin 2010) 
May argues that instead of explicitly setting policy directions, ‘intentions’ “sets boundaries around 
choices of instruments and implementation structures” (ibid see also Howlett 2009). That is why for 
example, a conservative politician may favor tax breaks while a liberal politician may instead prefer 
subsidies. Therefore, May suggest that it is important that policy ‘instruments’ or ‘means’ are designed 
in such a way that they are “consistent” with the intent’ or ‘goals’, otherwise the two may be 
incongruent with each other. He also suggests that the political environment (target groups and the 
implementers) must be ‘supportive’ of the policy intention, otherwise they may sabotage 
implementation. This is where building features of ‘commitment’ into the policy becomes crucial 
argues May (ibid). He concludes therefore, that “well-designed policies are necessary but not 
sufficient for improving implementation prospects (p. 289).  
How Interorganizational Relations Affects Policy Implementation 
Implementation problems are “thorniest” at the organizational level. This is because policy 
implementation “almost always require organizations to carry the burden of transforming general 
policy intent into an array of rules, routines and social processes that convert policy intention into 
action. This process is the core of what is meant by implementation” (O’Toole 2012: 293). Institutional 
settings argue O’Toole vary to a considerable degree (see also Saetren 2005). For instance, 
implementation can be carried out through a single organization (see also Torenvlied 2000) or through 
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multitude of organizations or parts of organizations (see also Winter and Nielsen 2008; Oosterwaal 
and Torenvlied 2011). O’Toole argues that although implementing policies through multiple 
organizations may enhance capacity but may also create complexities such that “impediments to 
concerted action becomes greater ceteris paribus and inducements to work together are typically 
fewer” (ibid). 
In this case, to achieve a successful implementation according to O’Toole implies having to induce 
“cooperation” and “coordination” among interdependent actors facing adversity. He argues that 
typically ministries or government departments have incentives to concert their actions in mainly 
three (3) ways (a) Authority: actor B cooperates with actor A because B feels the obligation to do so 
(b) Common Interest: B cooperates with A because B feels that doing so towards the overall objectives 
would also serve B’s own purposes (c) Exchange: B cooperates with A because B receives something 
else from A or from elsewhere, that makes it worthwhile to go along. Furthermore, the use of “formal 
authority” in form of “hierarchical institutional arrangements”, affords administrators the ‘authority’ 
to coordinate actions, but they cannot rely completely rely on formal authority or hierarchy to induce 
cooperation argues O’Toole. They could also for example use other mechanisms of cooperation such 
as developing communication channels for a successful policy implementation (p. 296). 
O’Toole argues that it is not the sheer number of organizational units per say that impedes successful 
policy implementation “Pressman-Wildavsky paradox”as earlier espoused by Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1984) - referred to as the. But the nature (or structure) of the prevailing interdependence required 
of implementing entities such as the pattern of the relationship as well as how they are linked to each 
other. He characterized these patterns of interdependence among implementing organizations into 
three (3) major types; sequential, reciprocal and pooled interdependence. For example, in a sequential 
arrangement whenever there is a ‘delay’ or ‘Impediment’ along the chain, implementation problems 
would be experienced and in that in this kind of arrangement (sequential) adding more organizational 
units increases the chance of having more “road blocks” to actions. Conversely, in a ‘pooled’ 
arrangement, increasing more organizational units enhances the prospects of implementation 
actions. Therefore, depending on the policy objective, the structural features of the interdependence 
is a difference maker in the outcomes of implementations argues O’Toole (p. 297). 
Inducing Interorganizational Cooperation in Policy Implementation 
Recognizing interorganizational patterns of relationship is a crucial first step for an effective policy 
implementation. A further step argued O’Toole, in ensuring effective implementation is a deliberate 
effort by those tasked with managing implementation to promote interaction between “counterparts” 
from relevant organizations and other stakeholders both in and out of government to build support 
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base, to negotiate, coordinate and sometimes even fend off influences capable of disrupting 
implementation (p. 298). O’Toole notes that this is typically done through ‘common interest’ building 
mechanism. The idea is that if each of the relevant implementing organizations share similar purposes 
about a policy and that they individually view their participation as essential to the success of the 
policy, then this shared interest to see to that the policy succeeds may be sufficient to generate 
effective implementation. However, O’Toole even though all the relevant organizations may share 
similar interest in the success of the policy, they may be reluctant to commit themselves to the policy 
unless they know that others are doing so. In other words, each organization may want to avoid the 
‘free rider’ or ‘collective action’ problem. Especially when trust is ‘low’ even efforts to get the policy 
off the ground may be difficult in this case (ibid). 
Some of the strategies for mitigating this includes “signaling” to stakeholders that everyone involved 
in the project share a sense of commitment in the success of the policy. Doing this may help douse 
the doubts that may arise argued O’Toole. “Framing” is another strategy that has been found to have 
profound effect on the perceptions of implementers. For instance, policy managers may ‘focus’ the 
attention of implementing organizations toward those areas that they mostly agree on so that trust is 
generated and thereby downplaying their differences. Other strategies for inducing cooperation 
including obtaining the “commitment” of relevant parties and making it public through publicity 
campaigns. “iteration” is another strategy to reduce ‘coordination costs’, increases ‘understanding’ 
and ‘predictability’ in implementation. A further strategy is introducing a “transparent” reporting 
system into the implementation so that all parties know what everyone else is doing (ibid) 
Additional strategies include policy managers “monitoring” actions of those tasked with 
implementation to prevent free rider problem. So also, promoting “norms” that facilitate cooperation 
may also help in effective implementation. Another strategy is “decentralization” of large and complex 
decision making points into smaller units may also help promote cooperation. “Exchanges” between 
implementing organizations is also useful in effective implementation. For instance, exchanges might 
be built into work tasks such that it requires the joint inputs of different organizations and in the 
process, induce cooperation between them. Exchanges can also be encouraged by explicitly reminding 
relevant actors of the consequences that could result from not reaching agreements which for 
instance could result in a higher authority imposing its will on those involved (p. 301). 
Policy Implementation in Federal Systems 
Policies in most federal systems are mainly implemented through the bureaucratic machinery of 
government. Ferguson (2014) argues that these procedural acts vary considerably among the 
constituent units (states) within a federation. For instance, in the United States, governors exercise 
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administrative control through ‘’statutes’’ or ‘’executive orders’’. While in some states, the governor 
can only review ‘’proposed’’ administrative rules, in other states the governor has the power to also 
review ‘’existing’’ administrative rules. Similarly, some states require the ‘’approval’’ of the governor 
to put into effect proposed administrative rules, whereas in other states approval of the governor is 
not required to change administrative rules (Grady and Simon, 2002 ibid: 16). 
 The Nigerian Experience in Policy Implementation 
In an empirical work on the experience of Nigeria in policy implementation, Makinde (2005) argues 
that the fundamental problem affecting policy implementation in developing countries is the “the 
widening gap between intentions and results” (p. 64). This ‘gap’ as conceptualised by Egonmwan 
(1984: 213) is the “widening of the distance between stated policy goals and the realisation of such 
planned goals” (cited in Makinde ibid: 65). From a general perspective, Honadle (1979) describe the 
problem of policy implementation as akin to masons who fail to adhere to building specifications 
thereby distorting the original “blue print” of a building plan. Honadle went on to highlight the general 
problem that commonly characterised policy implementation: 
Implementation is the nemesis of designers, it conjures up images of plans gone awry 
and of social carpenters and masons who fail to build to specifications and thereby 
distort the beautiful blue prints for progress which were handed to them. It provokes 
memories of “good” ideas that did not work and places the blame on the second (and 
second-class) member of the policy and administration team… (p.6, cited ibid). 
Makinde argues that the Nigerian experience is somewhat similar to Honadle’s analogy, he describes 
policy implementation in Nigeria as “the graveyard of policy where the intentions of the designers of 
policies are often undermined by a constellation of powerful forces of politics and administration…” 
(ibid, see also Egonmwan ibid).  He further argues that a constellation of factors may have been 
responsible for these observed gaps in policy implementation - these factors could be the policy itself, 
those who make the policies (or designers of the policy) and the environment where the policies are 
made. In essence, Makinde’s argument is that much of the problem affecting policy making in 
developing countries is not that of policy formulation but of implementation. He gave two examples 
of policy implementation failure; the Better Life Program (BLP) under the General Babangida 
administration and that of the Family Support Programme (FSP) under General Abacha administration. 
He concluded that even though these policies have ‘laudable objectives’ as they were aimed to 
empower women economically, but had failed to achieve this aim due to a ‘faulty implementation 
process’ (p. 67). 
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Policy Change: Policy Regime Framework (PRF) Perspectives  
This project further incorporates the Policy Regime Framework (PRF) into the theoretical framework 
in order to further help us understand the complexities of policy implementation (especially in 
developing countries contexts where implementation takes place within ‘weak institutions)’. By weak 
institutions we inverted the definition of effective institutions as espoused by the OECD,  to define 
weak institutions as characterised by a lack organizational capacity to deliver public services in a timely 
manner, have a slow and ineffective judiciary in dispensing justice and an ineffective oversight 
mechanism incapable of holding governmental organizations accountable to their mandates (see 
OECD definition of effective institutions). Specifically, the PRF allows for mapping and analysing how 
policy change especially at the implementation stage leads to intended or unintended consequences 
(Wilson 2000; May 2010; Jochim and May 2010; Jochim and May 2012; May et al 2011; 2012; 2013; 
May 2015; Dang 2017; Foran et al 2017). The PRF conceptualizes policy implementation as a governing 
arrangement for addressing “policy problems” that may or may not address such problems (emphasis 
added, May and Jochim 2013: 328). The Policy Regime Framework (PRF) allows for capturing the 
complexities of policy implementation, it is about how politics shapes the process of policy 
implementation (May and Jochim 2013 see also Wilson 2000; May 2010; Jochim and May 2010; Jochim 
and May 2012; May et al 2011; 2012; 2013; May 2015; Dang 2017; Foran et al 2017).  
As an analytical tool, the PRF has been widely applied in the study of how governing arrangements 
works at different levels of government. For instance, the framework has been used by policy 
researchers to analyse policy change at the subnational level (Mossberger and Stoker 2001; Stone 
1989 cited in May and Jochim 2013), at the national level (Esping-Anderson 1990; Kitschelt 1992 ibid), 
or at the international level (Krasner 1983; Kratowhil and Ruggie 1986; Martin and Simmons 1998 
ibid). The PRF allows for mapping different strategies deployed by governments as they attempt to 
address public policy problems. In the policy sciences literature, the concept ‘policy regime’ is often 
conceived by scholars as a term used by scholars to understand a specific policy strategy used by 
governments in a specific policy domain (Wilson 2000; McGuinn 2006; Rodgers et al 2008; Sheingate 
2009; Weaver, 2010 cited in May and Jochim 2013).  
The concept has also been used by scholars to study different regulatory arrangements (Harris and 
Milkis 1989; Eisner 2000 ibid) or in the study of different approaches to implementation (Stoker 1991 
ibid). For example, Stoker (1991) view a policy regime as a style of policy implementation which he 
defines as “arrangements for carrying out policies”. This may include among other things the 
coordination of activities between “multiple agencies and actors” (Howlett and Rayner’s 2006: 170 
ibid) or as “policy regime logics” that links policy objectives with policy tools (Howlett 2009: 79 ibid). 
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Approaching policy implementation from a regime perspective allows for identifying the “realities of 
how a given set of problems is addressed and the political dynamics that are engendered by those 
realities” (May 2015: 278). Stoker (Ibid) places policy regimes within the context of the different 
challenges often encountered by intergovernmental organisations as they attempt to implement a 
policy change (cited in May et al 2010: 310). 
Although the concept ‘Regime’ was originally developed by and widely used in the International 
relations literature. It has also found usage in other domains such as comparative politics literature 
where it is conceptualised in terms of the “centrality of power and interest groups” in inducing “regime 
formation and change” (ibid). For example, it has been applied in comparative studies of “welfare and 
income support regimes” (ibid) to analyse differences among American states (Rogers et al 2008) or 
“regulatory regimes” (Eisner 1994 ibid). This centrality of power is conceptualised in terms of the 
strength of a policy regime, which May et al (2011) defined as the “ability of a given regime to focus 
attention of players within diverse subsystems on a shared vision so that they are ‘on the same page’ 
in addressing a given boundary-spanning problem” (p. 290 see also May 2015). Here policy subsystem 
is defined as a “confluence of interests and patterned relationships among legislators, administrators, 
and interest groups” (Freeman and Stevens 1987 cited in Lodhi 2017: 24) or as “established coalitions 
of interests who interact regularly over long periods to influence policy” (Sabatier and Smith 1993 
cited in ibid). For this to be possible, a regime must be able to mobilize several forces with a “shared 
vision or purpose” to reach consensus about not only what is to be done to resolve policy problems 
but also how it is to be done, which according to the literature can be discerned through the 
“statements and actions” of the various interests around the policy. These shared ideas foster a 
common understanding between interests and is essential to securing both political as well as policy 
commitments or what May (ibid) referred to as the “glue” that binds the regime together. 
However, May (ibid) argues that this “glue” that holds the policy regime together might be weak 
especially when the ideas behind it are not understood due to “vagueness” or lack the endorsement 
of stakeholders. For instance, some stakeholders within the regime may not share the same “sense of 
urgency or degree of buy in” with the policy regime (p. 291). Another perspective considered by the 
literature is the extent to which the institutional design of a policy regime is congruent with the 
objective(s) of the regime itself. Here institutional design is conceived of as the mechanisms put in 
place as a response to “institutional collective action problems” which bothers on issues of 
coordination, authority, or intergovernmental relationships, oversight entities and how they are 
configured to represent interests for purposes of oversight, specification of mechanisms for engaging 
the public, and how management structures are shared among implementing bodies (May 2015: 281 
see also Feiock, 2013). May and Jochim (2013) further argues that no single institutional design can 
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achieve this in isolation of the prevailing relationships among diverse interests and the power of the 
uniting idea behind the policy regime, as the authors put it: 
institutions—rules, norms, and organizations—interact with ideas and interests in 
order to achieve change; they do not operate independently of them. The analytic 
issue is the degree to which a given form fits the circumstances of a particular policy 
regime and serves to focus attention of policymakers in different subsystems. Stronger 
regimes have institutional designs that accomplish this (Lieberman 2002 cited in ibid 
see also Jochim and May 2010) 
Like other fluid concepts in policy studies, policy regimes cannot be directly observed except its 
components like “institutional arrangements, interest alignments and ideas” and together these 
components constitute what is commonly referred to as policy regime (p. 428). Policy regime is viewed 
through the lens of any “authoritative decisions” taken as a measure against a set of ‘problems’ at 
some level of government, and that these problems are usually translated into policies by specifying 
(a) a set of intentions or goals (b) a mix of policy instruments for accomplishing these intentions and 
(c) the structure of implementing such policies. The authors suggest that the policy regime perspective 
starts with ‘problems’ rather than ‘policies’, and in this way affords policy makers the opportunity of 
considering “various combination of multiple laws, rules, and administrative actions that together 
specify relevant governing arrangements" (ibid: 429).  
However, May and Jochim (2013) further notes that while it is not a guarantee a chosen governing 
arrangement will address a set of problems under consideration, a governing arrangement may be 
“highly disjointed” across states or local counties, may be “piecemeal” which only addresses a part of 
the problem or even a “layering” of new solutions on old ones in which case the authors regard this 
kind of policy regime as “nascent or ill informed”. For example, this was indeed the case with the 
childhood obesity problem in the United States where states and local counties responded to the 
obesity epidemic in “a loosely-connected policy regime that shares common policy ideas but no 
binding institutional structure” (ibid). 
Wilson (2000) identifies four (4) key dimensions of a policy regime; first, the “power or arrangement 
of power” dimension, which involves the presence of one or more powerful interests that supports 
the policy regime. The second dimension is the “policy paradigm” dimension which “shapes the way 
problems are defined, the types of solutions offered, and the kinds of policies proposed” (p.257).  
Wilson likens a paradigm to a “lens that filters information and focuses attention” such that this lens 
defines the key assumptions made about the policy problem at hand such as its causes, magnitude of 
the problem at hand, how pervasive it is, those responsible for creating the problem or ameliorating 
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it, and the appropriate response mechanism to address the problem chosen by the government (ibid 
see also Gusfield 1981). The third dimension is the “policy making arrangements and the 
implementation structure” or the organizations and structures within the government that are 
mandated to address the policy problem. For instance, the policy making arrangement may include 
leaders of congressional committees, agencies, institutions, professional associations and organized 
interest involved in developing and maintaining the policy. While the implementation structure may 
include the agency tasked with implementing the policy, in some instances especially in federal 
systems state and local agencies may also be involved as implementing structures. And finally, the 
fourth dimension is the actual policy itself. The policy according to Wilson “embodies the goals of the 
policy regime” which contains the rules and regulation that guides the implementing agency thereby 
giving legitimacy to the policy itself (p. 258) 
Policy regimes also foster short-term feedback to the designers of policies. This feedback mechanism 
provides important information to decision makers such as whether policies enacted are acceptable 
or unacceptable to relevant interests. This feedback mechanism according to May (2015) provides an 
important indication on (a) whether a given approach to addressing a set of problems is perceived as 
legitimate or not (b) advances a coherent set of ideas or is fragmented, and (c) is durable and able to 
sustain commitments beyond that of the initial policy enactments or fleeting (p. 281). Towards this 
end May further adds three (3) other dimensions to the policy regime framework, which includes 
“legitimacy”, “coherence” and “durability”. Although these dimensions may not guarantee the 
successful implementation of policies argued May, but they serve as important recipes for “political 
success” and thus lay the foundation for future “policy success” because they institutionalize the 
commitments of both policy makers and policy implementers (ibid).  
These three (3) dimensions are further elaborated below; Policy ‘legitimacy’ is a function of how 
strongly a policy regime found support in its ideas, authority and institutions. A strong regime for 
instance may enhance policy legitimacy when its ideas are widely accepted, and its institutions and 
implementation structures serve to reinforce the regime. As May puts it “a sense of policy legitimacy 
is advanced when the commitments made by political actors are generally viewed as appropriate and 
just” (ibid: 282; see also Tyler 2006). Policy ‘coherence’ is conceived of as “consistency of actions in 
addressing a given set of policy problems or target groups”. These actions are realized through a 
“common sense of purpose” anchored on a strong idea and institutional structures that work together 
to reinforce this idea together with a ‘constituency’ that provides the political support for “consistent 
actions” to occur and be sustained (ibid; see also Schneider and Ingram 1997). In an earlier work, May 
and Jochim (2013) argue that a vague policy defeats policy coherence and thus undermines 
implementation success because it leaves room for relevant implementing structures to “reinterpret 
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fuzzy mandates” to suit their interests (p. 432 see also Bardach 1977). A shared sense of purpose can 
for instance helps to address policy coordination problems that commonly affect most policy 
implementation structures: 
A common purpose serves as a key mechanism for propelling consistent actions by key 
policy implementors. When they are “on the same page,” they will by definition be 
more likely to pursue actions that work toward common ends. Recognition of this 
leaves open the possibilities for regimes enhancing the “coordination problem” that is 
posed by disjointed implementation (p. 432) 
Policy ‘durability’ dimension is defined by May as the “sustainability of political commitments over 
time…It reflects the longevity of political commitments for addressing a given set of problems”. Policy 
durability shows how long political commitments put in place to address policy problems are sustained 
over time. May argues that policies are said to be ‘durable’ when their “principal commitments”, 
objectives and the means of realizing such objectives remain “unaltered”, and when policy objectives 
and political commitments are “altered” they are said to be a ‘signal’ of a lack in policy durability. 
These commitments may come in form of a “path dependent institutional structures”, adequate 
funding, and a coalition of interest that is able to hold those tasked with policy implementation 
accountable and can resist any effort aimed weakening oversight of their activities (May and Jochim 
2013: 433). Sometimes policies may also fail to achieve desired objectives or purpose because of a 
“weak policy design”, in such situation institutional support for implementation becomes inadequate 
and conflicting (May 2015: 283; see also Wildavsky 1979; Patashnik and Zelizer 2013).  
Using the American Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or better known as Obamacare as 
example, May shows how policy regimes in place could potentially hinder the effective 
implementation of governance arrangements. May noted that four (4) years after the Obama care 
program came into effect a number of obstacles became evidently clear, these obstacles include (a) 
the provisions of the program were characterised as too complex to find “politically viable” solutions 
to the policy problem at hand (b) roll out of the program was not properly planned and managed such 
that there were many problems with health care enrolments as well as the difficulty in accessing the 
websites of both the federal and the states governments (c) the program was also highly politicised 
and bogged down by incessant conflicts over the provisions of the enacted legislations which 
threatened to “derail” the program itself. In essence, what May try to show is that from a policy regime 
perspective, the “legitimacy” as well as the “durability” of the Obama care program was undermined 
by the growing “backlash” against the healthcare reforms and a lack of a strong “constituency” 
support (ibid p. 277-78).  
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A Review of Relevant Literature on the Implementation of Land Titling 
(Registration) Reforms in Developing Countries 
Implementing a policy change is not as smooth as envisaged by most advocates of such change. Most 
changes are not without their costs, like most human endeavours winners and losers often emerge 
from the processes of policy change. For example, Deininger and Feder (2009) argue that reforms 
aimed at improving the institutions of land administration such as formalizing land property rights (or 
what is often referred to as Land titling) does not always translate into desired goals. This was due to 
what is referred to as “naïve top down approaches” in the literature, a situation in which policy makers 
simply prescribe solutions to policy problems without paying careful attention to concrete diagnosis 
of the issues at hand and the genuine demands coming from the bottom (grass root) (p. 234-258). 
Deininger and Feder further suggest that apart from paying special attention to an inclusive policy 
making, it also important that stakeholders are also actively engaged in the process. That is for it to 
be the case that reforms are effective, the ability to hold those in various levels of responsibility to 
account is crucial: 
good governance is of overriding importance to ensure that clear property rights and 
institutions to administer them contribute to the desired socioeconomic outcomes 
instead of providing a means to enable elites and officials to usurp the rights of the 
poor and socially weak groups. This requires clear delineation of institutional 
responsibilities within the land administration system, an audit of regulatory 
requirements to ensure that these are justified, and that compliance is within the 
reach of target groups, transparent management and access to information, effective 
avenues to flag problems, and availability of accessible and accountable institutions 
to resolve conflicts and ensure enforcement (ibid, see also Easterly 2008). 
In a similar line of argument, Manji (2010) argues that the land policy reforms implemented in many 
developing countries in the 1990s failed simply because of the failure of the designers of the reforms 
to take into consideration crucial elements that are fundamental to the successes (or failure) of policy 
reforms. For example, in many African countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, Malawi, Eritrea, 
Mozambique and South Africa, the land reforms were considered as cases of sluggish implementation 
or stalled implementation. Manji argues that these land reforms failed because in most cases policy 
makers focus on pushing through legislations and thus neglecting other elements such as ‘capacity’ 
that are fundamental. For instance, the capacity of those tasked with translating these legislations 
into reality is often not given prominent attention. Capacity to deliver on the desired aims of a policy 
on the part of its implementers plays a significant role in shaping the implementation processes and 
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ultimately the outcomes of policy reforms. To support this line of thought Manji quoted Coldham 
(2000: 76) whom had expressed some concerns about a newly land act just passed in Uganda in 1998 
and the envisaged difficulties that will be encountered if the act was to be implemented without first 
addressing some fundamental issues: 
It will be essential to train the cadres who will be responsible for implementing the Act. 
In addition to increasing significantly the number of surveyors, planners and registrars, 
it will be essential to train the members of all the new administrative bodies … destined 
to play a central role in the process … the Act’s provisions are detailed and sometimes 
complex and … their effective implementation will require a knowledge of both the 
general law and customary law. While an extensive recruitment and training exercise 
will add substantially the cost, the land reform programme is already controversial 
and, if it is carried out in a way that is insensitive or inept, it will leave behind a legacy 
of disputes and bitterness. 
These views are also partly supported by a World Bank (WB) study conducted in the 1980s to review 
the performances of the land titling projects supported by the bank in some developing countries. 
Some of the major findings of the review shows that the implementation of the reforms was hampered 
by conflicting priorities among relevant implementing organisations, the lack of institutional capacity 
or support available to agencies and complex nature of the reforms with titling as just a component 
of the reforms (WB 1992 cited in Holstein 1996).  
In a study of the implementation of a Tanzanian Land Act, Biddulph (2018) found that there was a lack 
of ‘political commitment’ by actors at the national level in complying with the community driven 
approach advocated by the “1999 Village Land Act”. The act sought to prioritise securing the land 
rights of local communities and those tasked with its implementation instead favoured securing the 
rights of international investors who are mostly from the conservation, agricultural and tourism 
sectors (p. 55). This phenomenon is what Collins et al (2017) termed as “Glocalization”, where global 
markets and institutions actively engage in “glocal pressures” to capture and redirect the 
implementation of land reforms that favours large scale commercial developments as opposed to 
small scale individualised development and thereby effectively thwarting efforts aimed at improving 
the local conditions of vulnerable individuals in local communities (p. 2). The authors conclude that 
the Tanzanian example demonstrate that no matter how robust the designs of land reforms are, they 
will almost fail if the needs of local communities are not taken into consideration. This view supports 
a similar finding about the implementation of PROCEDE land tiling program in Mexico, the PROCEDE 
program was considered as successful because during its implementation the Mexican government 
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took into consideration the concerns of various interests and thus co-opted the existing institutions 
and practices that it met on ground (Bouquet 2009 cited in Sikor and Muller 2009).  
In another study on the implementation experience on the reform of land law in Uganda, McAuslan 
(2003) gave a detailed account of how the reforms stripped the old guards (the Ministry of Water, 
Lands and Environment (MWLE)) of their control over land administration and transferred it to a newly 
created entity. What subsequently ensued was what McAuslan termed as “bureaucratic sabotage”,  
where the old bureaucrats strategically hijacked the agenda, direction and ultimately determine the 
outcomes of reform efforts: 
senior members of the Directorate of Lands were openly and continually hostile to the 
project. This hostility ultimately stymied the project’s activities and goals, as well as 
on the morale of the members of the project’s secretariat… [they were] undermining 
a project designed to assist in the speedy implementation of the Land Act by attacking 
it from the outside, and then, once that had proved successful and control had been 
obtained of the project, emasculating it and its outputs from the inside... 
Implementation of the act was painted as donor driven and not putting the interests 
of Ugandans first. Opposition was portrayed as patriotic and being concerned with 
national “ownership” of the process of implementation (p. 16-27) 
The result argued McAuslan was at best a case of an incomplete reform caused by deep divisions 
among different implementing bodies competing to outdo each other in the capture of the new 
mandate. Sitte (2006) also found that the lack of ‘inter-agency cooperation and coordination’ was a 
major barrier in the successful implementation of the land titling reforms in Ghana. Sitte noted that 
the existing agencies administering land felt that the reforms had stripped them of their mandate and 
transferred it to another agency, therefore inter-agency rivalry ensued. This became the norm 
between the relevant land agencies and consequently information sharing became a difficult 
undertaken between them (see also Ehwi and Asante 2016). In another related study of 
implementation of land reforms in Malaysia, Kelm et al (2017) also noted that despite successes 
recorded with the reforms, “inter” and “intra” communication between implementing agencies 
remains a huge challenge. Also, in another study on land reforms in Guinea, Durrand-Lasserve (2003) 
noted that land administrators find it difficult to transition into the newly created and decentralized 
system of land property registration system, due to the direct benefits such as ‘power’ and ‘money’ 
they derive from the old “centralist and non-transparent administrative culture” system (p. 8). 
Durand-Lasserve (2003) further argue that most African countries lack the ‘administrative 
organization’ to realize an ‘efficient land market systems’ because core elements of efficiency such as 
52 
 
the existence of an accurate, updated, transparent, accessible land information systems and simple 
land registration procedures are mostly missing. In addition, he also suggests that African countries 
lack extensive stakeholder “acceptance of proposed measures” and a “favourable political 
environment” to develop ‘formal land markets’ (p. 4). In another empirical study of land markets and 
institutions in West Africa, Durand- Lasserve and Selod (2013) found a lot of irregularities in land 
administration in Bamako, Mali, these irregularities were characterized by a wide gap between what 
the land rules stipulate and what administrators implement. For example, officials were found to be 
in breach of the rules and regulations when carrying out “lotissement” (land resettlement schemes) 
by engaging in selective allocation of resettlement lands based on people’s political affiliations or to 
those who are more likely to vote for the incumbent mayoral candidate. In addition, officials also often 
contravene urban planning rules and regulations through the allocation of publicly demarcated lands 
such as parks or commercials zones for residential use or double allocation of the same lettre 
d’attribution (property or land title) to two or more individuals which often result in conflicts (p. 34-
35).  
Wubneh (2018) also found that the ‘ambiguity’ in the Ethiopian land laws afforded local land officials 
a considerable level of discretion in implementing land policies, to the extent that breach of 
procedural rules and regulations was a common practice among officials. Schmidt and Zakayo (2018) 
suggest that the degree to which reforms to formalize property or land titles succeed depends on the 
different perceptions individuals with a stake hold. These concerns according to the authors range 
from limited awareness, to fears of losing property in case of bankruptcy or concerns about high 
interest rates charged on loans, the characteristics of the local economy, lands property market as 
well as the legal, bureaucratic and political environment (see also Cortula et al 2004; Fernandes and 
Smolka 2004; Byabato 2005; Fernandes 2009; Monkkonen 2016). In a comparative study on the 
effectiveness of land reforms implemented in Kenya, Ghana and Vietnam, Narh et al (2016) noted that 
an important lesson learned and needs to be taken seriously in future reforms was that ‘power’ 
influences the outcomes of land reforms in developing countries. In other words, the authors suggest 
that outcomes of reforms (either positive or negative) is heavily influenced by those in political 
authority who could for example use their “power and connections” to either strengthen the 
processes of policy implementation to achieve desired results or manipulate and derail the processes 
and thus result in failed implementation. For instance, in the case of Vietnam it was the “political will” 
and the “financial incentives” coming from the political authorities that mitigated any potential risk of 
implementation failure and thus sustained and ensured the successful realization of the reform’s 
objectives. In contrast, however, this was not the case in either Ghana or Kenya (p. 10-13).   
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Cotula et al (2004) found that a combination of lack of “human” and “financial” resource capacity was 
responsible for slowing down the implementation of land reforms in Niger and Uganda. For example, 
the land commission in Niger, despite being in existence for over ten (10) years only managed to issue 
a few land titles. Backlogs of accumulated applications for land titles waiting to be processed land 
peasants were so overwhelming that locals have resorted to going through the local chiefs as an 
alternative means of acquiring land titles. Lack of capacity was also found have impacted on the land 
reforms implemented in Ghana, where many land administrators lacked the necessary skills to use 
modern land administration equipment like the Geographic Information System (GIS). Coupled with 
this was also a pervasive lack of maintenance culture, where equipment can completely break down 
before repairs are undertaken (Karikari et al. 2005 see also Mahama 2001; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; 
Collins et al 2017). Ubink and Quan (2008) found a lack of ‘political will’ by the political authorities to 
support Land Sector Agencies (LSAs) to hold local chiefs accountable in the administration of land in 
in Ghana’s local jurisdictions. Knox and Tanner (2011) also found the problems of ‘political will’ 
‘capacity’ and ‘awareness’ as huge barriers in the implementation of land titling reforms in 
Mozambique, in their own words: 
limited capacity and lack of political will have handicapped public-sector 
implementation of the law in Mozambique. The rural land administration lacks trained 
personnel and specialized equipment, and the country does not have a unified land 
administration strategy or land information management system.  Meanwhile, rural 
citizens remain unaware of their land rights under the law or how to have them 
recorded. Where residents are aware of their rights, the costs of identifying and 
recording DUATs are often prohibitive. 
Furthermore, Knox and Tanner (ibid) also note that lack of awareness of land policies and regulations 
constitute a barrier to successful implementation of land reforms and recommended that awareness 
raising campaigns on radio stations should be embarked upon in local dialects in areas with low 
literacy levels and language barriers. The authors argue that this was the strategy that helped 
increased awareness in the South African Land Restitution Program. For example, the local dialect 
awareness campaigns recorded an increase in claims over restitutions from 25,000 to about 70,000 
by peasants (p. 31, see also Mngxitama 1999; Sitte 2006; Jones-Casey and Knox 2011; Collins et al 
2017). In a study on the experiences in the implementation of land reforms in Ghana, Spichiger and 
Austin (2014) found that the decentralization of land administration reforms to regional districts has 
helped reduce the time taken to formalize (register) land by individuals and that the backlog of land 
related cases in the courts has also reduced significantly. Arko-Adjei 2006 also found a lack of public 
“awareness” on how to formalise their land as well absence of a “participatory approach” in the 
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making of land regulations in the Ghanaian land administration system as impediments to an effective 
and transparent system of land administration. 
However, Obeng-Odoom (2016), note that although some visible improvements may be observed 
when land reforms are implemented such as improvement in access to information on land, reduction 
in administrative delays, increased efficiency in processing land titles and creation of more courts or 
land registries to cater for rising demands in lands. They also note that reforms may also produce 
other unintended consequences. For example, the Ghanaian experience with land reforms was that 
over time, land disputes remained on the rise, security over land tenure continue to dwindle, unfair 
and inadequate land compensation was a common occurrence, the reforms continue to favour the 
rich over the poor and a growing speculative land market. Rebuelta-Teh (2005) findings on land 
administration in the Philippines shows that ‘strong support’ and active ‘participation’ of relevant 
stakeholders are crucial to the success of land reforms. The author argues that a high-level political 
support by the government as well as a strong partnership between the highest and the lowest levels 
of officials were some of the crucial success recipes in the implementation of land titling reforms in 
the Philippines. In areas where this element of support is absent the authors found “resistance” was 
a major constraint on the implementation of land reforms. For example, official within the agencies 
were sabotaging all efforts aimed at moving the reforms forward to the extent that it stalled, and the 
government was unable to pass the proposed land use act into law. Similarly, Fernandes and Smolka 
(2004) also found evidence that both officials of the judiciary as well as the public vehemently resisted 
the land titling reforms implemented in some Latin America countries.  
In another related study of the experiences of Thailand on land titling projects, Bowman (2004) noted 
that the factors that made it possible for considering the Thailand’s land titling project as a success 
story was that; First, only a single agency (the Thai Department of Lands) was given the mandate to 
implement the land tilting reforms. Secondly, early on into the implementation of the land reforms 
the Thai Department of Lands focused more on the simpler aspects of the titling project that could be 
implemented quickly and are devoid of controversies and conflicts. This strategy according to the 
authors made it possible for the implementers to acquire the necessary experience in handling more 
complex areas of the reforms that are highly controversial. For instance, the institutional aspect of the 
reforms that were seen as conflictual were only introduced much later when significant progress has 
been made on the technical aspects. Thirdly, at the design stage of the project human resource 
capacity was identified as a crucial element to the successful implementation of the reforms, therefore 
adequate attention was paid on staff capacity trainings within the implementing agency. Fourthly, 
there was also a strong support and commitment by both the Thai government as well interest groups 
which facilitated the smooth implementation of the reforms. And finally, an “appropriate reward” 
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system was also incorporated into the system so that field staff are discouraged from engaging in 
behaviours capable of jeopardising the “quality or quantity of work or establish an informal reward 
system” for themselves (p. 7-10). Elsewhere in another related study, Holstein (1996) also found “staff 
incentives” as key to the successful implementation of land titling and registration projects in 
Indonesia, Laos and Thailand. Holsten noted that staff involved in the project were meeting key project 
targets because the project objectives were tied with monetary incentives such as rewards for 
performance. 
In another similar a study on the implementation of land formalization program in selected districts 
of Moshi, Tanzania, Schmidt and Zakayo (2018) observed that communities characterised by active 
public engagement (between land administrators and communities) and a leadership that is very strict 
in monitoring the implementation and enforcement of the land reforms, recorded higher levels of title 
deeds registrations - as compared to those districts with poor community leadership and a lack of 
public engagement (p. 22-25 see also Kombe & Kreibich, 2000; Magigi & Majani 2006; Magigi, 2013). 
In Papua New Guinea, Chand (2017) also found that agencies in charge of regulating land were able 
to achieve credibility in land titling reforms by ensuring they had a “buy-in” (another word for support) 
of the communities through extensive consultations. This “inclusive process” allowed for robust 
discussions and debates across all stakeholders and that these consultations were as important as the 
final outcome (p. 418).  
Njoh et al (2018) identified “cumbersome, vague and costly” rules and regulations in use were key 
institutional impediments to the effective delivery of land titling and registration system in Cameroon. 
For instance, they found that in general people (especially women) often felt discouraged to come 
forward because of the complex administrative procedures they have to go through to formalize their 
property titles. In another study, Fernandes (2009) found that a lack of “institutional integration” as 
barrier to effective implementation of land reforms and that efforts aimed at bringing relevant land 
agencies together under one umbrella (one stop shop) so that administrative procedures could be 
made easier to the public and investors were often costly, stringent and lengthy processes. For 
example, according to Fernandes in many cities of Latin America, lack of ‘institutional integration’ was 
responsible for severe delays in registration such that it usually takes up to five (5) years to formalize 
a property (p. 305; see also Ward 1999; Osman and Manuh 2005; Durand-Lasserve and Payne 2006).  
Smolka and Mullhy (2007) identified a lack of “public access” to land information or the inability of 
land administrators to make available such information to the public, combined with “discontinuity” 
in policy implementation were barriers to the effective implementation of land policies in Latin 
America. The authors further argue that even in situation where there is availability of information a 
general lack of capacity to look for such information, organize it and make use of it for public purposes 
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was a major problem for administrators. They also suggest that policies don’t get successfully 
implemented because most often “petty political or economic interests” supersedes “technical quality 
or social relevance” considerations when it comes to implementation (p. 5). As Deininger and Feder 
(2009) will argue by making such information available to the public it could also help to boost the 
revenue generating capacity of agencies, as it was shown by the significant improvements on revenues 
generated from land transactions in Eastern Europe when land reforms were implemented during the 
1990s (see also Bouquet 2009). Also, in a study of the land administrative practices in ten (10) African 
countries as bench marked against global best practices, Deininger et al (2014: 84) had this to say 
about just one of the elements (availability of information): 
 In many of our countries, available information on land ownership, especially spatial 
records, is partial, unreliable, not updated, and not shared between public agencies, 
giving rise to duplication and opening opportunities for fraud and weak governance. 
High transfer taxes, together with surveyor and notary fees, either drive transactions 
into informality or lead to under-valuation and fraud (p. 84) 
 
PART TWO 
CHAPTER THREE 
Research Design and Methodology of Empirical Inquiry 
This research study employed the case study method of inquiry in the study locations. Yin (2009) 
defines a case study as ‘’an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth 
and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident’’ (p. 36). In a similar vein, Goodrick (2014) defines a case study as ‘’an in-depth 
examination, often undertaken over time…such as a policy, programme, intervention or 
implementation process (p. 1). The case study method Yin argues allows for mapping out “scope 
conditions” - for grounding an object of inquiry or a phenomenon within its context by offering a 
pragmatic way of understanding a given phenomenon within its context especially when the said 
phenomenon is intertwined and difficult to distinguish it from its context. It is an approach that is 
suitable in coping with a “technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables 
of interest than data points…multiple sources of evidence, and…the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis’’ (ibid p. 37). As Gerring (2007) argues, the strength 
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of the case study method rests on its ‘implicit’ ability to link “micro” with the “macro” aspects of social 
phenomena- it is a method that enables us “gain better understanding of the whole by focusing on a 
key part” (p. 15). Gerring went further to argue that case study analysis “focuses on a small number 
of cases that are expected to provide insight into a causal relationship” (p. 86).  
Specifically, we employed the comparative case study approach to analyse the cases under study. 
Beasly and Kaarbo (1999) defined the comparative case study method as a ‘’systematic comparison of 
two or more data points (cases) obtained using the case study method’’ (p. 372). The justification for 
a comparative analysis of the cases is guided by the project’s research question and its guiding 
assumptions which requires selecting cases that reflect the conditions (or factors) under which 
different configuration of factors structure the implementation behaviour of the land agencies in the 
study locations. This research strategy according to Huber, Shipan and Pferler (2001) allows for explicit 
theorizing and a structured investigation in variations of institutional designs within federal systems. 
Adopting this approach at the subnational level offers us the advantage of a ‘’controlled comparisons’’ 
that may aid in strengthening the internal validity of the study (Snyder 2001: 94). For example, the 
approach allows to select and match cases so as to detect the presence or absence of key factors that 
may help explain key differences across cases (Frendreis, 1983 cited in van der Heijden 2013: 45). 
Thus, we modelled the different implementation styles adopted by the cases (the selected Nigerian 
states) under study based on the reform ‘processes’ that prevailed in the study locations, and which 
in turn led to their adoption of different institutional designs and how the implementation behaviours 
of agencies tasked with implementing a policy change also contributed to the outcomes. Doing this 
enabled us to unpack and thus identify which configuration of factors leads to a better implementation 
of the land titling (registration) reforms.  
Thus, following George and Bennett (2005), a ‘structured’ and ‘focused’ comparison was used in the 
collection of data. By ‘structured’ the method requires “asking a set of standardized, general questions 
of each case…These questions must be carefully developed to reflect the research objective and 
theoretical focus of the inquiry. The use of a set of general questions is necessary to ensure the 
acquisition of comparable data in comparative studies. By ‘focused’ it requires that the study should 
be “undertaken with a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that 
objective…to adopt a different focus, to develop and use a different theoretical framework, and to 
identify a different set of data requirements” (p. 181-86).  
Over a period of seven (7) months, we conducted a field work in the three (3) study locations 
triangulating (documentary evidence, interviews and observation) and a ‘nested’ strategy at two 
(organizational and individual) levels (Guest et al 2013: 84) to collect data at the study locations. We 
also ensured there is ‘variability’ in the collected data to detect key similarities as well as differences 
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among the cases (Yin 2009). This strategy helped us add rigour and richness in the process (Denzin 
2012). As Gerring (2007) argues: 
the case study should not be defined by a distinctive method of data collection but 
rather by the goals of the research relative to the scope of the research terrain. 
Evidence for a case study may be drawn from an existing dataset or set of texts or may 
be the product of original research by the investigator. Written sources may be 
primary or secondary. Evidence may be quantitative, qualitative, or a mixture of both, 
Evidence may be experiments, from “ethnographic” field research, from unstructured 
interviews, or from highly structured surveys (p. 68) 
We also employed a ‘content-driven (exploratory) document analyses’ approach to incorporate new 
concepts and themes that emerged during the field work in order to to account for aspects of the 
fieldwork findings not accounted for by the theoretical framework (Guest et al 2013). This is also in 
line with Neuman (2014) suggestion that in qualitative data analysis, concepts and evidence are often 
treated as “mutually interdependent”, therefore cases are defined by both “data and theory” (p. 344). 
Thus, following Neuman’s and Guest et al approaches, the cases were built from the theoretical 
framework as well as the evidence that emerged from the field work and thus became the basis for 
explaining the factors that contributed to the divergent implementation of the land policy changes by 
the cases under study.  
In addition, we also employed an “in-depth” interview technique to gain further valuable insights from 
land officials on their perceptions of the workings of their organizations. According to Guest et al 
(2013) in-depth interviews are well suited to asking questions about “polarizing, sensitive, 
confidential, or highly personal topics”. Thus, we adopted this technique as suggested by Guest and 
his colleagues to not only elicit the opinions of staff within their organisations on “processes, norms, 
decision making”, but also their “beliefs, interpretations, motivations, expectations, hopes, and fears” 
about their jobs (p. 288).  We specifically, designed a ‘semi structured close ended interview’ 
questionnaire and administered it on a total of thirty (30) ( ten (10) in each state) officials at different 
levels in the parent ministries (ministry of lands) as well as the newly created agencies (NAGIS, CRGIA 
and NIGIS).  We also paid special attention to ensuring that the interview questions were developed 
from the theoretical concepts. Furthermore, like Guest et al (2013), we not only ensured that the 
questions asked were the same in all the study locations but also paid special care on the wording of 
the questions so that they are as similar as possible across all levels of those interviewed. The selection 
the interviewees was also done randomly, and we segmented them into three (3) groups: 
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1. Upper level officials: comprising members of the advisory committees, commissioners of land, 
permanent secretaries and directors of departments within the ministries and agencies 
2. Middle level officials: comprising heads of units/sections, coordinators and supervisors within 
the ministries and agencies 
3. Lower level officials: comprising land administration officers from relevant departments 
within ministries and agencies 
We began each interviewer by following the protocols of conducting an academic interview such as 
informing the respondents of the aims and objective of the study, the reasons for conducting the 
interview as well as the protection of the respondent’s privacy (anonymity). We also assured 
respondents of guaranteeing their anonymity by protecting any information collected as provided for 
under the European Standards of Data Protection. The interviews were documented using a 
combination of ‘note taking’ and ‘audio recording’, as Guest et al (2013) suggests doing this helps to: 
capture a complete verbal record of the interview sessions…recording greatly 
improves the quality of the data collected and is a requirement for analytic approaches 
that require verbatim data, such as many forms of text analysis.  
The aims of the interview were to (a) corroborate documentary evidence (land laws and regulations) 
with oral accounts of officials within the ministries and agencies (b) understand how officials’ task with 
policy implementation perceive and interpret institutional rules and regulations, and (c) more 
interesting to uncover what potential factors are crucial in instilling a culture of policy continuity in 
Nigeria. As Guest et al (2013) argued “through qualitative inquiry, a researcher can more directly 
document why individuals behave in a certain way, because the participants themselves can make 
that causal connection explicit” (p. 78). The overall objective was to draw useful lessons on what 
specific policy implementation factors combine to make it possible for a successful and sustained 
implementation of a policy change in the context of a developing country. 
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Implementation Regimes (Ideas, Institutional Arrangements and 
Interests): The Implementation of Land Policy Changes at the 
Subnational Level in Nigeria  
Nasarawa State 
Brief Profile of Nasarawa State 
Nasarawa State emerged as a province with the British colonisation of the territories of Northern 
Nigeria in the 1900s, initially it was referred to as the lower Benue province with its headquarters 
situated at Akpanaja. In 1902, its name was changed to Nasarawa province and its headquarters 
moved to Nasarawa town. By 1926, the British colonial administration merged the provinces of 
Nasarawa, Mubi and Bauchi into a single province called Plateau province, shortly after Nigeria’s 
independence in 1960, plateau province was further merged with another province known as the 
Benue province to form the Benue Plateau State as part of the 12 states created by the then Military 
regime of General Yakubu Gowon in 1967. In 1976, the Nigerian military headed by General Murtala 
Mohammed further created additional seven (7) states resulting in nineteen (19) states thereby 
splitting the Benue-Plateau state as Benue and Plateau states respectively. In 1996, the military regime 
of General Sani Abacha created Nasarawa state out of Plateau state and its capital was moved to Lafia 
(Nasarawa.gov.ng) 
With a total land mass area of 26,875.59 sq km and bordered by six (6) states (Kaduna, Plateau, Taraba, 
Benue, Kogi and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja), Nasarawa state is located in the central region 
of Nigeria. It comprises 13 local governments with a population of over two (2) million inhabitants, 
and agriculture is its major economic activity.  
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Source: Labaris et al 2014 
Reconstructing the Processes Leading to the Reforms of Institutions of 
Land Administration in the State  
Nasarawa state’s proximity to Abuja (Nigeria’s capital) presents it with both geographical advantages 
and challenges. An apparent advantage this proximity confers on the state, is its much lower cost of 
living compared to its next-door neighbour Abuja. For instance, a 500 sqm2 property in Asokoro district 
of Abuja cost about five hundred (500) million-naira, while the same 500 sqm2 piece of land a stone 
throw in neighbouring Karu district of Nasarawa state cost just about two (2) million naira (w 12). This 
therefore makes Nasarawa state an attractive option for low income earners to live in Nasarawa and 
instead commute daily to work in Abuja. However, this advantage also come with its costs, such as it 
has also led to an explosion of population in some of the towns in Nasarawa (especially those closest 
to Abuja). It has for example created problems such as the growth of “unplanned” and ‘’unregulated” 
settlements (popularly known as slums) in towns like Karu and Keffi (Jibril 2014: 2).  
Further compounding the problem is the widespread abuse of the system of land administration in 
the state. It is widely perceived that land administration in Nasarawa is dominated by corrupt officials 
of the ministry of lands as well as other private individuals popularly referred to as “land grabbers”. 
These “land grabbers” posing as land or property agents often collude with officials of the ministry of 
lands to illegally allocate or sell land or property land to unsuspecting people (w 14). The ministry of 
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lands was widely seen as a cesspool of corruption, which in turn generated a general lack of public 
confidence in how land is administered in the state. Some of the ministry’s officials we interviewed 
stated that apart from the impunity that was ongoing at the ministry, politicians were also found to 
be culpable. These politicians working at the highest levels of authority often abuse their privileges by 
using land as a weapon to gain political patronage or to fight perceived political enemies. For instance, 
they could revoke land belonging to certain individuals or influence officials in charge of lands to delay 
or refuse to grant individuals the opportunity to formalize their property such as obtaining a certificate 
of occupancy. Here the perception according to some of the interviewees was that some of the 
politicians use land or property as a weapon to fight enemies. For example, those in position of 
influence often politically disagree with as enemies especially if such individuals own a property or 
land, they see such a person as capable of using such property as a collateral to secure bank loans in 
order to fight those in power (w 13).  A senior management official paints a picture of what obtains in 
the state prior to the land reforms: 
we had staff that were outright corrupt, at that time we were the most corrupt 
ministry because you need to grease palms [pay bribes] for your files to move. i had 
always said either they [the staff] didn't understand the project or lack the 
will…resistance to the reforms naturally came from those who benefit from the old 
system of doing things, of course there is no question about that corruption thrives in 
chaotic situations, that is where some people benefit from the prevailing 
circumstances and when you are introducing reforms naturally even your staff will 
resist it. In fact, the resistance was so much so that you had to have the heart of a lion 
to deal with it, i recalled in one of our meetings a management staff told me that i 
should be careful not to step on toes [those who benefit from the status quo]. But the 
system is not perfect up to this moment there is still pockets of resistance here and 
there, but over the years they have learnt that i am not willing to accept any sabotage 
and anybody who stands in the way of implementing these reforms will have himself 
surely to blame (w 12) 
The state government blame this stagnation in the institutions governing land on the failure of past 
governments to properly regulate the land sector in the state. Therefore, in response to the challenges 
and opportunities the land sector presented to Nasarawa state, both in terms of a growing 
unregulated and a corrupt land sector and a rising demand on land due to the state’s proximity to the 
Nigeria’s capital (Abuja). The government initiated some reforms aimed at making the state an 
attractive investment destination. To this end, the Nasarawa Development Platform (NDP) Project was 
launched in 2011 to introduce a modern system of land administration in the state (Edmead et al 2013) 
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The administrative and legislative aspects of the reforms were handled by the ministry of lands and 
the governor’s office, while the technical aspect was initially contracted to SIVAN Nigeria Ltd to among 
other things (1) set up the Land Information System (LIS) (2) capture the entire topography of the state 
using aerial telephoto (3) the geographical mapping of the whole state into districts using Geographic 
Information Systeme (GIS). However, early into the implementation of the reforms it was discovered 
SIVAN was failing to deliver on the technical components of the project, so the government through 
the ministry of lands terminated the contract and a fresh contract (worth 2.7 billion naira) was 
awarded to SIRAJ Engineering Ltd. The contract was redesigned and new implementation guidelines 
(using incremental steps) were issued (w 14). Although it is to be noted here that at the initial 
implementation phase of the project it generated controversy because the government decided to 
raise the ground rents (fees charged on land or property). This move became not unpopular with the 
public, but also it did not resonate well with the traditional institutions in the state. As one 
management official of NAGIS tries to tries to justify the increase: 
when we raised our land rates, people felt why should we do that, and it became an 
issue and even to some extent went to the house of assembly and we stood our 
grounds and justify why we had to do that. For instance, when you spend a hundred 
to a hundred and fifty thousand naira (100,000 - 150,000) to process your land title in 
Abuja, why wouldn't you spend about twenty to twenty-five thousand naira (20,000 – 
25,000) across the border on the other side [Nasarawa]? (w 12)  
Most people felt that it was unjustifiable for the government to have increased the fees by over 300% 
of the original fees. People were used to the old system where it takes only a few thousands of naira 
to formalize their land or property titles. For instance, in the past it usually takes about fifteen 
thousand (15,000) naira to get a C of O, but with the present arrangement people have to now part 
with about seventy thousand (70,000) naira to obtain a C of O. Another higher ranking official of the 
agency also tries to defend the new tariffs:  
although they [the public] don't take into consideration the delays in processing of 
land titles has been drastically reduced, for instance, between 1999-2007 only about 
270 land titles were officially issued, compared to 1300 titles issued between 2007- 
2015. And the enhanced security features incorporated into the titles is a further check 
on land fraudsters (w 14). 
In addition, officials of the ministry of lands were as well opposed to the proposed reforms and 
therefore were not cooperating with the government’s efforts to implement the new land regulations. 
Some of the reasons given for the resistance by officials of the lands ministry include (a) wanting the 
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status quo to remain (the benefits derived by entrenched interests who often enrich themselves at 
the detriment of the government) (b) fear of the unknown by some officials of the ministry over the 
outcomes of the reforms such as loss of job. Most of the core civil servants of the ministry were used 
to the manual system of land administration and thus felt the proposed reforms (a computerized 
system as envisaged by the designers) may make them irrelevant in the new arrangement (w 14). The 
management of the ministry had to come up with measures to counter the opposition. Some of the 
strategies the management employed include recruiting new staff ato work at the newly created 
agency while existing staff of the ministry (who could not fit into the new system were either deployed 
to other ministries or disengaged. Some staff of the ministry that showed interest in participating, 
were co-opted by the management and the implementation of the reforms proceeded in incremental 
steps. A senior official tries to describe some of the challenges faced by the management as they try 
to push forward the reforms: 
when we came on board we had a lot of resistance, i am not proud to say this but in 
the process, we had to let some staff go, especially those who had become recalcitrant, 
we had to bring in new persons and train them differently from the old system and 
now you have a hybrid of the old and the new and to us it works perfectly. We had 
staff that were dismissed out rightly and some were transferred away from the 
ministry, some of them retired, and some that felt they could not exist in a very 
transparent space voluntarily left, we identified the few committed staff that were 
willing to work and asked them to join us in the reforms, initially we had less than 10 
staff that were willing and they were working from 7:30am to 7:00 pm. But 
subsequently other staff eventually saw the good in it and key in (w 12) 
Another higher-ranking official attested to this when he said: 
that was where the commissioner did a marvellous job, in the sense that he used a 
carrot and stick approach to get what he wants, he was so coercive to a level that he 
threatened some people before he was able to push through the reforms (w 13). 
To give legitimacy to the reforms and therefore assuage the fears coming from the public and the 
traditional authorities, the state government embarked on massive publicity campaigns. The publicity 
campaigns were aimed at convincing stakeholders on why the reforms were necessary so as to make 
the state’s land administration system a more efficient and transparent one. As one senior official puts 
it: 
The thing about the NAGIS bill is its public outreach we were out there from the 
beginning; several ads on newspapers and online and we also use to organise what 
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we call town hall meetings across Nasarawa state to enlighten people about what 
NAGIS is all about. So i think that sort of publicity gave us a leverage to showcase an 
organisation that nobody knows about, so people were already familiar with us and 
when the issue of the bill came up and asked people to participate what we got was 
not resistance but accolades (w 14)  
To further consolidate on the progress made so far, the government also felt the need to 
institutionalize the reforms. An executive sponsored bill for the establishment of the agency to 
implement the proposed new regulations was sent to the state house of assembly. However, the bill 
initially suffered some setbacks, which according officials was because at the time it was proposed to 
the legislature, the governor had defected from the ruling party (which controls the state legislature) 
and thus the bill was defeated. However, the 2015 elections saw the governor’s party having a 
majority in the legislature, and thus provided an opportunity for the executive to push through the bill 
a second time: 
…that was why initially they [the legislature] never pay attention to NAGIS bill, as of 
then the relationship between the executive and the legislature was frosty. But with 
the coming of the new administration from day one there was a good relationship 
between the two arms [executive and legislature] and they passed the bill in less than 
2 years (w 13) 
The government also sponsored a public hearing to further give legitimacy to the bill so that it doesn’t 
get unnecessarily delayed at the state house of assembly. As one management official remarked:  
 … [the stakeholders] thought that their interests will not be covered by the bill, so 
what we did was to ensure that they [state legislature] organise a public hearing with 
stakeholders across Nasarawa state and beyond to come and give their views on what 
they think. For instance, i think at the state assembly out of so many submissions 
made, it was only one person that objected to the passage of the bill and he couldn't 
give his reasons why the bill should not be passed…we were constantly in dialogue 
with the lawmakers and emphasizing on the importance of the bill, so it was more of 
a collaborative effort… despite the delays it was eventually passed, because almost 
90% [legislative members] were in support of the NAGIS bill (w 12) 
Another perspective shared by many officials was that strong commitment showed by the 
management of the ministry also ensured successful implementation of the reforms. For instance, a 
management official told me that there was a strict supervision by the management on the proper 
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utilization of resources committed to the reforms. This implies that funds meant for implementation 
are not diverted to other purposes outside of the reform objectives: 
 coming from a different background as a hands-on person i prefer to go to the field 
and see what is happening but some people prefer a different style, for instance some 
prefer staying in the office. When I was a member of the transition committee of the 
reforms one of the things I observed was that the process was all muddled up, we have 
a system, but people hardly follow procedures and when I was brought in i saw an 
opportunity to correct things, so i read so much about modern land administration… 
(w 12)  
The management also ensured that they eliminated redundant and unnecessary administrative 
processes or reduced them to a minimum and even in some instances eliminated them altogether. 
For example, the land registration procedures were streamlined into a single document for easier 
understanding and application. Also, the time and number of procedures it takes to register a land or 
property were greatly reduced, so also was the establishment of a customer service centre to attend 
to public enquiries. Staff of the agency were trained on customer relations to better handle the public 
and a website was also created where information about the agency regulations and activities could 
be accessed twenty (24) hours a day (w 13). As one management declares:  
arguably we offer the best services to clients and if you observe we run the place like 
a bank, we are transparent, when you enter the ambience of the place and the manner 
you are received, and the language used, and you can’t have our staff yell at someone 
because they are properly trained (w 12)  
A secure electronic system of land administration was also put in place, and staff were given different 
levels of administrative access (based on their various job functions) so as to restrict access on who is 
authorised to access what documents: As a staff reported:   
every single activity is being monitored and we can produce a report showing who 
goes where, who logged on at a particular time. These are parameters set to ensure 
that the system is highly secured so that staff do not go outside of their scheduled 
duties (w 14) 
Some of the interviewed officials further reported that the management used a combination of carrot 
(rewarding those staff that put in efforts in their jobs) and stick (discouraging undesirable behaviour) 
approach to further elicit staff cooperation. For instance, whenever revenue targets were met, those 
concerned were usually given bonuses in order to encourage others to emulate them. Similarly, when 
targets for processing land titles are met, the management usually organise meetings with staff to 
67 
 
celebrate the successes achieved (w 15). Staff of the agency could also receive knocks (such as 
criticisms or warnings from the management) when too many procedural errors are made or when 
revenue targets are not met (w 16). These incentives according to the agency’s officials greatly 
improved land administration in the state, and in turn instilled public confidence in the process. For 
instance, the situation in the past was that it usually takes up to three (3) years for an individual to get 
a C of O, but with the current system, officials claimed that once an application meets all requirements, 
a C of O is processed within weeks. A management staff tries to compare what currently obtains with 
what happens prior to the reforms:  
 … i can proudly tell you that today you can see how the system works seamlessly… if 
you were here 4-5 years ago we use to have a thousand files here [pointing to a shelf 
in his office] waiting to be signed, now we have a computerized system and offices are 
transparent in their dealings, staff are not allowed to keep their files for over 24hrs, 
all our offices are open so that you could see what someone is doing, of course there 
could be a few who might be doing it [illegal practices] but on the whole am very proud 
to say that this has been reduced to the barest minimum (w 12) 
However, some officials also admitted that the issue of “land grabbing” remains a huge challenge for 
the land administrative bodies in the state. And that despite the ongoing public enlightenment 
campaigns associated with the risks of transacting on an unregistered land or property, many still don't 
verify the authenticity of land or property before going into transactions (w 14). Furthermore, other 
officials claim that it was the government’s determination to make the reforms a reality that made 
the difference, because despite the enormity of the challenges the agency faced (such as lean 
resources and a lack of support from development partners) the reforms pressed on. As one senior 
official disclosed: 
when you are doing reforms it also comes at a cost, you are doing a project that is 
important to partners such as the world bank…we wished the bank had given us a 
grant to support the project and we did went round to ask partners for support, if 
partner organisations had supported us it will have discounted the costs of 
implementation of the program but we had no support and the state government had 
invested billions of naira in the project (w 12) 
Another major achievement of the reforms according to officials was that the reforms embedded the 
newly created LIS with a fraud detection mechanism. Some officials claimed that they are confident 
that the new system can detect any attempts by officials to illegally engage in fraud can be detected. 
For example, they argued that the new platform is designed to monitor and record all activities of land 
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officers such that if anyone engages in any dishonest transaction with regards to land, he or she will 
be detected and will be called upon to explain why he carried out such an action. This according to 
them was why for instance early into the implementation of the reforms, positive results were 
observed: 
within the first year we started seeing changes, for example in April 2012 revenues 
jumped from 35 million naira that was what was generated in the [previous year 
before the reforms in 2011] to about 300 million naira and now we are currently 
generating 6 billion naira [annually], I did not initiate the project in the first place, but 
i studied it very well i dedicated so much time and effort to ensure the success of the 
project (w 13) 
However, a dominant concern expressed by the officials of the land agency is that this new 
arrangement may also come with its own challenges. For instance, as an IT based system, the agency 
is aware it could experience technical breakdowns or could be compromised (especially if those 
currently managing the project are no longer there).  This fear expressed by the officials was due to 
the experience with a similar past land reforms project implemented in Abuja (more specifically the 
Abuja Geographic Information System (AGIS)). After a few years of its existence, the AGIS project 
became an example of an abandoned project, because when a new management took over the project 
in 2007 it began to falter. It is important to note here that coincidentally the consultants currently 
handling the NAGIS project handled the AGIS project in Abuja. One management official tries to 
describe what the AGIS used to look like in its hey days: 
at the time in Abuja a staff cannot enter into the system and manipulate land titling 
fees, but today in AGIS people can do that, the initial program [the AGIS] with all its 
safeguard is now the subject of fraudulent abuse (w 14) 
The story according to those we had discussion with was that shortly after the consultants handling 
the AGIS project left, it started failing because all the administrative controls and checks put in place 
were largely abandoned by the new management that took over the project. Staff of the AGIS who 
previously have no access or restricted access to crucial areas of the land administration platform 
suddenly found themselves with privileged access to areas they are not supposed to handle. And thus, 
began a systemic and widespread abuse of the AGIS. Alarmingly, those that currently manage the 
NAGIS project fear that the same problem does not befall it by the time they leave:   
presently their contract [the consultants] expired in October 2017, but we are hoping 
it will be extended, we hope that by the time these people leave [the consultants] those 
who are going to manage the place will be strict and thorough just like as it is currently. 
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Our concern is that since we are in a democratic era [where government changes 
through electoral cycles] the person that may be at the helm of affairs may decide to 
sacrifice those that know and had been managing the system and bring his own people 
[nepotism] who may well be novices and with such kind of people the system can easily 
be compromised. Though we have put in place people that will take over from us so 
that the system will endure but that does not mean that the system may not change 
given uncertainty about future political events (w 14). 
Institutional Design of The Nasarawa Geographic Information Service 
(NAGIS)  
The Nasarawa Geographic Information Service (NAGIS) informally began operations with the 
implementation of a new land policy in 2012. However, the law establishing the agency was formally 
passed in 2017, the law establishing the agency states: 
 there is hereby established a body to be known as Nasarawa Geographic Information 
Service (in this law referred to as "NAGIS" to exercise the functions and powers, and 
pursue the objectives assigned to it by this law…NAGIS shall be a body corporate with 
perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in its corporate 
name (s 2 (1)(2)). 
The agency was established as an autonomous body mandated with powers to recruit, train and 
remunerate its staff and can also enter transactions with a third party while carrying out its functions 
(s 9)). It also has the mandate to exercise the following functions (a) create and compile all electronic 
land registration instruments (b) manage cadastral maps and datasets using the Geographic 
Information System (GIS) and the Land Information System (LIS) platforms, as well as serve as a source 
of survey information (c) process statutory Rights of Occupancy (RO), Certificate of Occupancy (CO),  
and issue grants of consents signed by the governor (d) provide support to the Land Use and Allocation 
Committee (LUAC) by facilitating its operations in the state as well as in each Local Government Area 
(LGA) of the state (e) provide administrative and technical support for the processing of grants of 
customary rights of occupancy (s 7 (1) (2) (3) (4)). 
In addition, it is also within the agency’s domain of competence to (f) acquire, own, dispose of or 
charge interests on fixed assets under its care (g) set standards in relation to the quality and format 
of geospatial information utilized by the state and local governments (h) bid for and accept grants 
made by international development agencies, and act as the state’s delivery agent on GIS based 
projects to other states in Nigeria, as well as the federal government (i) enter into collaboration with 
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academic institutions within Nigeria and internationally for the purposes of developing its staff 
capacity (j) charge fees for services it renders (k) subject to the approval of the Governor enter into 
other obligations in pursuance of the delivery of its services (s 9). To exercise the above functions 
without any hindrance, the NAGIS law explicitly states that obstructing or not complying with the 
agency in performing the functions conferred to it by the law constitute an offence which is liable to 
a fine of up to five hundred thousand-naira (500,000) or an imprisonment of six (6) months or even 
both (s 21). The NAGIS law also stipulates the conditions for commencing litigation against the agency 
in a court of law, the provision states that: 
 no suit shall be commenced against NAGIS before the expiration of a period of one 
month after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall have been served 
upon NAGIS by the intending plaintiff and the notice shall clearly and explicitly be 
stated (misc. 22)  
Political Control of the Agency 
By the position he occupies (as the chief executive officer of the state) the governor automatically 
assumes overall control of all instruments of land administration in the state. Section 1 subsection 1 
of the land use act of 1978 states: 
all land comprised in the territory of each state in the federation are hereby vested in 
the Governor of the state and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the 
use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of this act  
The NAGIS law also affirms the earlier powers granted the state governor by the Land use act of 1978, 
the NAGIS act also made the state governor the final approving authority of the most important 
instruments of land regulation in the state. The governor is the only authority that grants the Right of 
Occupancy (RO) and Certificate of Ownership (CO) to individuals or corporate bodies (s 5 (1)). The 
NAGIS law further stipulates that the agency “shall be domiciled under the office of the governor of 
Nasarawa state” (s 2 (2)), thereby effectively reinforcing the Governor’s overall control of the agency. 
Furthermore, it also empowers the governor to direct the agency or its Advisory Board to carry out 
other subsidiary functions, and it explicitly states that the agency and/or the advisory board shall 
comply with such instructions coming from the governor (s 19). However, some of these powers 
conferred on the governor are usually exercised through proxies. For instance, the governor is 
required to appoint a governing board that acts on his behalf to supervise and make policies and 
regulations for the agency, as the provisions of the NAGIS law states: 
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there is hereby established for NAGIS an advisory Board which shall consist of 
members appointed by the Governor (s 3 (1)) …the Advisory Board may, with the 
approval of the Governor, make such regulations as necessary or expedient for 
carrying into effect the provisions of this law (s 20) 
The advisory board exercise these powers through a periodic review of the agency’s regulatory policies 
and making appropriate policy recommendations in line with the state government’s objective of 
realizing an efficient land administrative system in the state. Furthermore, the board is also mandated 
to periodically convene a quarterly meeting with the management of the agency (headed by the DG 
of the agency) to discuss and review the business plan and budget of the agency, make 
recommendations and necessary adjustments to the agency’s regulatory policies. The advisory board 
is to also receive a quarterly report of the agency’s operations, review the report and if necessarily 
make further recommendations to the governor for action. However, the law also requires that any 
decision taken by the board over matters concerning the agency is to be done within three working 
days after the sitting of the board (s 6). Decisions of the board are binding on the agency if the board 
attains a minimum quorum of four (4) members including its chairman (suppl. 14). The law also sets 
out the specific criterion for the recruitment of members of the advisory board: 
 …should have cognate experience of modern public service institutions, and/or land 
administration, and/or any related field of geographical sciences or Information 
Technology (s 3 (2)).  
The advisory board is headed by a chairman who serve on a part time basis and is composed of 
members representing different relevant groups such as a representative of the Nigerian Bar 
Association (NBA) in the state; a representative of the Institute of Chartered Accountants Nigeria 
(ICAN); a representative from a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO); a representative specifically 
selected from an NGO focused on women; a representative from the state’s traditional rulers council; 
a representative from the Nasarawa Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture; a 
representative of the Nigerian Institute of Estate Surveyors and Valuers and finally the DG of NAGIS 
who shall also be on the board, whom the provision specifically states that he: 
… attends as a member except that he shall not be entitled to vote or count towards a 
quorum (s 3 (3)).  
The provisions also stipulate the maximum period the advisory members are to serve as well as how 
a member can be removed from office: 
 members shall hold office for a period of four years, renewable for a further period of 
four years only…a member may be removed from office by the Governor if he is 
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satisfied that it is not in the interest of NAGIS or the interest of the public that the 
member should continue in office (s 4 (3)). 
Members of the board are also required by law to declare any personal interests capable of conflicting 
with their professional judgement and decision or that of the board and that such a member shall 
abstain from voting on matters related to that (misc. 27) 
Administrative Control of the Agency 
The agency is headed by a Director General (DG), who is the chief executive and accounting officer of 
the agency and responsible for the execution of the agency’s policies as well as its management. The 
DG coordinates the implementation the agency’s business plans and budget and submits it for review 
to the advisory board at least three (3) months before the commencement of every financial year. In 
addition, the DG is also required by law to submit a quarterly report of the agency’s activities to the 
advisory board for review and may be called upon by the state Governor to perform other ad-hoc 
duties (s 13 (1)). Although the law is silent on who appoints the DG and the qualifications required of 
such position, it did however states that the DG shall serve a maximum two terms of four years each 
(s 13 (2)) and specifies the conditions under which he could be removed from office: 
the Director General may be removed from office for inability to discharge the 
functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other 
cause) or for gross misconduct (s 13(3)).  
The law requires that the agency operates a single financial account known as the "NAGIS Fund 
Account" from which it shall draw all its budgetary allocations and make fiscal appropriations. The 
account is to be opened on behalf of the agency by the office of the accountant general of the state. 
The provisions further stipulate that all revenues generated by the agency are to be deposited into 
the “NAGIS Fund Account” and that the account shall be audited annually with any unspent funds 
transferred back to the state treasury account (ss 14 and 15). The agency is also required by law to 
present its budget estimates for the next fiscal year to the state’s ministry of finance who in turn 
submits the budget to the governor all of which shall be done not later than the 30th September of 
every year (s 16 (2)). In addition to the statutory allocation the agency receives from the state’s 
treasury, with the consent of the governor the agency is also permitted by law to raise additional funds 
from both domestic and external sources: 
 subject to the approval of the Governor, NAGIS may from time to time borrow by way 
of overdraft or otherwise such sums as it may require for the effective discharge of its 
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functions under this law…grant charges, including charges over immovable property, 
as security for its obligations (s 10). 
The agency can also collaborate with academic or other relevant organizations for the purposes of 
acquiring or sharing knowledge or professional expertise. It can receive grants or donations or 
technical assistance both in cash and kind if such are consistent with the agency’s mandate and does 
not compromise on its regulatory functions (s 11). The law also spells out the timing as well as the 
guidelines in auditing the accounts of the agency. For instance, the agency is required by law to 
prepare a yearly financial report of its activities in the previous year not later than three months after 
end of each financial year. And that the DG shall submit this report together with its annual profit and 
loss accounts, and its audit report to the governor (s 17(1)). The accounts of the agency are to be 
audited by the auditor general or persons appointed by the auditor general not later than four (4) 
months after the end of the financial year (s 17(4)). Figure 2 below, depicts the formal structure of 
control of the agency. 
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Figure 2: FORMAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE NAGIS 
 
 
Keys:               indicates a top down (command) and a bottom up (reporting) relationship between actors  
                        indicates only a bottom up (reporting) relationship between actors  
                       indicates the actor is not formally part of the governance of the agency.  
Source (own illustration) 
 
Staff Perceptions on the Internal Workings of the Agency  
Funding and other Support to the Agency 
A consistent viewpoint among management staff was that of a general satisfaction with the level of 
support the agency receives from the state government. Especially regarding the funding of its 
operations, officials reported that whenever the agency makes request to the state government, they 
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are promptly approved by the state governor. This support according to agency was crucial in enabling 
the smooth operations of the agency. Some of the various responses coming from the agency’s 
officials includes: 
we get adequate funding from the government and the political will is there…the 
project was so dear to the governor’s heart…despite lean resources due to the 
recession because the reform was solely financed by the state government, the state 
the governor was very interested in the project and supported us generously and 
without his support we wouldn't have gotten to where we are today and that's why 
the project succeeded, every credit goes to him. ‘As a regulatory agency’ [changed 
some wordings to mask respondent identity] ‘we’ do the proposals and he does the 
approvals” (w 12). 
the agency is fully funded by government, without any external assistance we wouldn’t 
have been here. For instance, generators [to provide constant power to the agency], 
vehicles [for running the operations of the agency], production equipment [machines 
needed to process lands documents i.e. charting of survey plans etc], are capital 
intensive (w 12). 
the governor is always happy with the ministry, that is why he is cooperating with us 
all the time consenting to our demands such as funding, equipment etc (w 13).  
this is the governor’s baby [referring to the agency], if there is anything he is proud of 
is NAGIS we are the yielding fruit in the state that is why he regularly visit us. Apart 
from the revenue aspect, we also help the government in geographic mapping. for 
instance, during the Ombatse crisis [ethnic militia cleansing] of 2014/2015 we help 
provided the security agencies with the [geographical] mapping of entry and exits 
points of the whole state and other important landmarks that the governor was so 
happy about. [In 2017] we also developed the smart city geospatial map (w 14). 
Top management officials of the agency stated that one of the reasons responsible for its performance 
was the presence of a highly-motivated staff which according to them was due to the government’s 
provision of a modern and fully equipped conducive working environment. In addition, they also claim 
that regular payment staff salaries further reinforce this. As some official remarked:  
in fact, this is the first time in my life that i have where salaries of staff are embedded 
in the project contract and there is a plan to migrate all the staff into the mainstream 
civil service where their salaries will be paid by the state government but for now their 
salaries reside with the project (w 14). 
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staff are given all the necessary tools such as computers, trainings [on the job capacity 
building], in short, we are given what we need to do our job (w 16) 
Oversight of the Agency’s Activities  
Senior officials of the agency reported that not only does the commissioner of lands regularly hold 
meetings with the agency to discuss its activities, but that the state governor receive regular briefings 
on the operations of the agency: 
we have to inform the governor by submitting monthly reports concerning our 
activities to the governor and we also hold regular meetings in the ministry (w 12).   
Some officials also reported often seeing the governor at the agency, as one official declared “the 
governor regularly come in unscheduled visits” and when he was asked to specify on average the 
number of such visits by the governor he mentions: “say quarterly [four times] in a year” (w 14). This 
was also corroborated by other officials of the agency: 
 for the governor to visit your agency at least three times a year means he is very 
interested in the agency (w 13).  
because the governor comes two to three times a year and in place there are 
consultants [those handling the IT component of the NAGIS project] checking what we 
do on behalf of the management (w 16).  
At the mid and lower levels, there was also a general feeling that the management is very meticulous 
with work tasks, as indicated by some their responses: 
even if a staff mistakenly skipped a step, he will be referred back to correct it, the 
procedures must be 100% complied with (w 15). 
my boss doesn’t joke with me when it comes to writing reports, when he gives me work 
he always wants it done at the right time and whenever any activity took place a report 
must be written and submitted to him (w 17) 
whenever we have special activities [such as meetings or seminars] my supervisor 
always asked us to cover the event and report to him (w 18). 
The Agency’s Loyalty Norms  
A recurrent view among the management staff of the agency, was the perception that the agency is 
more obligated to the government than to the public. As one management staff remarked: 
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 this is a government organisation, in the land use act it says all lands is vested in the 
governor, therefore whatever we do his excellency [the governor] must approve of it 
and if we are to do anything concerning land administration policies we must consult 
with the governor (w 13).  
Similarly, among the middle and lower staff there was also a general feeling of obligation to their 
bosses than to the public: 
as civil servants we are more of a hierarchical organisation, so obeying instructions is 
a must. For instance, if I have a customer in front of me and my supervisor ask me to 
do something, I have to stop whatever I am doing and attend to him and come back 
later to the customer (w 18). 
Officials reported that the reason for this feeling of obligation to the government was due to the 
technical nature of their jobs. They suggest that the agency is mostly composed professionals such as 
surveyors and town planners who consider their bosses as more important than the public when it 
comes to taking decisions on land matters. Some officers declared:  
because I take directives from him [director], we work according to policy (w 16).  
I am more answerable to my supervisor because I receive instructions from him (w 17) 
Discretion in Decision Making at the Agency  
A dominant view among management officials was that in general the agency does not independently 
take decisions outside of their mandate. And that any new policy or regulatory decision the agency is 
about to take must first be communicated to the state governor before such a decision is taken: 
we often consult the governor before taking decisions outside our mandate, otherwise 
we stay within limit (w 13) 
especially decisions that affects the public, we must first consult with the governor (w 
14). 
we have to inform the governor, we have to brief him [the governor] even in case of 
an emergency decision (w 14).   
At the middle and lower levels, there is also a feeling of obligation to notify their bosses before taking 
decisions. Staff reported that he management does not allow them take independent decisions 
regarding their jobs and that they only take decisions within the scope of what their job functions 
specifies. Several officers expressed these feelings: 
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we strictly follow laid down procedures, i constantly consult with my superior before 
taking any action in the unit (w 16) 
whatever I decide, and my supervisor learnt of it he normally does not concur 
[disagrees] with me (w 17) 
here we don’t take independent decisions, all what we do we have to adhere to 
established guidelines (w 16).  
 I am required to explain in detail to supervisor in whatever processes I follow 
concerning land registration, i have to strictly follow instructions given by my 
supervisor, although I feel free but whatever I do I cannot go out of the rules (w 18).  
When further asked to give specific examples, one staff had this to say: 
every morning I must see Mr [name withheld] and briefed him and he usually asked 
me to inform him on my unit’s previous day activities, therefore it means I report to 
him every day, as I mentioned earlier the only time that i don’t have to inform him of 
what I am doing is when I change the order of which work gets more priority in my 
unit (w 15). 
Public Access to Information on the Activities of the Agency 
Most of the senior officials of the agency reported that information on the regulatory activities of the 
agency is always in the public domain and that such information is easily accessible to the public. They 
mentioned some of the ways the agency informs the public about its activities which includes 
organising town hall meetings with the local people, placing advertisements on newspapers, TV and 
radio. When asked to provide specific instances of such activities some of the senior official had this 
to say: 
the agency always provides documents, we are a repository of land documents 
therefore we are obliged to supply the public with requests (w 13) 
we have a dedicated customer service unit and shelves that display all of our agency’s 
activities. In fact because of FOI [Freedom of Information Act] we have to abide by 
whatever the public ask except if it is a classified information (w 14) 
However, officials at the mid-level and lower levels reported mixed feelings about public access to the 
agency’s information, while some reported that the public is not adequately informed about the 
regulatory guidelines of the agency: 
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the public are not adequately aware of the agency’s activities, despite our sensitization 
and enlightenment campaigns the rules and regulations are still not very clear to the 
public (w 15) 
 most of the locals have no knowledge of the rules and regulations, that is why 
sometimes we embark on enlightenment campaigns (w 18) 
Others reported that the public is well informed about the regulations: 
if you go to the customer care, all information the public should have is provided there, 
flyers are there, and our staff are always on seat to attend to or provide clarifications 
to the public (w 16) 
we are here to serve the people, we are here for them that’s why we place information 
on social media, TV, radio, newspapers notices board and even on our website (w 17) 
after putting out notices in the media, we also paste in all the key public places for the 
public to see. We also have archival records though not many of such records (w 15) 
most of the time the agency staff go out to enlighten the public through house to house 
visitations. For instance, out of the 13 local governments in the state NAGIS has 6 zonal 
offices in order to be closer to the people in those areas (w 17) 
How the Agency Makes Regulatory Decisions  
The dominant view among management officials was that land policies or regulations are usually 
decided internally and the public is informed afterwards. Some of the officials interviewed, reported 
that the agency informs the public of such decisions through notices or gazettes. Some of the officials 
disclosed that the reason the agency usually decides on the regulation internally is that the agency 
assumes it is acting in public interest: 
we don’t generally pre-notify the public because we generate our policies based on 
lesson learnt as we deal with the public…we don’t need to often inform them on what 
we are about to decide, we decide in the public interests (w 13). 
when we wanted to introduce property registration we visited the head chief ruler of 
Karu [a traditional ruler of a local government], who in turn invited local chiefs and 
market women and enlighten them on the benefits of regularizing [formalizing] their 
property. That is why now we have no any hitches whenever we embark on our site 
activities (w 14) 
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whenever we are coming out with fresh initiatives or guidelines we often put out 
adverts in the media because this is a service organisation (w 16). 
Clarity of the Agency’s Regulatory Mandate 
A commonly held view by the agency’s management officials was that the rules and regulations 
guiding land administration in the state are detailed and easy to comprehend by both the staff and 
the public: 
we have regulations and processes, for every process we have a guideline, for instance 
to title land that belongs to an individual or a person is consenting his land for 
mortgage purposes and we expect our staff to follow strictly on those guidelines and 
if you go outside those guidelines then right away the alarm bells go off [referring to 
how the IT system is configured to call the attention of supervisors when an officer 
goes beyond his level of access to the (Land Information System) (LIS)] (w 12) 
we have procedures and guidelines manual specifically prepared for guiding both staff 
and the public (w 13) 
Those interviewed at the middle and lower levels also reported that the regulations are clear enough 
and not difficult to apply: 
I think it’s easy to follow because we know the guidelines very well of which we explain 
to the customer in detail, it’s not difficult we have the rules stated so we just follow 
what it says, we only encounter difficulties in cases of land dispute between individuals 
and even with that there are procedures for resolving the issue (w 18) 
A staff even went further to demonstrate his understanding of what the regulations says about 
registering a land: 
before opening a file [an application to register a land or property] you must have your 
agreement letter between parties to land transactions, you must have a site plan and 
a change of ownership letter duly signed by the local authorities. And here in NAGIS 
there is site inspection where a team of town planners inspect the property and make 
sure all regulations are followed before we process the application (w 16). 
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Compliance with Administrative Procedures and Enforcing Sanctions at 
the Agency 
While some officials of the agency reported that cases of non-compliance are dealt with swiftly and 
severely: 
once a staff violate any of our laws we sanction immediately to serve as a deterrent 
to others (w 13) 
sometimes our bosses are too harsh on us concerning what we are supposed to do, 
once a staff violates any rules here the management punish him”, of recent we had a 
staff that quarrelled with his supervisor over a wrong doing a panel was setup to 
investigate it and knowing what the outcome is he left because he knows the outcome 
(w 17). 
Others reported that sanctions are not often strictly applied, that the management follows the 
substantive rules of the state civil service which provided guidance on how civil servants are to 
sanctioned. This was indicated by the responses below: 
 when you report a case on irregularity first the staff will be warned, and so far, we 
are fresh graduates that is why ministry staff are not brought in to contaminate staff 
with bureaucracy and insubordination behaviours (w 16).  
most time before a staff is punished he goes through series of warnings like two or 
three times and most times people adjust their behaviour (w 18).  
it rarely happens that staff are found to engage in serious offenses that warrant 
straight punishment. However, there are often cases of mistakes in workflow that staff 
are normally warned to pay attention (w 15) 
if a staff or an applicant under or over declare the dimensions of a property to suit his 
interests. In such cases, we just warn because with the system we have we can take 
the dimensions based on aerial photograph of the site and then warn the staff not to 
do such again since we can always detect it (w 14) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Cross River State  
Brief Profile of Cross River State 
Cross River State is a coastal state in the south-south region of Nigeria, named after a confluence river, 
which passes through the state. The state covers a 20,156 square kilometres of land area and shares 
boundaries with Benue and Ebonyi states to the north, Abia State to the west, the Cameroon Republic 
to the east and Akwa-Ibom and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. 
The State was created on May 27, 1967 from the former Eastern Region, by the military regime of 
General Yakubu Gowon. The state was officially granted state status in 1976 by the then military 
regime of General Murtala Mohammed (www.crossriverstate.gov.ng). The state has an estimated 
population of over 3 million people and is divided into 18 local government areas, these include Abi, 
Akamkpa, Akpabuyo Bakassi, Bekwarra, Biase, Boki, Calabar Municipal, Calabar South, Etung, Ikom, 
Obanliku, Obubra, Obudu, Odukpani, Ogoja, Yakuur, Yala (Ogundijo 2015).  
 
Source: Ikpi and Offem 2012 
Ejagham and Efik are the two major languages widely spoken in the state and its economy is 
predominantly agricultural and where about 40% of the population are actively engaged the 
agricultural sector. Some of the major crops cultivated in the state include cassava, yams, rice, 
plantain, banana, cocoyam, maize, cocoa, rubber, groundnut and palm produce. Its main livestock 
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production are cattle, goats, and pigs and mineral resources in the state include limestone, titanium, 
iron ore and crude oil (www.lawyard.ng). 
Reconstructing the Processes Leading to the Reforms of Institutions of 
Land Administration in the State  
Experience over the years has shown that the manual system of land administration presided over by 
the ministry of lands in Cross River state is seen as too bureaucratic and characterised by irregularities 
(w 7). It is also common knowledge that officials of the ministry of lands often engage in all sorts of 
questionable practices to manipulate the system for personal gains and thereby denying the public of 
good services and the state government of vital revenues (w 7). There were calls from several quarters 
both within and outside the government for the reform of the existing system of land administration 
into an efficient and transparent one. The idea according to the proponents of the reforms is that 
doing this will entrench sanity and public confidence in the system. Those within government felt that 
unlike the manual system which is to manipulate by officials, the introduction of a computerised 
system of land administration will minimise fraud since most administrative procedures will be 
automated. For example, with the automated system according to them land registration fees is 
automatically programmed to generate a fixed amount and thereby act as a constraint on the ability 
of officials tasked with registering lands or property to alter figures. The aim is to block revenue 
leakages in the system and thus raise the overall revenues accruing from the land sector in the state 
(w 3).  
In 2009, the state government headed by the then governor (Senator Liyel Imoke) set in motion series 
of reform efforts aimed at placing the state among leading states on ease of doing business in the 
country. The idea according to the government was simple; if ‘’land transactions [could] be made 
quickly, transparently and with confidence” through establishing a single independent agency to be 
known as “one stop shop”, then the state can favourably compete with other states in Nigeria as a 
leading investment destination (Edmead 2013: 9). To achieve this objective, the state government 
came up with four strategies (a) reduced the cost of acquiring land by at least 10% (b) reduced the 
number of procedures and days it takes to formally register a land (c) make the process of 
administering land a more transparent and accountable one (d) institutionalized property rights to 
attract foreign investments to achieve (ibid).  
The reforms were consolidated in 2011, with the transmission of a proposed bill by state government 
to the state house of assembly for the establishment of the Cross-River Geographic Information 
Agency (CRGIA). The CRGIA bill was passed into law as CRGIA Law No 2 of 2012 and it sets out the 
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proposed changes to the land administration system of the state. Thus, began the processes for the 
establishment of a modern system of land administration (using the Geographic Information System 
(GIS)) in the state. To this end the state government invested about $6.3 million with a contract 
awarded to technical consultants Tec Bridge Nig Ltd and Thomson Reuters of USA to setup a modern 
system of land administration system in the state using the Geographic Information System (GIS). The 
objective is to (1) reduce the turnaround time for processing land title documents, as the manual 
system of land titling that was in use was time consuming and therefore the computerised system as 
envisaged will significantly reduce the volume of work as well as time taken to produce land titles (2) 
it was also envisaged that the new system will help eliminate fraud since all relevant organizations 
tasked with the various processes of land administration in the state will be brought under a unified 
system, so that whatever any single agency or official within the agencies are doing they are being 
monitored (w 7). 
The reforms were implemented in two stages; the first stage called the ‘’fast track stage’’ involves the 
setting up and building of the virtual and physical infrastructure such as workstations for the 
recertification of land titles. And the second stage referred to as the ‘’re-engineering stage’’ was 
supposed to be the phase where all the relevant bodies in charge of land administration in the state 
are connected to a central land database. For instance, the re-engineering stage was envisaged to 
connect both the ministry of lands and the CRIGIA in sharing information, so that the land 
administration architecture can support communication across land bodies virtually (w 3). However, 
it is to be noted that the implementation of the reforms began to stall from 2015 due to the conflict 
that ensued between the parent ministry of lands and the newly created agency as the reforms 
proceeded (w 7).  
The Implementation of the Reforms and the Resultant Disagreement 
Over Mandate 
To understand how the implementation of the reforms resulted in conflict between the parent 
ministry and the newly created agency, we need to go back a little to the period before the 
establishment of the CRGIA. Prior to the reforms, the ministry of lands administers all instruments of 
land registrations such as processing applications for Certificate of Occupancy (CO) or Right if 
Occupancy (RO) in the state. The process usually starts with the ministry acquiring large parcel of land 
on behalf of the government and divides it into smaller plots and invites the Land Use Allocation 
Committee (LUAC) to notify the public of the availability of such lands for allocation. The LUAC is a 
committee enshrined in the Land Use Act of 1978, with the mandate of: 
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(a)… advising the governor on any matter connected with the management of land (b) 
advising the governor on any matter connected with the resettlement of persons 
affected by the revocation of rights of occupancy on the grounds of overriding public 
interest under this act; and (c) determining conflicts as to the amount of compensation 
payable under this act for improvements [done] on land (State Land Laws Part 1: L4-3)  
However, when the CRGIA was created, some of the core functions previously handled by the ministry 
of lands were transferred to it. However, the elections of 2015 saw a change of government as well as 
a new leadership at the ministry of lands. The new commissioner of lands reverted some of these core 
functions that were earlier ceded to the CRGIA back to the ministry. For example, the issuance of land 
application forms was given back to the ministry. The ministry claims that since it is the responsibility 
of the LUAC to notify and allocate lands to the public as stipulated in section 3 of the 1978 land use 
act, it is only natural that the LUAC also issue land application forms (w 3). The CRGIA on the other 
hand disagreed with the ministry and claims that it is the only agency mandated by the law to charge 
fees for the processing land registration and which also includes the issuance of land application 
forms. The officials of the CRGIA claims that it is not the statutory responsibility of the LUAC issue 
application forms and by implication also charge fees. It instead argues that the responsibility of LUAC 
is that of providing policy advice to the governor on land allocation and compensation claims where 
the government has acquired lands belonging to individuals (w 7). 
These claims over mandate by both sides marks the beginning of an acrimonious relationship between 
the parent ministry and the CRGIA. The agency felt its autonomy has been threatened, by accusing 
the ministry of refusing to allow it fully to exercise its mandate. A management staff of the CRGIA 
declared: 
we are yet to be autonomous, for example according to the law we should prepare 
consent [processing application for granting rights to transact on land] instead of the 
ministry, but in reality, this is not the case (w 4) 
This has also affected how officials in the two organisations perceived oversight of the agency. In other 
words, there are disagreement as to which political authority is to oversee the agency’s activities. For 
example, a dominant view among the ministry officials is that the commissioner of lands has the 
powers to make regulations as well supervise the activities of the CRGIA, as one senior official of the 
ministry states: 
for me the commissioner represents the governor in overseeing the ministry and the 
agency...every Monday all departments heads and units meet with the commissioner 
and give him updates of their activities who in turn reports to the governor (w 6) 
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However, a contrasting view held by senior officials of the CRGIA was that advisory board is mandated 
to perform this function and not the commissioner, as a management official of the CRGIA asserts: 
 they [the ministry] are not involved in running the agency, theirs is at the policy level, 
if it becomes very regular the issue of autonomy is at stake (w 2)  
the commissioner on his own cannot just direct us on what we should do, he doesn’t 
have such powers at best anything he wants done he can write to us through the 
governing board (w 7).  
The dominant view among officials of the agency is that the parent ministry wants to keep agency 
under its control since the agency is now generating revenues that by far surpassed what the ministry 
was generating prior to the creation of the agency. For instance, in the past, the annual revenues 
generated by the ministry (as claimed by some officials of the CRGIA) has never surpassed five hundred 
million naira (500m), as compared to that of the CRGIA where in 2016 alone, it generated a whopping 
one billion eight hundred million naira (1.8bn) (w 4). Therefore, the CRGIA felt that the ministry is 
doing all it can to frustrate any efforts aimed at ensuring the agency is fully autonomous from the 
ministry, as one official puts it: 
the former governor was so passionate about us [the CRGIA] so much so that for him 
we should be completely be autonomous from the ministry of land (w 5).  
The crisis had reached an all-time low such that there is currently little or no cooperation between the 
two to coordinate on the regulation of the land sector in the state, as one official told me:  
even administrative procedures such as files exchange meant for processing land 
documents are returned unsigned [by the ministry], in the last administration things 
were not this bad, but now it is so bad that it looks as though the commissioner himself 
is involved in this (w 7). 
As at the time of writing this chapter, both parties have gone before the state house of assembly 
seeking further clarifications over mandate, but the state’s legislature is yet to pass any resolution on 
the matter (W 4). Officials of the CRIGIA felt that the ministry of lands refuses to allow the reforms 
work because it benefits from the status quo. To buttress this claim, an official of the CRGIA cited a 
case of an individual who paid seven hundred and fifty thousand naira (750,000) for a C of O but 
couldn't get his C of O and when a follow up was done on his file the only evidence found of payment 
was eleven-naira sixty kobo (11.60). He further asserts: 
 so, do you expect such a people to allow you to come change things for the better? 
that is exactly what is going on [impunity and corruption], so it will take extra ordinary 
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courage for someone to sanitise that place by not allowing things to go the way they 
are currently (w 7).  
The agency also accused the commissioner of lands of high handedness by refusing to constitute the 
governing board which according to them is the body mandated to supervise the activities of the 
agency. An official of the agency told me that in the previous administration, when the governing 
board was in existence this was not the case (w 7). The management of the agency felt the problem 
would have been sorted out if the advisory board was in place (note that the board was dissolved in 
2015 with the inauguration of a new government and a new one is yet to be constituted). The thinking 
according to some senior officials of the agency was that since by law the board is constituted of 
diverse interests, the agency might get a fair hearing, as one management official states: 
…doing this may help check the dictatorial tendencies of the commissioner [of lands] 
and if he [commissioner of lands] insists on having his way then the whole world will 
see that he is being autocratic… and i think that is why he doesn't want the board 
constituted (w 7) 
The Institutional Design of the Cross-River Geographic Information 
Agency (CRGIA) 
Law No 2 of 2012 formally established the Cross-River Geographic Information Agency (CRGIA) and 
transferred some core functions previously handled by the state’s ministry of lands to the newly 
created agency. A governing board and management officials were appointed, staff were also 
recruited and trained.  The agency the agency formally commenced operations in 2012 (w 7). Part 1 
of the of the CRGIA Law states: 
there is hereby established the Cross-River State Geographic Information Agency...a 
body corporate with separate legal personality and a common seal and may sue and 
be sued in its corporate name (s 1 (1) (2)). 
By the law establishing it, the agency is to operate as autonomous entity, it has the mandate to decide 
its own internal matters such as funding, recruitment, and sets both the rules of staff conduct as well 
as sanction independent of the state civil service rules and regulations of the state: 
the staff of the agency shall function outside the state civil service structure and 
recruitment, retention and discipline of staff of the agency shall be conducted in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of service of the agency as approved by the 
Governor or contained in the regulations made pursuant to this law (s 21 (2)) 
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The CRGIA law also grants the agency the mandate to retain five percent (5%) of the total revenues it 
generates to fund its operations. In addition, the agency can also source funding from the state 
government’s budget and other sources such as grants or contributions which shall be accounted for 
by the agency (s 17 (1)(2)). Some of the core functions carried out by the agency under the CRGIA law 
are (a) establishing and regulating standards on land related data in the state (b) creating and 
compilating land registry records and registering land instruments (c) serve as repository of land and 
survey information and data charge fees for services related to these (k) processing of Rights of 
Occupancy (RO), issuance of Certificates of Occupancy (C of O), and granting of consent to land 
transactions (d) providing support to the activities of the Land Use Allocation Committee (LUAC) at 
the state level as and in each Local Government Area (LGA) (e) providing administrative support for 
the processing of grants of customary rights of occupancy and (f) perform other functions related to 
the discharge of its responsibilities (s 2). 
The CRGIA is also mandated to (g) acquire, own, dispose or charge interests on fixed assets (h) enter 
into contract with third party in the discharge of its functions (i) sets the direction and standards on 
geospatial information adopted by the state government and local government councils (j) charge 
fees, for rendering its services to clients (k) obligations subject to the approval of the state governor 
can raise funds externally by entering into agreements with other entities (l) grant charges including 
charges over immovable property as security for its obligations (m) compile and collate information 
about land within the domain of the state, and to provide products and services derived from that 
information to the government and the general public (s 4). Although the law is silent on the penalty 
imposed on individuals in case of any deliberate attempt aimed at obstructing the agency from 
carrying out its mandate. It does however anticipate a possibility of legal action brought against the 
agency, in which case it states who should represent the agency in a court of law: 
in any civil action or proceeding [brought against it], the agency may at any time be 
represented in court by a state counsel or a legal practitioner approved by the attorney 
general of the state (misc. 23).  
Political Control of the Agency  
By the position he occupies as the chief executive officer of the state, the governor automatically 
assumes overall control of all instruments of land administration in the state. For example, the state 
governor is the final approving authority in the granting of RO as well as approval of CO of lands to 
individuals or corporate organisations (s 5 (1)). Section 1 subsection 1 of the land use act of 1978 states 
that: 
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all land comprised in the territory of each state in the federation are hereby vested in 
the Governor of the state and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the 
use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of this act  
In addition to these powers, the CRGIA law also grants the state governor the powers to direct the 
agency to carry out other subsidiary duties: 
the Governor may give to the Agency directives of a general or specific nature with 
respect to the performance by the Agency of its functions under this law (s 24). 
However, some of the powers of the governor over the agency are exercised by proxy, for instance, 
the governor appoints a governing board that acts on his behalf to supervise and make policies and 
regulations for the agency such as (a) formulating policies for the agency to achieve the objective of 
the government such as an efficient system of land administration in the state (b) vetting the financial 
accounts and annual reports of the agency prior to submission to the state governor (c) approving the 
business plan and budget of the agency (d) providing advice and guidance to the head of the agency 
(s 7). To exercise this mandate, the advisory board under the direction of its chairman is required to 
meet at least once every three months to discuss and review the activities of the agency (s 12), and 
that whatever was decided in such meetings of the advisory board shall be valid and binding upon the 
agency provided board members present at the meeting have met a minimum criterion of seven 
members (s 13). 
Other provisions of the CRGIA law that further enabled for political control of the agency, is with 
regards to the revenues it generates. For instance, not only is the governor authorised to demand and 
be provided information about the agency’s activities, but the state legislature is as well authorised to 
review the agency’s financial accounts as well as its operations: 
copies of the [agency’s] accounts, auditor’s report and annual report [of the agency’s 
operations] shall be submitted by the [management] board to the Governor and to the 
State House of Assembly (s 17(5)) 
Although the CRGIA law is silent with respect to the qualifications of those who are to be recruited 
into the advisory board, but it does stipulates that the advisory board shall be composed of the 
following members: the commissioner of lands as the chair, the director general of the agency, the 
surveyor general of the state, the director of town panning, the special adviser to the governor on 
security, a chairman of a local  government council representing other local government councils, a 
representative of the ministry of agriculture, a representative of the ministry of environment, a 
representative of the forestry commission, a representative of the ministry of finance and four 
representatives from the private sector, one of whom shall be from an NGO with cognate experience 
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in land administrative nominated by the state governor (s 6). The law further specifies that the tenure 
in which the board shall serve in office is a maximum of two terms of four years (s 8) and that in case 
a board member is found to have committed a misconduct or is convicted, upon recommendation by 
a disciplinary committee such member may be removed from office by the governor (s 9). 
Administrative Control of the Agency 
At the administrative level, the commissioner of lands (subject to the approval of the governor of the 
state and the state house of assembly) may make certain regulations for the agency, for example, the 
commissioner may (a) set the fees and charges for the payment of services the agency renders to the 
public as well as set the pre-conditions and the procedures for calculating such fees and charges (b) 
recommend the forms and formats of documents and how these documents should be procured or 
authenticated by the agency in the course of carrying out its regulatory mandate (c) the commissioner 
may also make other regulations that are necessary for the effective operations and performance of 
the agency (s 20; s21 (1)(2)(3)).  
Next in line in the hierarchy of administrative command is the Director General (DG) who acts as head 
of the agency. The DG (also appointed by the state governor) is mandated to (a) provide an account 
of the agency activities (b) be responsible for implementing the decisions of the advisory board as well 
as overseeing the administrative activities of the agency and (c) perform other subsidiary duties 
assigned to him by the advisory board (s 14 (1)(2)). The CRGIA law also spells out the qualifications 
required to be the DG, it says the: 
[DG] shall have a degree or equivalent qualification in the physical or social sciences 
or law, and at least ten years’ relevant post qualification experience five of which must 
be in management position (s 14 (3)).  
The CRGIA law also provided for a secretary to the agency who is to also act as its legal adviser and 
whose function is to (a) organise and keep minutes of meetings of the advisory board (b) heads the 
legal department of the agency and performs other ad-hoc duties assigned to him by the DG or the 
advisory board (s 15 (1)(2)). The law also requires that the secretary should be a qualified lawyer with 
a minimum of ten (10) years post qualification experience (s 15 (3)). The various departments of the 
agency are headed by directors who communicate the various decisions of the management to staff 
and ensure compliance with such decisions. And finally, there are units within each department that 
are headed by unit heads who monitor and supervise the activities of staff under the different units 
and reports to the directors of departments. Together these different components carry out the 
regulatory mandate of the agency in accordance with the provisions of the CRGIA law.  
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The agency’s financial year runs annually (between January and December) and it is required by law 
to present to the advisory board its budget for the following year not later than September 30th of 
every year (s 18 (1)(2). The agency is also required to reflect in its financial accounts a full record of 
profit and losses incurred and that such accounts are to be audited (not later than six months after 
the preceding financial year) by the state auditor general or auditors appointed by the auditor general. 
The auditor general is also empowered by law to initiate investigations into the financial transactions 
of the agency if he has cause to do so. Furthermore, the agency is also required to prepare an annual 
report of activities it carried out during the previous year not later than three months into the current 
year (s 19 (1)(2)(3)(4)). Figure 3 below, depicts the formal structure of control of the agency. 
Figure 3: FORMAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE CRGIA 
 
Keys:               indicates a top down (command) and a bottom up (reporting) relationship between actors  
                        indicates only a bottom up (reporting) relationship between actors  
                       indicates the actor is not formally part of the governance of the agency.  
Source (own illustration) 
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Staff Perceptions on the Internal Workings of the Agency  
Funding and other Support to the Agency 
At the management level, senior officials of the ministry and the CRGIA had a consensus that 
underfunding partly account for the land administration bodies dwindling performance. Most officials 
agreed that they don’t get adequate funding support from the state government, as one senior official 
of the ministry tries to defend the ministry’s lack lustre performance: 
the governor expressed his displeasure that the ministry is slow in carrying out its 
duties, but he forgets that he refuses to release funds to the ministry to enable us to 
perform our functions (w 3).  
For instance, all revenues generated by the CRGIA, goes directly to the state government’s central 
treasury account, and that not even the 5% to run its operations stipulated by the law t is given to the 
agency. Thus, the agency can neither fund its operations nor even pay the salaries of its staff. One 
high-ranking official of the CRGIA describes the situation as akin to “putting money in a bottomless 
pit’’, he goes on to state that: 
how the money is spent can only be explained by the accountant general of the state, 
nothing come to us… in order for this place not to shut down completely people are 
personally sacrificing their money to run this place...management staff often 
personally give money to staff to go outside and print or photocopy documents… in 
the last 3 years operational funds for vehicles have not being paid (w 4) 
These challenges were also re-echoed by other management officials when they told a story of how 
the agency was operating at optimum until the new government came into power in 2015 and thus a 
change of leadership at the ministry. A senior official noted that within a period of just two (2) years 
the agency has gone from one with bright prospects to one of bleak future. The officials I discussed 
with told me that in the first few years of its operation, the agency was so funded and functional that 
it cannot even experience five (5) minutes of power failure.  But according to him, today the agency 
cannot even pay its energy bills such that incessant power cuts from the power company are often 
experienced by the agency.  He further adds whenever such situation happens the management 
usually resort to personally raising funds among themselves in order to tip the power company to 
restore back power. Other officials’ further shed light on the current situation facing the agency:  
a customer will walk in no paper, ink and the computer dead [not functional] to offer 
any services (w 7). 
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the processes are characterised by a lot of difficulties, for instance the CRGIA was 
created to operate 24hrs but it is currently operating below average [sub optimally] 
due to broken equipment and light problem [incessant power outages], in fact the 
problem is so bad that staff cannot even access their computers due to lack of power 
(w 5) 
As at the time of writing this chapter officials stated that the agency’s staff salaries have not being 
paid in the last 12 months (w 7). A further challenge the agency currently faces was that of lack of 
working tools such as servers and computers, officials reported that even the equipment for 
processing land titles is currently domiciled in the governor’s office not at the agency further making 
the process of issuing land titles less efficient and time consuming (w 3).  
Oversight of the Agency’s Activities  
A commonly held view among officials was a lack of effective oversight on the activities of the agency, 
officials of the agency are of the view that the ongoing acrimony between the two organisations partly 
accounts for the inability of the ministry to effectively supervise the activities of the agency. The 
responses aptly capture these feelings: 
because of the crisis with the ministry, we have a conflict relationship with our 
supposed oversight ministry (w 4).  
i remembered the [name and title withheld] told me that over 2 years now the 
commissioner has been promising to constitute the board but up to now he hasn't 
done so, yet he is supposed to be the chairman of the board… the way i see it is not in 
the interest of the commissioner for the governing board to exist (w 7) 
Furthermore, there was also a widely-held view among officials that the governor as well as the state 
legislature does not give enough attention to the activities of the organisations in charge of 
administering land in the state, one higher-ranking officials claims that: 
the governor hardly visits the ministry, the only time i saw the governor is when he 
came to the secretariat [the secretariat is where all government ministries are located] 
wanting to catch late comers (w 3) 
A CRGIA official also states a similar feeling:  
presently the governor has never been here [referring to the CRGIA] since he was 
inaugurated [in 2015], he seems disinterested in the agency (w 5) 
The same view was also expressed about the state house of assembly, one official had this to say: 
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 it was only when staff protested [over salary] that i saw the members of the assembly 
[legislators] (w 4) 
This feeling of poor attention of the political authorities on the activities of the land regulatory 
organisations also cascaded down among the middle and lower levels. A consistently held belief 
among the mid and lower levels staff was that of a lax atmosphere within their organisations, 
especially in terms of scrutiny on what specific administrative procedures staff follow as they perform 
their job functions: 
 since the work is not there due to poor working environment, therefore they 
[management] don't expect much from us (w 8) 
Another officer reported: 
 sometimes when we go out for field work and we have a stipulated date to report 
back [on what we did], but my supervisor is not too strict on date [deadline] so we can 
report several days after the given date [deadline]... (w 10) 
Other staff revealed that even though some of them are committed to their jobs, but their supervisors 
hardly show interest in what they are doing:  
i always do my reports because that is what is expected of me even though my 
supervisor doesn't always ask about it (w 11) 
The Agency’s Loyalty Norms  
While the dominant view among officials of the parent ministry was a feeling of obligation to the 
government over the public, as reflected by the various responses of those interviewed: 
the Governor oversees us directly...we have a duty to ensure that he is informed of 
what is happening in terms of revenue generation and challenges we are facing, we 
are only open to the public to render services to them, but we don't have a duty to 
report to the public on our internal activities, they are only given services concerning 
land registration (w 1).  
whenever i have a task to do [as instructed by my director] if it conflicts with the public, 
i [still] go with my director (w 6).  
we are more answerable to the committee [referring to the LUAC] … (w 3) 
In contrast, a feeling obligation to both the government as well as the public was a commonly held 
view among officials of the agency: 
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we primarily serve the public...they make inputs and their inputs influence our policy 
decisions (w 4). 
our board is not that influential in terms of policy direction, in fact at the moment we 
don't even have a governing board since it was dissolved in 2015 (w 2).  
 Another official puts it slightly different: 
 primarily i am answerable to my director who in turn is mandated to be answerable 
to the public (w 7). 
This was also true with officials at the middle and lower levels staff of the parent ministry and that of 
the CRGIA. For example, while the dominant view within the parent ministry was that obligation to 
senior colleagues than to the public - as indicated by their responses: 
[i am more answerable to my director] because he [the director] gives the directives 
on what we should do based on our schedule of duties (w 8)  
Another officer went a little further to describe how he feels about the public and his boss with regards 
to his job functions:  
my director allocates assignments to do, and so we report back to him based on 
instructions he gave, i consider the public as spectators while my supervisor as a 
teammate (w 10) 
However, mid and lower levels officials of the agency mentioned that even though they feel a sense 
of obligation to their superiors, but they also feel obliged to the public, as one officer puts it:  
because this organisation is service delivery based, therefore i have to attend to the 
public before my supervisor (w 11) 
Discretion in Decision Making at the Agency  
A widely-held view among senior officials of both the parent ministry and that of the agency was that 
taking a discretionary decision depends on the weight attached to such a decision. According officials 
in some decisions, the agency usually informs the governor or the advisory board before taking a 
decision. While in other circumstances decisions are often taken without having to first inform the 
governor or the board. For example, if a decision is a minor one such as reviewing of land fees, it is 
mostly taken without first informing the governor. However, in major decisions such as allocation of 
land for infrastructural or commercial purposes, the governor must be pre-informed, and his approval 
sought before the decision is taken (w 3). As one high-ranking level staff declared:  
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if we are to make any major policy decision it has to be approved from above [the 
governor’s office], the management cannot just sit and make policy without the 
consent or approval of the governor (w 5). 
Another management official affirms this when he stated: 
without informing the governing board we are breaching procedures…major decisions 
are approved by him [the governor] as far as land matters are concerned, while [in] 
minor ones [decisions] I inform him [governor] afterwards (w 1). 
In addition, another recurring view when it comes to discretionary decision making by officials is to do 
with the nature of the land regulatory bodies. For example, officials reported that because the 
regulatory functions they perform are highly technical in nature, they could decide on the contents of 
land regulations without having to first inform relevant stakeholders (such as the public or businesses). 
This was also true among the middle level officials within the various departments. Officials at this 
level also reported they don’t have to first inform the management before taking decisions in their 
various departments, but only required to inform the management of whatever decisions they have 
taken. As some officials declared: 
i don't need to get permission to instruct my staff [and] i had issues with the 
management [whenever i don’t inform them], so i have to give up in the interest of the 
management, i don't have to inform before the decision but after the decision it is 
mandatory to inform them, as a manager i have a level of discretion (w 7).  
in my professional capacity, I don’t have to take decisions jointly with them [the 
management], but I have to inform them, I have to share the information of whatever 
I do with them (w 7) 
Other mid-level officers also reported similar feelings: 
because he [my director] is a professional colleague, he understands what it takes to 
do the job in terms of the challenges we face, so he gives room for us to use our 
professional experience to solve problems (w 10)  
because he [head of unit] trust me to do the right thing, therefore he does not always 
keep checking on me (w 11) 
However, opinions were divided at the lower levels about taking discretionary decisions. While some 
reported a feeling of not obligated to inform their supervisors before taking decisions: 
we are already well informed through experience; therefore, we don't always have to 
explain the procedures we follow because it is expected we know the guidelines (w 8).  
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because i know my job functions, therefore i don’t have to explain to my supervisor on 
the specific steps i take [in registering a land] (w 11)  
… [in general, I take decisions independently] except in areas where i make mistakes 
and he [the supervisor] corrects it (w 9) 
Other officers however reported a feeling of obligation to inform their supervisors before taking any 
decision: 
 my supervisor is more knowledgeable and experienced than i do, right? therefore i 
relate with him in detail on every step i take concerning land registration (w 10)  
I always inform the management, for example to select staff that will accomplish a 
certain task, I always inform the management on the number and who gets what 
done, so if I want 5 staff for instance the management can decide to increase or 
decrease their number (w 6) 
he [the director] is the head, so taking decisions without his consent amounts to 
insubordination (w 8)  
If my supervisor is absent and there is a certain job to be done which requires his 
approval, if i do it without his consent and when he comes back he usually shows his 
displeasure, therefore i usually wait for him to approve (w 9) 
Public Access to Information on the Activities of the Agency 
In terms of how accessibility of information on the activities of the agency, officials interviewed 
consistently reported that information on the agency activities is easily accessible to the public. Some 
of the responses among others include:  
if we don’t provide information that pertains to interests of our clients, land matters 
are sensitive we could be taken to court, therefore we provide information and 
documents that are relevant to the public (w 1).  
we are bound by the FOI [freedom of information] act to avail the public of all the 
procedures and guidelines concerning land registration (w 6)  
applying for any document or information the public must always be provided to (w 4)  
A further probe on those interviewed at both the ministry and the agency shows some of the major 
ways the agency provides access to information. For instance, officials mentioned a client services 
desk at the ministry, dedicated to providing information on land registration procedures to the public 
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(w 2). The CRGIA also has a marketing and public relations department that provides similar services 
to the public (w 7). However, some of the official disclosed that not all information on the agency or 
the ministry’s operations is publicly accessible. For instance, they suggest that access to information 
depends on the motive behind the request and whether there are any official restrictions placed on 
such information, as on senior official in the ministry states: 
 in government we have classified documents i.e. top secret, restricted and secret etc., 
therefore we have a duty to protect government secrets...unless an approval is 
obtained for documents that are classified before the public can have access to them. 
But we have public documents that the public can access such as legal search on 
property (w 3). 
provided we know the purpose for which such documents are requested, anybody with 
a clear motive...we have no reason to hide the documents from him (w 5). 
Similarly, middle and lower levels officials also expressed a consistent view that information on the 
regulatory activities of the agency (especially with regards to the land registration guidelines and 
procedures) are always available to the public. Some of the responses includes:  
we do a lot of publicity, [upon] entering [the agency] you meet client services unit that 
ask you what you want and then tell you everything [required documents] that you 
need to provide for the registration to be done [referring to information of registering 
a land] (w 7) 
the registry office which is there for conducting search is always accessible to the 
members of the public (w 8) 
Some of the officers also disclosed that public apathy in requesting for information was a persistent 
challenge. They reported that people rarely come forward to request for such information even 
though it is available (w 10). Furthermore, a staff disclosed to me that in certain situations the 
statutory bodies does not give accurate information to the public especially regarding the payment of 
compensation over government acquisition of private property. In other words, the government 
usually under value property belonging to individuals when paying for compensation claims and when 
the officer was probed further to give specific examples on this, he said:  
in terms of valuation [on property or land] for [payment of] compensation, we don't 
usually give accurate information to the public otherwise the public could take us to 
courts (w 9)  
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How the Agency Makes Regulatory Decisions  
A recurrent view among senior officials in both the parent ministry and the agency was that new 
regulations are often designed internally. For instance, the usual practice according those interviewed 
was that the public is only notified of new regulations when they have been already decided: 
we roll out policies, we don't have to inform the public...there was a time we came out 
with a policy that for one to obtain a consent [government approval] you must show 
a layout plan because…people build anyhow (w 3) 
we often put out notices on land policies and guidelines through gazette and they are 
all in the public domain all you have to do is ask for it (w 6) 
we always put out notices to the public whenever we have new guidelines coming out 
(w 7) 
A major reason given by officials as responsible for this recurrent practice was because the land 
agencies lack the resources to organise forums where policy or regulatory proposals could be publicly 
deliberated upon before they are rolled out. As one officer laments: 
 the sensitization is not there because of poor incentives… no [operational] vehicles to 
take us round to inform the public, no air jingles [advertisements] (w 8) 
lack of public participation in the making of land regulations in turn has led to inadequate 
understanding of the land regulations by the public, as suggested by some officials: 
i am not sure if most of the public are aware of the procedures and guidelines on land 
registration (w 11). 
most times the property owners don't know the importance of [land] registration, 
[most are not aware that land] registration gives them access to loans and also gives 
them backing in courts [serves as surety] (w 9) 
Clarity of the Agency’s Regulatory Mandate 
Responses on the extent to which the regulations are clearly stated in the statutes were mixed at the 
senior level. For example, while some of the officials interviewed claimed the rules and regulations 
are detailed enough: 
the law clearly states this (w 4) 
we have land registrations guidelines and procedural manual (w 3) 
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In contrast, other officials were of the view that some aspects of regulations are ambiguous such that 
officials often interpret the laws differently. When further asked to give specific examples, the current 
dispute over mandate between the ministry of lands and the CRGIA was cited as evidence of ambiguity 
in the land rules and regulations: 
by law we are supposed to process C of O’s, collect ground rents revenues [taxes on 
land ownership] and process consent [approval to transfer ownership of land], but the 
ministry is also claiming such mandate, so there is need for the house [state 
legislature] to look into this and the committee on public accounts [legislative 
committee] has agreed on the need to review the law further (w 5)  
[there is the need] for a better understanding [of the regulations] by both staff and the 
public (w 1) 
Similarly, mixed feelings were also reported by the middle and lower levels officials on the clarity of 
the land regulations and procedures. While some indicated that the regulations are easily understood 
and applied by staff: 
land registration is a laid down procedure and if you follow the procedures it is easy 
(w 8) 
 the [land registration] procedures have defined steps that staff follow (w 11). 
Other officers reported that in certain situations the regulations are silent on which instruments to 
use and therefore they often go outside the regulatory provisions to solve problems. When probed 
further to give specific examples one staff states: 
in the case of consent [an instrument of land administration] which is not part of the 
law, sometimes we create the guidelines and procedures ourselves for the smooth 
operation of our functions… it has gradually become the norm (w 7) 
other officers also indicated that the regulations are so complex that staff often commit procedural 
errors, some of which often incur costs to the government, as one official disclosed: 
we have different kinds of documents to be registered which sometimes makes us 
commit mistakes and people take us to court (w 9) 
Another view shared by many officers was that some aspects of the regulations discourage 
formalization of land titles. For example, the procedure on conducting search on land or property 
requires that an individual pays a fee to a private lawyer to conduct a search on property of interest 
so that it is not a subject of litigation. According to officials, experience has shown that this procedure 
is considered by many people as too demanding and therefore discourages people from formalizing 
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their land or property titles. The perception is that  many see this as the government shifting 
administrative costs to the public and therefore shying away from its responsibility (w 9 & w10).  
Compliance with Administrative Procedures and Enforcing Sanctions at 
the Agency 
Opinions about how the management deals with non-compliance issues such as violation of regulatory 
and administrative procedures differ among those interviewed. Though a dominant view among 
officials both at the senior level as well as the mid and lower levels was that applications of sanctions 
not only depends on the severity of the offence but also whether the offender was a first time or serial 
offender. Officials indicated that in general the management prefer to first issue warnings rather than 
punishing staff straight away. The reason for these according officials in both the ministry and the 
agency was that the substantive rules of the state civil service guide the administration of staff 
conduct, which spelt out the specific steps to follow in dealing with cases of administrative 
misconduct.  
For example, the civil service rules require that a first-time offender be issued a verbal warning, and if 
he commits another offence he is to be issued a query. But If he becomes a repeated offender a 
recommendation may be made for his suspension or dismissal. However, all this steps depends on 
what the relevant authorities decide on what to do with a case, such as whether to apply sanctions or 
ignore it (w 3). Some examples of how the authorities handle cases of misconduct as provided by those 
interviewed includes: 
 we had a case of a lady who connived with some surveyors and gave a report of a 
land as free she was dismissed...staff can be dismissed for altering a document... but 
we also have a staff [who] took a whole file to a market woman [sold an office file 
containing vital documents] selling Akara [bean cake], he was given a warning based 
on compassionate grounds (w 3). 
we have had cases of dismissal and suspensions, in fact we currently have a case of a 
staff who fraudulently deceived some people on letter of [land] allocation which was 
forged, so we recommended sack [dismissal] as a committee constituted to look into 
his case (w 6). 
At the middle and lower officer levels, feelings of leniency in terms of enforcing sanctions differed 
among the ministry and the CRGIA staff. While most officers of the CRGIA felt that the management 
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of the agency is strict when it comes to enforcement of sanctions, as indicated by the various 
responses: 
 cases of violation [of rules and regulations] is outright dismissal, for example my staff 
was found engaged in fraudulent practices and was dismissed, even my driver was 
dismissed in similar circumstances (w 7) 
even late coming is punished, committing an offence warranting dismissal is always 
carried out (w 9) 
staff have been dismissed [but] if it were in the civil service they will probably be 
warned or redeployed (w 11) 
Those interviewed at the ministry in contrast reported a general feeling of leniency by the 
management when it comes to enforcing sanctions, one officer declared: 
 we work as a team therefore the management needs us and usually temper justice 
with mercy in whatever punishment they give (w 10) 
Other officers mentioned that suspension or dismissal remains the last option in the minds of 
the management, as one officer outlines: 
we have civil service rules whereby if you violate any of the rules you are issued a query 
and when you can’t convince the management then you will be punished (w 8) 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Niger State  
Brief Profile of Niger State 
The area known as Niger State today was originally part of the defunct North-western state which was 
one of the twelve states initially created in 1967. In 1976 the military regime of General Murtala 
Muhammed regime divided the old North-western state into Sokoto and Niger states. In terms of 
landmass Niger State is the largest state in Nigeria and is popularly referred to as the “Power State” 
because of the existence of three hydroelectric power stations in the state namely the Shiroro, Kainji 
and Jebba power stations. Niger State is made up of twenty-five Local Government Areas (LGAs). 
These include Agaie, Agwara, Bida, Borgu, Bosso, Chanchaga, Edati, Gbako, Gurara, Katcha, Kotangora, 
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Lapai, Lavum, Magama, Mariga, Mashegu, Mokwa, Muya, Paikoro, Rafi, Rijau, Shiroro, Suleja, Tafa, 
and Wushishi LGAs respectively (www.nigerstate.gov.ng)   
Located in north-central geopolitical zone of Nigeria, the State lies on the 3.20° East and longitude 
11.30° North covering a total land area of 76, 469.903 Square Kilometers (about 10% of the total land 
area of Nigeria) out of which about 85% is arable. The State is bordered to the North by Zamfara State, 
West by Kebbi State, South by Kogi State, South West by Kwara State, North-East by Kaduna State and 
South East by FCT. The State also has an International Boundary with the Republic of Benin along 
Agwara and Borgu LGAs to the Northwest (www.nigerstate.gov.ng)   
 
Source: Audu and Usman (2015) 
Reconstructing the Processes Leading to the Reforms of Institutions of 
Land Administration in the State  
A major rationale behind the reforms of the institutions of land administration in Niger state was that 
the procedures of conducting search and verification of landed property for the purposes of 
acquisition are too cumbersome and riddled with severe delays and unnecessary procedures. The 
procedures of registering land were so cumbersome and characterised by extreme cases of missing 
files such that on average it takes about 3 to 5 years to process a Certificate of Occupancy (CO). The 
process also lacked transparency, as there was no clarity between what the public paid for land or 
property registration and the actual revenues going to the government coffers. An official of the 
ministry of lands had this to say about the state of land administration Niger prior to the reforms “In 
the past if you come looking for ten (10) files, you hardly get one’’ (w 23). 
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Also, a widespread phenomenon prior to the reforms was the issue of “double allocation of land”, 
which is basically a situation in which land officers allocate the same piece of land to different 
individuals. This phenomenon according officials has resulted in incessant disputes and litigations 
between the ministry and individuals, and in turn it created a general lack of public confidence in how 
land is administered in the state (ibid). The Niger state government therefore felt there is an urgent 
need to reform the processes of administering land so that public confidence can be restored in the 
system. For instance, the government envisaged that after the reforms, an application for a CO should 
be processed within a reasonable period of time in order to restore public confidence in the system. 
However, the challenge was how to convince the public that the government means business as one 
official stated: 
…is getting to convince people to accept the new changes and gaining their confidence back 
after years of neglect and a pervasive lack of trust in the institutions of land administration in 
the state (W 19). 
Despite the numerous challenges of the land sector, the state government pressed ahead with the 
reforms by setting in motion the processes that towards changing the existing institutions of land 
administration in the state. In 2009, a two hundred million-naira (NGN 200,000,000) contract was 
awarded to technical consultant (Sivan Designs Ltd) to execute the technical component 
(computerization of the land administration system) of the reforms. The reforms culminated with the 
merging of the lands department of the parent ministry with the newly created agency (the Niger 
State Geographic Information System (NIGIS)), in 2012. The newly created entity was given the 
responsibility of preparing the core instruments of land administrations such as consent, certificate of 
ownership, property search and verification, and surveys and production of land maps. Furthermore, 
in 2014, another forty-nine million naira (NGN 49,000,000) was approved for for the upgrade of the 
NIGIS technical infrastructure to cater for the anticipated increase in the volume of land registration 
applications (W 23).  
However, at the initial stage the reforms did not go smoothly, as many officials of the parent ministry 
were opposed to the reforms and thus were refusing to cooperate with the authorities in the 
implementation of the reforms, as one high-ranking official disclosed: 
hoarding of information was a major problem for us, staff engaged in uncooperative 
attitude towards disclosing relevant information that will help push forward the 
reforms (w 22) 
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A major reason for the initial resistance according to the official was the misperceptions by officials of 
the ministry over jobs security. Many of them felt their jobs may be taken away from them as result 
of the reforms, the official went further to state: 
our major challenge was the misunderstanding of the reforms, staff lack a general 
sense of what we want to do, so what the management did was to look at those that 
can be changed and try to explain to them what we really wanted to do and also co-
opt those against the reforms by assuring them of being part of the new system and 
to some extent the strategy worked as it reduced the level of uncooperative attitude 
initially exhibited by those opposed to the reforms, thereby allowing for the reforms 
to sail through (ibid) 
There were also disagreements among the proponents about how the reforms were to be 
implemented. For instance, some of the officials are of the view that the lands department of the 
ministry shouldn’t have been merged with the newly created agency (NIGIS). Their argument is that 
the merger has led to shortage of capacity, especially staff with expertise at the ministry (w 19; w 21; 
w 22). Nevertheless, the reforms proceeded as planned, and a bill was presented to the state house 
of assembly for consideration, as one official tries to describe how the bill was presented: 
We look for other [land] laws to compare and we told the house of assembly how we 
needed it done. A public hearing was organised. Initially there was opposition 
especially by professional bodies like estate surveyors were adamant at the beginning 
but had to give up and cooperate (w 23) 
Institutional Design of the Niger State Geographic Information Agency 
(NIGIS)  
NIGIS was conceived of and designed by the state government (in conjunction with its development 
partner the GIZ), as a one stop shop agency that is dsigned to capably provide a fast track land 
transactions and investments, improve revenue generation from the land sector, as well as an auditing 
process that provides a trail of who is doing what at any time. The government hopes to achieve these 
objectives through a number of strategies; eliminating or substantially reducing the bureaucratic 
bottlenecks and delays around the process of land administration in the state, prompt response to 
public enquiries and demands, upgrade the land administration infrastructure from an analogue to a 
digital one, control unplanned growth of settlements through spatial planning (Ministry of lands). 
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In 2012, a bill for the establishment of the Niger State Geographic Information Service Agency (NIGIS) 
was passed by the state house of assembly (legislature) and subsequently approved by the state 
governor in 2013, the NIGIS law states: 
there is hereby established an agency to be known as Niger State Geographic 
Information Systems Agency (in this law referred to as “the Agency") to exercise the 
functions and powers, and pursue the objectives assigned to it by this law…the body 
shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue 
and be sued in its corporate name and hold, acquire and dispose of any property or 
interest in property, movable or immovable (s 3 (1) (2(a)(b))). 
The NIGIS law established the agency is a semi-autonomous agency through the provisions of its 
various sections which spelt out the powers of the agency vis a vis staff recruitment, discipline and 
promotion. For instance, one of the provisions states that: 
The agency may from time to time, appoint such other employees as it may deem 
necessary, to enable the agency effectively to perform its function (s 11 (1)). 
The agency is however constraint to exercise these powers in consultation with other mandated 
bodies such as the state’s civil service commission, its advisory board. Yet still, it should do so subject 
to the final approval of the governor. This thereby effectively placed the powers of the agency over 
its officials under the control and supervision of other authorised bodies such as the state civil service 
commission:  
The staff of the agency…shall be appointed upon such terms and conditions of service 
as the agency may, after consultation with the Niger State Civil Service 
Commission…promote and control the staff of the agency as may appear to the agency 
necessary or expedient and dismiss, terminate, consider the resignation or withdrawal 
of appointment and exercise disciplinary control over the staff of the agency, other 
than the general manager…The staff of the agency shall be public officers of the state, 
as defined in the civil service commission (s 11 (2)(3(a)(b)) (5)) 
The employment of the staff of the agency shall be governed by the terms and 
conditions generally applicable to officers in the public service of the state (s 12 (3)) 
The governing board also has mandate to decide on the terms of staff recruitment into the agency: 
The board may specifically delegate to the General manager, the power to appoint 
such categories of staff of the agency as the board may from time to time specify (s 4) 
As well as the state governor who has the final say in approving staff recruitment: 
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Staff regulations issued by the agency…shall have no effect until approved by the 
Governor and published in the Gazette (s 12 (3)) 
Some of the functions the agency is mandated to perform includes (a) maintain, generate, manage 
and provide information on land transactions (b) register land instruments, regulate and control the 
instrument of conducting search on land property (c) produce certificate of occupancy (d) carry out 
subsidiary functions assigned to it by the governor  (e) introduce, implement and sustain best practices 
of keeping land  records and certification land titles in the state  (f) receive, conduct due diligence on 
and verification of applications for the issuance of certificate of occupancy or the grant of other rights 
over land or subsequent transactions in land, within the state and forward same to the authority  (g) 
develop and maintain a database of all land within the state particularly with respect to land title and 
title history, location, size, use and other related indicators (h) permit access to existing data on land 
for the purpose of conducting title searches for the public at a fee to be prescribed from time to time  
(i) undertake all such other activities as are required for the efficient discharge of its duties. 
Other duties mandated on the agency include (j) develop and maintain a geographic information 
system or such other appropriate system and structures in the state for research, land management 
and development planning (k) acquire develop and manage software and hardware for storing, 
assembling, manipulating and displaying geographically referenced material (l) establish a central 
geographic information clearing house to maintain map inventories on current and planned 
geographic and spatial information system, establish and manage a directory or geographic 
information and the resources available within the state (n) coordinate geographic information 
systems projects, including participating in the development and maintenance of base maps and 
geographic information systems within the state (o) provide consulting services and technical 
assistance, education and training on the application and use of geographic information technologies 
(p) maintain, update and interpret geographic information systems standards (q) review and submit 
to the Governor for approval all proposed geographic information systems projects within the state 
(r) pursue funding strategies to continually develop and maintain up-to-date geographic information 
systems solutions for the state (s 5 (1)(2)(3)(4); s6 (1)(2)) 
In discharging the above functions, the provisions of section 7 of the law explicitly states that the 
agency (a) shall have a right to all relevant geographic information records of any person within the 
state and (b) may by a written notice, serve any person request to furnish or caused to be furnished 
geographic information or other similar information held by or available to such persons, on such 
matters as may be specified in the notice and (c) it shall be the duty of any person required to furnish 
information pursuant to provisions of the section to comply with the notice within the period in the 
notice or where no period is specified in the notice within a reasonable period (s7 (1)(2)). 
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And section 17 of the law further stipulates the penalties imposed on any individual who attempts to 
prevent the agency from executing its mandate: 
Any person who (a) wilfully obstructs the agency or any authorized officer of the 
agency in the exercise of any of the powers conferred on the agency by this law; or (b) 
fails to comply with any lawful enquiry or requirements made by an authorized officer 
in accordance with the provisions of this law shall be guilty of an offence and shall be 
liable upon conviction to a fine of two hundred and fifty thousand naira or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both such fine and 
imprisonment (s 17 (a)(b)) 
In addition, the law also provides a detailed guideline of how litigation could be brought against the 
agency in a court of law: 
no suit shall be commenced against the Agency before the expiration of a period of 
one month after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall have been 
served upon the agency by the intending plaintiff or his agent and the notice shall 
clearly and clearly and explicitly state (a) the cause of action (b) the particulars of claim 
and (c) the relief which he claims… shall be served upon the agency in connection with 
any suit by or brought against the agency shall be served by delivery of same to the 
secretary of the agency (s 18 (1)(2)) 
Political Control of the Agency 
By the position he occupies as the chief executive officer of the state, the governor automatically 
assumes overall control of all instruments of land administration in the state. For example, the state 
governor is the final approving authority in granting of right of occupancy as well as approval of 
certificate of ownership of lands to individuals or corporate organisations (s 5 (1)). Section 1 
subsection 1 of the land use act of 1978 states that: 
all land comprised in the territory of each state in the federation are hereby vested in 
the Governor of the state and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the 
use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of this act  
The land use act therefore effectively makes the state governor the final approving authority over the 
most important instruments of land regulations such as certificate of occupancy or right of occupancy. 
However, some of the powers of the governor over the agency are exercised by proxy, for instance, 
the governor appoints a governing board that acts on his behalf to supervise and make policies and 
regulations for the agency: 
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There is hereby established for the agency, a governing board to be responsible for the 
general policies of the agency… (s 4 (1))    
The board may subject to the approval of Governor make regulations for the effective 
operation of this and the due administration thereof (s 16) 
Although the law establishing the agency is silent on the specific mandate given to the governing board 
in providing the overall regulatory and policy direction for the agency, it does however spelt how the 
members of the board are to be recruited, remunerated and sanctioned  (if found guilty of committing 
an offence), the law states that the board shall be composed of (a) a chairman with cognate experience 
in land related matters (b) the general manager of the agency (c) two persons (one of whom shall be 
a practitioner of land related matters) from each of the three senatorial zones of the state (d) a 
representative from the Niger state urban development board not below the rank of director (e) a 
representative of the ministry of justice not below the rank of a director (f) a representative of ministry 
of lands and housing  not below the rank of director. All the members of the board according the 
provisions are to be appointed by the governor and shall serve on a part time basis except for the 
General Manager of the agency (s 4 (1) (a-f)). 
The law also stipulates that the board members serve for an initial period of 4 years, of which may be 
renewable for a further 4 years only. The law also provides for how a member may cease to act in his 
capacity as a board member. For instance, a member of the board may resign from the board by 
notifying the governor in writing and in case of death the governor shall appoint another member to 
complete the reminder of the term of the said member. The Governor is also empowered to remove 
any member from office if he considers such a member as acting contrary to the agency’s or the public 
interests. The emoluments, allowances and benefits are also to be determine by the Governor board 
members (s 3 (a-c) and s 4). The board is also required to have a Secretary whom shall have a 10 years 
post legal practice qualification experience and who also doubles as the agency’s secretary. The 
secretary is mandated to (a) issue notices of meetings of the governing board (b) keep the records of 
the proceedings of the board (c) carryout such duties as the chairman or the board may from time to 
time directs him (s 10 (2) (a-c)). 
Administrative Control of the Agency 
A General Manager (appointed by the Governor) acts as the chief the executive officer of the agency 
(s 9 (1)), he is to have a cognate experience of no less than 15 years in either geographic information 
systems or land related matters (s 9 (2)). The general manager is mandated to oversee the daily 
administration of the agency as well as the execution of the policies and practices of the agency under 
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the supervision and control of the governing board (s 9 (3)). He shall also hold office for a term of 4 
years and renewable for another 4 years or such terms together with his emoluments as specified by 
the governor on his letter of appointment. In addition, the general manager is also mandated to make 
other administrative policies that may aid the provisions of the law establishing the agency especially 
with regards to matters that concern geographic information systems (s 9 (4)(5)(6)). However, the law 
is silent on who should or how the general manager is to be removed from office, such as in situations 
where he is found to be unfit to continue carrying out the mandate bestowed on him. 
Under the requirements of the NIGIS law, the agency is mandated to establish and maintain a financial 
account known as “the fund”, which shall consist of (a) the initial take off grant from the state 
government (b) other funds such as a subventions provided by the government (c) fees and other 
charges received by the agency from its regulatory activities (d) all other funds accruing to the agency 
by way of grants, gifts, testamentary dispositions, endowments, bequest and donations made to it (e) 
income from any investment or other property acquired by or vested in the agency and (f) any other 
fund accruing to the agency (s 13 (1)(a-f)). The fund shall be managed in accordance with the rules 
prescribed by the state governor in accordance with the provisions of the law such as the way the 
assets of the funds are held, how payments are made into the fund account and how record of 
transactions is properly kept (s 13(2)). In addition, subject to the approval of the governor, the agency 
is also allowed to raise funds through borrowing to enable it effectively to execute its mandate (s 
13(3)). It may also accept gifts, grants or donations such as land, money or property from any person 
on terms acceptable to the agency provided such is done in good faith and not contravention of the 
law (s 13 (4)(5)). 
The NAGIS law also requires that the agency prepare its annual budgetary income (revenues expected 
to accrue into the agency’s fund) and spending estimates for the incoming year before the end of 
every year September of each year (s 14(1)). Adhere to accounting standards by keeping proper 
records of its financial accounts and the agency fund account shall be audited at the end of each by 
auditors appointed by the governor who are to be paid by the agency (s 14 (2)(3)). In addition, every 
mid-year (specifically June 30th) the reports of the agency’s audited accounts, its activities as well as 
its administration during the preceding year, are to be submitted to the state governor through the 
commissioner of lands whose comments shall form a part of the reports submitted to the governor (s 
15 (1)(3)). Figure 4 below, depicts the formal control structure of the agency; the different arrows 
indicate the kind of administrative mandate an authority has over the agency and the obligation 
placed on the agency to answer such authority: 
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Figure 4: FORMAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE NIGIS 
 
 
Keys:               indicates a top down (command) and a bottom up (reporting) relationship between actors  
                        indicates only a bottom up (reporting) relationship between actors  
                       indicates the actor is not formally part of the governance structure of the agency.  
Source (own illustration) 
 
Staff Perceptions on the Internal Workings of the Agency  
Funding and other Support to the Agency 
A recurrent phrase amongst most officials interviewed at the management level was that the agency 
lacks adequate funding to effectively execute its mandate.  For example, the agency does not have a 
NIGIS
Office of the Governor State House of Assembly
Office of the 
Accountant General
Ministry of Lands
Advisory Board
Government 
Appointed Auditor 
 
Budget and Planning 
Commission 
Land Use 
Allocation 
Committee 
112 
 
special budgetary allocation that comes directly from the government treasury. Instead, it is funded 
from the parent ministry’s budget. As a governing board member of the agency reveals: 
they [the agency] generate significant revenues but the percentage they are given of 
the money they generate is too small because they are an appendage [under] of the 
ministry which they have no control over (w 20) 
Therefore, the agency further relies on external support from international development 
organisations such as the German agency for International Development Cooperation (GIZ) to 
supplement its income which is still not adequate to cover for the shortfalls. The GIZ for instance not 
only provided the funds for the agency’ staff trainings on new system of land administration such as 
the geographic information system, but also donated the equipment needed for operating the GIS 
platform such as computers, GPS devices, data capturing machines, printers etc. Officials of the agency 
further complained that frequent power outages meant that these donated equipment cannot be fully 
utilized (w 23). As one management official laments: 
funds were so scarce that it often severely impacted on the ability of the ministry and 
the agency to mobilize officers for field work, for example, office working tools such as 
computers, survey equipment were wholly inadequate, for instance, handheld GPS to 
be given to officers for field work were not enough at the headquarters not to talk of 
the ones to supply to local area offices (w 19) 
This was further compounded by a lack of staff capacity was no fresh recruitments were made into 
the new agency, the ministry simply deployed existing staff to the newly created agency: 
we didn't go outside the ministry to source for staff it was the same officials of ministry 
of lands and housing that are still in NIGIS...we felt that this can reduce cost for the 
government (w 22) 
This further placed constraints on important departments (such as the survey and cartography 
departments) within the ministry since a significant number of its staff have been deployed to the new 
agency. While most of the remaining staff have either reached the mandatory retirement age or some 
have even died and there was no fresh recruitment into the service to replace them (w 19). Another 
dominant view among the middle and lower levels officials was also a feeling of poor working 
environment. One staff reported “staff are only provided the basic tools to work with though working 
conditions, in short some important things are lacking”. And when further probed to give specific 
example of what he meant by lacking he mentioned, “offices and furniture” (w 24). Another staff 
affirms this when he also mentions “lack of enough working tools” (w 25). Other officers reported lack 
of operational vehicles as hampering their ability to conduct site inspections and also carry out 
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sensitization tour in communities about the agency’s activities with regards to regulating land (w 26). 
Another officer also reports the same challenge: 
…we have only one operational vehicle which only the manager uses so we are 
demobilised, poor working environment having undergone training capacity (w 27) 
Another staff reported: 
… staff are not well motivated, working equipment are hardly provided sometimes 
staff go out of their way to personally purchase working equipment to their jobs (w 
28) 
Oversight of the Agency’s Activities  
The advisory board of the agency was inaugurated in 2012 and functioned up to 2015 when it 
was dissolved with the change of government and since then a new board has not been 
inaugurated (w 23). We tracked and interviewed some members of the advisory that served 
in the previous administration, those interviewed were of the view that the agency had a 
harmonious relationship with the board. They stated that the board regularly receive briefings 
from the agency on its activities and that the agency also complies with any Terms of 
Reference (TOR) drawn up by the board to provide policy directions: 
We hold meetings with the agency regularly, by law we are supposed to meet 
monthly… but in fact we even changed the meetings [with the agency] to monthly so 
that members will understand thoroughly the workings of the agency (w 20) 
Another board member reported: 
The management brief us quarterly and if there is anything happening we are sent 
notices (w 21) 
This was also corroborated by other management officials of the agency. For instance, a senior official 
mentioned that the advisory board members even surpassed the number of sittings they are required 
by law to meet - as almost every month the board meets. When further asked to describe how the 
board relates with the agency the official said: 
They usually ask of updates on our progress and challenges we face, and discuss where 
we are heading, for instance in 2014 it was through their efforts based on the 
information we provided concerning our challenges that they took it up to the 
governor through the commissioner [the chairman of the board] and some funds were 
approved for us (w 23) 
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There was also consensus among most officials that there is a harmonious relationship between the 
ministry and the agency, officials in both the ministry and the agency mentioned that the ministry 
supervises and monitors the activities of the agency. For instance, a monthly meeting between the 
ministry and the agency to discuss issues such as revenues generated is common. And that this 
ensured there is no communication gap between the two organisations. As one management official 
of the agency states: 
As an agency under the ministry we report to the commissioner because access to the 
governor is difficult even if the law provides for that (w 23) 
In addition, most administrative competences are shared between the ministry and the agency. For 
instance, the procedures for applying the instruments of land regulations such as the granting of 
consent or certificate of occupancy usually begins at the agency, passes through the ministry for the 
commissioner’s approval and terminates at the governor’s office for final approval (w 23). However, 
since 2015 when a new government came into power the advisory board has not being constituted, 
most officials reported the absence of board since 2015 (w 22; w 25; w 26). 
The Agency’s Loyalty Norms  
According to senior officials of the agency each actor involved in land administration in the state acts 
in accordance with the mandate given to them. For example, some of the advisory board members 
interviewed reported the board only relates with the government: 
we don’t have anything to do with the public because we advise, and the government 
implements (w 21) 
…we are there as the watch dog of the government so that the enabling law is properly 
implemented (w 20) 
Similarly, especially with regards to policy formulation, the management officials at the agency also 
reported a general obligation to report to formal authorities: 
It [the agency] was established on statutes and based on that it is working according 
to the rules and regulation establishing it (w 22) 
For example, officials reported that the advisory board directs on how policies are to be implemented 
and when probed on whether lack of public input into the agency’s policy making process may 
overlook some concerns by the public, one management official puts it this way: 
For me I feel they [advisory board] acts in the public interests, both the agency and the 
advisory board are working in the interests of the public, we listen to the public and 
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try to adjust. We only give information that is relevant to the public, for instance the 
public can only ask for information related to land acquisition procedures. For 
accountability purposes relevant government bodies like the Code of Conduct Bureau 
is the body that can request for such information. So, we are only answerable to the 
public to the extent to which that affects them (w 23) 
At the mid and lower levels of the agency, there was also a general feeling of obligation towards the 
authorities rather than the public: 
nature of the civil service does not allow you to report to the public, you are to be seen 
not be heard, only the political heads like the commissioner are answerable to the 
public, therefore i am more answerable to my director (w 24) 
I answer my general manager first before the public because we work to together, for 
our work to be successful there is need to cooperate with each other (w 25) 
Anything or decision I must brief him first, he is the first person I report to (w 26) 
Due to the nature of my job which is very technical I must ensure that I use my 
professional judgement to decide on what is in the public interests like deciding on 
where structures are to be erected to shield the public from danger. They [public] 
might not want it but we must do it. The nature of my job also does not need much 
contact with the public (w 27) 
[Because of] hierarchy in public service whatever my boss decides is binding on me 
than that of the public because the public service is configured to have little or no 
contact with the public (w 28) 
Discretion in Decision Making at the Agency  
Officials at the management levels reported that in general the agency enjoys a considerable freedom 
to take regulatory and administrative decisions without excessive interference from its parent ministry 
or the political authorities: 
The agency is designed to be self-sustaining and the ministry only supervises it (w 22) 
Another management official of the agency affirms the agency’s autonomy in taking regulatory as well 
as administrative decisions, when probed further to give specific examples he said this:  
For instance, I have complete autonomy to process certificate of occupancy or consent 
[referring to the agency’s freedom to process instruments of land administration 
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without hindrance from the parent ministry], another example is that just a week ago, 
I requested somebody to be removed from here for misconduct (w 23) 
This was also indicated by some members of the advisory board interviewed, they reported the agency 
enjoys discretionary decision making.  Their argument is that by merging the lands department of the 
ministry with the agency, effectively transferred more responsibilities and thus discretion to the 
agency. For example, instruments of regulations such as compensation, acquisition and survey 
formerly handled by the ministry through the lands department are now handled by the agency as a 
result of the merger. The advisory board members I had interviews with told me that the board even 
wrote a memo to the governor recommending a review of the merger so that the merger does not 
place too much burden on the agency and slows down the process of administrating the regulations, 
but the recommendation was not approved by the governor (w 21). 
Similar responses were also reported at the mid and lower levels of the agency, most of the officers 
at the middle levels such as those heading units within departments indicated that they usually decide 
on how the various units under their commands are run. For example, when one of the interviewees 
was asked to describe how he runs his unit he stated: 
 I manage the staff under me such as bringing innovative ideas on how to move the 
unit forward, but all within the limits of the civil service rules (w 24) 
Another mid-level officer said: 
My GM [general manager] allows me to take decisions in my unit without first having 
to inform him (w 25) 
Yet still, another officer further confirms the independence staff of the agency enjoy with 
regard to taking independent decisions: 
The management gives me the opportunity that suits how I carry out my job, it [the 
management] gives me freehand in choosing who and how to carry out tasks (w 26) 
The responses from officers at the lower levels of the agency were mixed, while some staff at this level 
also reported a general feeling of independence in taking decisions regarding their various job 
schedules. For instance, one of the interviewed officials reported that even though administrative 
procedures are hierarchical, but in general contrary opinions regarding administrative matters are 
welcomed and if convinced their bosses usually approved their decisions and if not, such decisions are 
reviewed (w 27). Another officer reported that he can suggests to his boss to approve decisions he 
considers the best options to improve services such as consent to mortgage or transfer of land or 
property, but such suggestion depends on the final decision taken by his boss (w 28). 
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The management wants results, so if they give you an assignment, how you will go 
about doing it is your business, just bring them what they want (w 22)  
Other officials of the agency also reported that regardless of whether a decision is made at collective 
or at individual levels, in general people do not take decisions independently of those who supervise 
over them. Starting with the advisory board, some officials indicated that the agency always keeps 
them informed on any policy or regulation it is about to take decision on (W 20; 21). Opinions about 
discretionary decision making also differ among higher-ranking officials, while some felt the obligation 
to inform superiors before taking decisions, as one officials state: 
I have always informed the management before taking major decisions if I really don’t 
want to be in trouble, for instance when we had the advisory board it was important 
for us to carry them along to know what we are doing so that they don’t deal with us 
(w 23) 
However, most officials at the mid and lower levels reported they usually don’t take discretionary 
decisions in isolation of their departmental or unit heads, some of these responses include: 
If it’s a decision that affects the management I will be facing insubordination, but if it 
is a minor decision the management simply want to get the job done regardless of 
how I do it (w 24) 
Any decisions we take we have to inform our superiors because these are decisions 
that affect the public. However, sometimes I take decisions without informing my 
superior especially minor ones that I know don’t have any significant impact (w 25) 
And when asked to give specific instances of how decisions are taken with the explicit permission of 
their supervisors, one officer had this to say:   
Of recent we had issues with some youths while working on site, we had to stop the 
job we were doing while I come back to inform the management before taking any 
decision (w 26)  
Similarly, other officers also reported obligation to give detail accounts how they apply the regulations 
in the field to their supervisors: 
I have to explain in detail [to my supervisor] because if anything goes sour my 
supervisor takes the heat, therefore he must be in the clear picture (w 27) 
However, in situations where the regulations are silent on what instruments of the regulations to 
apply while carrying out their jobs, some staff reported taking decisions outside the regulations. For 
instance, one interviewed staff stated that in exceptional circumstances such as when a land or 
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property title has exchanged hands between many people and the original owners could not be found, 
they are sometimes asked by their senior colleagues to advise on the best possible way to handle such 
matters (w 28). 
Public Access to Information on the Activities of the Agency 
There was a general agreement among management officials that the agency often carries along the 
public concerning the activities of the land regulatory bodies, one management official said: 
They [the agency] advertise their activities on TV and radio talks which I once 
participated, they also do flyers [leaflets] and neighbourhood visitations to get 
information across to the public (w 20) 
There is a weekly programme sponsored by the ministry of lands called “land matters” 
where the various heads of departments [of the ministry] engages the public of the 
activities of the ministry (w 24) 
When the public come for information we provide them such [information] and we 
also do sensitization (w 22) 
A management official tries to contrast the past situation with the current one, he stated that prior to 
the establishment of the agency, officials of the ministry of lands often hide information to the public, 
but that presently the public is availed of any information it requests (w 21). This was also 
corroborated by another official when stated that the agency publishes on its website statistics on the 
number of land registration certificate made, processed, collected and those awaiting collection. 
Doing this according to him affords the public the opportunity to track the total number of C of O’s 
signed by the governor and are ready for collection, or those awaiting the signature of the governor 
or those Cos that have already been collected by awardees. And that as soon as a CO is signed by the 
governor, text messages are sent out to respective applicants to come forward for collection (W 22). 
This was also true across the responses from the mid and lower levels officials of the agency, in general 
staff reported that information about the agency activities is easily accessible to the public: 
Documents are there for the public, so I don’t think there is any reason to hide them 
(w 25) 
Whenever the public come they are informed about the land registration guidelines 
and procedures (w 26) 
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NIGIS [the agency] is always open for enquiries Monday to Friday and if you can’t come 
[to the agency], our website is open 24 hours and we have app on Google store and 
Facebook [page] (w 28) 
However, some of the interviewed staff also reported that despite the availability of information there 
is public apathy in coming forward to ask for information, for instance one staff had this to say: 
Is available [information] but most people are not aware of such documents or their 
rights [to ask for information] (w 26) 
Initially the public is not well informed, therefore don’t see the need to register their 
lands…but slowly things are getting better (w 27) 
A lot of people don’t have access to internet to search for information on land titling 
procedures, also TV and Radio advertisements are inadequate (w 28) 
One of the interviewed official went in detail to reveal the dilemma the agency faces regarding the 
lack of public interest in undergoing the procedures of registering their land: 
They are available [information] because we have pamphlets, on air advertisements 
etc, but the information dissemination is not very effective, [but] the irony is that 
majority of the public doesn’t seem to care. People don’t bother to go through the 
guidelines they prefer to give gratification [bribes] to staff to do the procedures for 
them such as court affidavits or statutory declaration of age. These are things the 
individual should do himself (w 27) 
How the Agency Makes Land Regulations 
Management officials reported that the public is always notified of new land regulations rolled out by 
the agency. This according to them is that public is often notified of new policies and guidelines 
through the mass media such as announcements on Newspapers, TV and Radio or sending bulk Short 
Message Service (SMS) to the public (w 20).  As an advisory board member states “during the period 
of my tenure I have witnessed NIGIS [the agency] always putting notices on TV and Radio” (w 21). 
However, it is also interesting to note that the formulation as well as the contents of the regulations 
are often decided within the agency without public inputs into the process, as one management 
official declared: 
Often, we make the policy decisions and later we inform the public about our decisions 
(w 22) 
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Officials at the mid and lower levels, also reported that the public is usually post-notified rather than 
pre-notified of new land regulations and policies as indicated by the different responses from those 
interviewed: 
When we wanted to introduce the land bonanza [a discount on land fees to incentivise 
people to formalize their land titles] the public was notified, and we even extended the 
period and the management team went around all the 8 traditional councils to 
enlighten the public (w 26) 
We often notify the public, for instance whenever we are coming out with new 
guidelines we call for public comments through adverts on newspapers and radio. 
However, sometimes we take decisions by ourselves having in mind that those 
decisions are in the best public interest. For example, whenever we want to acquire 
land for public projects such as dams, roads or housing estates, first we have to go to 
a district head concerned inform him and seek his consent, then all the stakeholders 
such as farmers and land owners are contacted and invited. We tell them our mission 
and then we do the assessments and then paste the notices so that anybody that has 
a complaint can come forward (w 25) 
Clarity of the Agency’s Regulatory Mandate 
Views about the clarity of the procedures of registering land were mixed among higher-ranking 
officials, while some reported there is need for the procedures to be more specific, others reported 
that the procedures are clear and detailed. For instance, while some of higher-ranking management 
officials interviewed stated that the regulations are complete: 
The laws are clearly stated (w 20) 
We have looked at the regulations in other states [of Nigeria] and discovered that 
Niger state’s [regulations] are quite comprehensive (w 21) 
Other management officials reported a need for some aspects of the procedures be further reviewed, 
as one higher-ranking official remarked: 
Some of the procedures evolved based on experience in the day to day running of the 
agency [norms] (w 22) 
Another higher-ranking management official of the agency declared: 
Yes, guidelines and procedures should be clearly stated, so it should be provided (w 23) 
121 
 
In contrast, all officials interviewed at both the mid and lower levels reported that the land registration 
procedures are detailed and clearly stated: 
The land use act is properly stated, there are ethics that guide all professionals in the 
ministry such as town planners, surveyors etc (w 24) 
Another mid-level officer stated “everything [the land registration procedures] is clearly stated” and 
when probed further to demonstrate why he considers the procedures clearly stated, he had this to 
say: 
For instance, guidelines for land registration states that a person must fill a land form 
either electronically via the website or download and fill it manually, then a land officer 
opens a file for the customer with his passport. Even the recent staff deployed here if 
you ask them what the procedures for land registration are, they would be able to tell 
you the complete steps (w 25) 
Another mid-level officer had this comment about staff in his unit: 
Staff know the procedures of land [registration], they can’t tell me they don’t know it 
because if one procedure is missing the whole thing [process] is compromised (w 26) 
Lower level officers also reported the land registration procedures are easy to comprehend by staff: 
They are very easy to understand, however sometimes when it comes to land or 
property that is subject to litigation is where you use your judgement to solve problems 
outside of the procedures (w 27) 
The procedures are clearly spelt out, documents that are required to process a land 
can easily be obtained... (w 28) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedures and Enforcing Sanctions at 
the Agency 
Those interviewed at the advisory board as well among higher-ranking officials of the agency indicated 
that in general staff of the agency often complied with the land regulations and administrative 
procedures. While the advisory board members indicated that the management of the agency 
generally complies with the board’s instructions: 
The agency always complies with our advice and is responsive to public complaints (w 20) 
  We did not have any issues with the management throughout our tenure (w 21) 
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However, at the management level opinions about the way sanctions are enforced at the agency were 
mixed; while some officials reported that sanctions are strictly enforced, such as when a staff is found 
to have violated the regulations he or she is punished right away. When further asked to give specific 
example, one management official remarked that: 
the ministry recently sanctioned some officers with a termination of appointment over 
a fraudulent allocation of a piece of land in Gidan Kwano local government (w 23).  
Other officials reported that except in cases where a staff is found to have consistently violate 
instructions, in general the management prefer to warn than sanction officials (w 22). Furthermore, 
even more interesting to note was that at the mid and lower levels except for one official who reported 
that staff are always sanctioned through redeployments or demotions though also admitted that 
dismissals were a rare occurrence (w 24). Other officials interviewed also reported that in general the 
management is lenient when it comes to enforcing sanctions violation of the regulations, most of the 
time staff are warned (w 25). For example, according some of the staff even when a staff is found to 
be involved in a corrupt act he may still be warned by the management, as some officials attempt to 
describe the process: 
Sometimes a staff may be in corrupt cases but will be warned several times, if he 
continues [even] after several warnings, a query is then issued and that is all. And if he 
is queried up to 3 times a disciplinary committee is set up that will deal with the staff 
using extant civil service rules (w 28). 
When a staff defraud somebody and when reported to the management he might just 
be asked to pay back the individual rather than be suspended or dismissed, a normal 
Nigerian thing (w 27)  
A staff was recently queried and warned as opposed to being suspended and asked 
not to repeat such (w 26). 
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PART THREE 
CHAPTER SIX 
Comparative Analysis of Land Policy Regimes in the Study Locations 
The evidence from the field observations as well as accounts given by officials at different levels of the 
parent ministries and the agencies, point to some important dimensions that appeared to have 
conditioned how the land policy changes were implemented at the study locations. First, the findings 
suggest that the behaviours of relevant actors matter more for the implementation than does the 
different designs of the regulations adopted by the states. For instance, the implementation of the 
policy changes was very context specific such that much of what occurred during the implementation 
of the reforms was a function of the different actions taken by the political authorities and the 
implementing bodies rather than that of the rules in use. For instance, while all the states under study 
had in their land laws a provision which requires the state governors to appoint an advisory board 
with the mandate to provide general policy direction as well as oversight on the land agencies. Niger 
state was the only state that complied with this provision, yet Nasarawa state (despite its non-
compliance to this provision) appeared to have outperformed both Niger and Cross Rivers state in 
terms of regulatory making and oversight.  
One possible explanation for this was the willingness of the Nasarawa state government and the 
ministry of lands to actively oversight the agency. This seemed to have compensated for the absence 
of the advisory board in Nasarawa state. A consistently held view among staff was that of a relatively 
successful reform. This according to them was made possible by a credibly sustained commitment 
from the political leadership as well as the existence of an effective cooperation and coordination 
between the agency and the parent ministry. The agency also aligned its conduct with the goals of the 
authorities. In addition, the agency management also ensured that staff within various departments 
and units are strictly monitored. In the case of Cross River conversely, the advisory the advisory board 
neither existed nor was the state government or the parent ministry willing to step in and fill the 
created vacuum. Moreover, the acrimony over mandate between the agency and its parent ministry 
further compounded the problem for the agency and worsened an already bad situation. The 
dominant view among staff of the agency was that of a failed reform. They reported a general lack of 
commitment from the political leadership, together with the existing discordant relationship therefore 
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ensured an ineffective cooperation and coordination between the agency and its parent ministry. 
Overtime time the agency realized the state government was not willing to provide the agency the 
needed support to thrive and therefore, lost confidence in the system and was no longer putting in 
any effort to ensure that the state government’s objectives were aligned with theirs.  
In the case of Niger state, the dominant view was that of a mixed bag outcome. Officials repeatedly 
mentioned that despite a good working relationship between the parent ministry and the agency, a 
lack of sustained commitment by the political leadership had prevented the full realization of the 
reform objectives. A limited support the agency receives from an external donor (the GIZ) and a 
harmonious relationship between the agency and its parent ministry was what gave the land reforms 
some impetus. These revelations coming from officials of the land bodies were further corroborated 
by the observations we made in the study locations. For instance, in terms of resource capability, a 
visit to the NAGIS in Nasarawa indicates that the state government has made tremendous efforts 
towards creating an enabling environment for the reforms to succeed. For example, despite the 
general power shortages in the country, we observed that the agency was powered twenty (24) hours 
a day using generators. In contrast, in Cross River and Niger states we observed that sometimes the 
land agencies could go without power for days since they must rely on the power company because 
they lack the funds to provide an alternative source of power. Similarly, we also observed that the 
Land agency in Nasarawa state is fully equipped with modern working tools and staff capacity building 
trainings are regularly undertaken. However, Niger state, resources were so meagre that that the 
agency relies not only relies on external donors (such as the GIZ) for working equipment but also the 
funding of staff capacity building trainings. This was also true in Cross River; the land agency’s situation 
was even worse than that of the land agency in Niger state because it neither gets funding from the 
state government nor from any external donor support. 
A further important finding is to do with the different interpretations, perceptions and understanding 
of the land rules and regulations by officials. Officials of the parent ministries noticeably differed with 
officials of the agencies in how they perceived, interpret, and therefore understand the land 
regulations. For example, while the dominant view was that of a feeling of being more obligated to 
the government than to the public among staff in the parent ministries. In contrast, the dominant view 
among staff within the agencies was that of a feeling obliged both the public and the government. 
This was also true with regards to enforcing sanctions in cases of non-compliance, a recurrent view 
among ministry officials was that of lax enforcement by superiors, while officials of the agency 
repeatedly reported a swift enforcement of sanction. Furthermore, from the analysis of the land laws, 
we also observed that the regulations heavily focused on the executive arm than other arms such as 
the judiciary or the legislature. For instance, the state governor features prominently as the central 
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figure in land matters, again suggesting the reforms like the earlier land reforms such as the Land Use 
Act of 1978 concentrated powers on the state governors. For instance, we conducted a line by line 
analysis of all the provisions of the regulations in the study states and found that the ‘legislature’ was 
only mentioned once in Cross River state while Nasarawa and Niger states had zero mentions of the 
state legislature in their respective land laws. This was also true of public participation in the making 
of the land regulations, again none of the land laws had a mention of public participation in all the 
three study locations. This seem to coincide with the dominant view among officials who see the 
government or their senior colleagues as more important to them when it comes to implementing the 
land regulations than does the public. 
In terms of discretion in taking decisions at the collective (agency) as well as at individual levels, while 
the dominant view among officials of the land agencies in some states such as Cross River and Niger 
states was that of exercising moderate discretion. In contrast, most officials of the land agency in 
Nasarawa state reported having a low discretionary authority in taking decisions (both at the agency 
and individual levels). Officials within agencies in Cross River and Nasarawa states repeatedly 
mentioned instances where they have first taken decisions and then informed superiors of such 
decisions afterwards or sometimes even if they take decisions outside of the regulatory mandate of 
their organisations their senior colleagues are not too strict about punishing such decisions. On the 
other hand, a recurrent view among staff of the land agency in Nasarawa was that any decision a staff 
takes without first having to communicate with superiors are strictly discouraged and punished. 
Public accessibility to information about the agencies activities is observed to be very high in Nasarawa 
and Niger states, while in Cross River the activities of the land agency is found to be less visible to the 
public. For example, while both Nasarawa and Niger states have a functional website that is available 
24 hours to the public and made available information on land instruments such as land registration 
forms or procedures for formalizing a property titles. They also regularly engage and inform the public 
on the activities of the agencies via town hall meetings, TV, Radio and Newspaper adverts. The land 
agency in Cross River lacks a functional website as of the time of writing of this project, a customer 
could only have to physically visit the agency to access any information. In addition, due severe 
shortage of funds, the agency does not also regularly engage with and inform the public on its activities 
such through town hall mediums, TV or Radio. This observation was also substantiated by some of the 
views among officials of the agency that the public is not adequately aware of the land regulations in 
the state. 
Compliance with regulatory and administrative instructions among officials is observed to be high in 
Nasarawa, but low in both Cross River and Niger states respectively. Some of the reasons responsible 
for this is that most lower and mid-levels officials at NAGIS in Nasarawa state reported that regardless 
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of whether an offence was committed in error or deliberate, their senior colleagues do not take cases 
of non-compliance lightly. While in Cross River and Niger states the dominant views among officials 
were at best mixed. On the one hand, there were those who felt that their senior colleagues were 
lenient when it comes to punishing non-compliance. Some of the staff adduced reasons such as the 
management was aware of the challenges staff faced such as poor working environment and several 
months of unpaid salaries and thus the general lax attitude by the management to sanction staff. On 
the other, there were those who disagree and instead reported strict enforcement of sanctions by 
their senior colleagues and that staff strictly comply with administrative and regulatory instructions.  
In addition, the management of the land agency in Nasarawa state also employed a carrot and stick 
approach to induce staff compliance with administrative and regulatory instructions. For example, 
when a staff, unit or department within the agency meets a performance target or recorded less errors 
in their jobs, they are often rewarded in cash or in kind by the management and when they perform 
badly or found to have made unacceptable errors they usually receive knocks. This kind of incentive-
based mechanism was observed to be absent in Niger and Cross River states. Another crucial finding 
is the pervasive lack of continuity in the implementation of the land reforms, this is more pronounced 
as was the case of Cross Rivers and Niger states. For instances, at the beginning of the reforms the 
reforms gathered pace and looked promising after a few years’ cracks start to appear. Based on the 
interviews we had with various officials we understood that some of the reasons responsible for this 
are change in government (the 2015 elections) which comes with different political actors with 
different agendas and priorities as was the case with Cross River and Niger states. Conflicts among 
implementing agencies and lack of political will and commitment (especially in Cross River and Niger 
states) were also cited as reasons for the lack of continuity. Table 2 below shows the patterns of 
similarities and differences discerned across the cases based on the key explanatory factors that 
emerged during the field work. 
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EXPLANATORY 
FACTORS 
NAGIS (NASARAWA STATE) CRGIA (CROSS-RIVER STATE) NIGIS (NIGER STATE) 
Resource 
Capability of the 
Agency 
high as indicated by: 
 
presence of a sustained commitment by the 
government in adequately funding the agency  
 
adequate working tools i.e. computers, printers, 
chairs, desks etc 
 
regular power supply using alternative (generators) 
 
availability of operational vehicles to conduct field 
work 
 
high staff capacity building training  
 
absence of support from an external donor 
Low as indicated by: 
 
absence of a sustained commitment by the 
government in adequately funding the agency  
 
inadequate working tools i.e. computers, 
printers, chairs, desks etc  
 
irregular power supply from power company 
 
non-availability of operational vehicles to 
conduct field work 
 
low staff capacity building training  
 
absence of support from an external donor 
medium as indicated by: 
 
absence of a sustained commitment by the 
government in adequately funding the agency 
 
moderate working tools i.e. computers, printers, 
chairs, desks etc  
 
irregular power supply from power company 
 
non-availability of operational vehicles to conduct 
field work 
 
moderate staff capacity building training  
 
presence of support from an external donor 
Oversight and 
Control of the 
Agency  
high as indicated by: 
 
presence of regular visits of the state governor to 
the agency  
 
presence of regular visits of the commissioner to 
the agency  
 
absence of regular visits by the state legislature 
 
absence of regular meetings between the agency 
and the advisory board  
 
low as indicated by: 
 
absence of regular visits of the state governor to 
the agency  
 
absence of regular visits of the commissioner to 
the agency  
 
absence of regular visits by the state legislature 
 
absence of regular meetings between the agency 
and the advisory board  
 
medium as indicated: 
 
absence of regular visits of the state governor to the 
agency  
 
presence of regular visits of the commissioner to the 
agency  
 
absence of regular visits by the state legislature 
 
presence of regular meetings between the agency 
and the advisory board  
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high supervision of staff activities by senior officials 
within departments and units  
 
low supervision of staff activities by senior 
officials within departments and units  
 
low supervision of staff activities by senior officials 
within departments and units  
 
Agency Rule 
Making 
only the executive arm is enfranchised as the 
reporting forum  
 
absence of public participation in regulatory and 
policy making (decided internally) 
 
a dominant feeling of loyalty to the government 
than to the public among staff 
 
both the executive and the legislative arms is 
enfranchised as the reporting forum  
 
absence of public participation in regulatory and 
policy making (decided internally) 
 
a mixed feeling of loyalty to both the government 
and the public among staff 
 
only the executive arm is enfranchised as the 
reporting forum  
 
absence of public participation in regulatory and 
policy making (decided internally) 
 
a dominant feeling of loyalty to the government 
than to the public among staff 
 
Discretion in 
Decision Making 
low discretion as indicated by the dominant view 
among staff of the agency  
 
medium discretion as indicated by mixed views 
among staff of the agency 
 
medium discretion as indicated by mixed views 
among staff of the agency 
 
Access to 
Agency 
Information 
high as indicated by presence of an active website, 
presence of customer care unit, presence of 
massive public engagement through town hall 
meetings, tv, radio and newspaper, presence of 
statistics on land applications, registration and 
titling  
low as indicated by absence of an active website, 
presence of customer care unit, absence of 
massive public engagement through town hall 
meetings, tv, radio and newspaper, absence of 
statistics on land applications, registration and 
titling 
high as indicated by presence of an active website, 
presence of customer care unit, presence of massive 
public engagement through town hall meetings, tv, 
radio and newspaper, presence of statistics on land 
applications, registration and titling 
Interests 
Support 
high as indicated by the dominant view among staff 
of the agency  
medium as indicated by the mixed views among 
staff of the agency  
medium as indicated by the mixed views among 
staff of the agency 
Political 
Commitment 
high as indicated by a sustained commitment of the 
political leadership to provide enabling support to 
the agency 
low as indicated by a dissipated commitment of 
the political leadership to provide enabling 
support to the agency  
medium as indicated by inconsistent commitment of 
the political leadership to provide enabling support 
to the agency 
Enforcement of 
Sanctions and 
Compliance  
high enforcement indicated by swift enforcement 
of sanctions in cases of non-compliance to 
administrative or regulatory instructions 
 
high compliance due to presence of an incentive-
based mechanism that encourages compliance  
low enforcement indicated by lax enforcement of 
sanctions in cases of non-compliance to 
administrative or regulatory instructions 
 
low compliance due to absence of an incentive-
based mechanism that encourages compliance  
low enforcement indicated by lax enforcement of 
sanctions in cases of non-compliance to 
administrative or regulatory instructions 
 
low compliance due to absence of an incentive-
based mechanism that encourages compliance  
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Inter-Agency 
Coordination 
and 
Cooperation 
high coordination and cooperation indicated by: 
 
presence of regular meetings and exchanges of 
information between the parent ministry and the 
agency 
 
absence of conflict over mandate between the 
parent ministry and the agency 
low coordination and cooperation indicated by: 
 
absence of regular meetings and exchanges of 
information between the parent ministry and the 
agency 
 
presence of conflict over mandate between the 
parent ministry and the agency 
high coordination and cooperation indicated by: 
 
presence of regular meetings and exchanges of 
information between the parent ministry and the 
agency 
 
absence of conflict over mandate between the 
parent ministry and the agency 
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Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation 
Several important observations followed from the comparative analysis of the cases. First, the analysis 
suggest that political commitment is crucial factor for a successful implementation of policy change. 
This means that those in political authority must go beyond just enacting laws by actively participating 
at every stage of the policy process until stability is achieved and even after that policy makers should 
continue to engage in the oversight of those tasked with implementation so as to maintain control 
and thus forestall any possibilities of policy deviation. Secondly, the major task of the political heads 
(such as commissioners or director generals) should be strictly devoid of partisanship but that of 
providing a sound policy direction and supervision of agencies under their ministries or agencies. 
When political heads begin to sabotage agencies for personal interests, this may cause crisis as was 
the case with Cross River state where the land reforms can at best be described as akin to throwing 
away the baby with the bath water. This finding is in stark contrast to an earlier argument put forward 
by Painter and Yee (2011) where they suggest that segmentation of “policy fields” and “processes” 
can be used as a mechanism to avoid competition over control of policy, which would inevitably create 
conflict within a political and administrative elite that highly values consensus and cooperation” (Bach 
et al 2012: 190). For instance, this segmentation of policy was what led to a long-drawn conflict 
between the parent ministry and the newly created agency under its supervision in Cross-River state. 
And thus, political control over the process of implementation was lost and the implementation 
stalled. 
A similar finding by the Office of Public Services Reform also concluded that the “main problem in 
achieving more effective performance is that some agencies have become disconnected from their 
departments” (Office of Public Services Reform, 2002: 6 cited in Pollitt et al 2005: 22). Furthermore, 
our finding also seems to be in line with the argument by Handke (2012), that “high salience reduces 
policy autonomy because the ministry takes over activities previously performed by the agency” (ibid: 
189). It also seems to resonate with the argument by Pollitt et al (2005) that it is very difficult to find 
a balance between “active steering of agencies by parent ministries which the authors assume as 
“desirable” and “micromanagement” which they see as “undesirable” to the agencies (p. 22). 
Thirdly, pledging allegiance to the governor or government may have detrimental effect on 
accountability, as reflected by the dominant view among officials. It is intriguing to note that most 
officials selves as primarily responsible to the government than to the public. This implies that the land 
agencies may only pay attention to the government’s demands and therefore beholding to the 
governor or government. The implication of which is that officials often see themselves as rendering 
service to the government rather than to the public. Also, crucially missing is the opportunity for the 
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public to have a say in the making of the regulations or bring issues of accountability to the public 
domain, this is important because this will not only make the public have a say on issues that directly 
affect them such as how land regulations should be designed, but will also empower them monitor 
the activities of the agencies and can report instances of any agency drift. Absence of public 
participation in the making of the regulations may create a sense of loyalty among land administrative 
agencies towards the government rather than being neutral. Furthermore, for fear of being 
sanctioned by their senior colleagues, frontlines officers felt often lack the courage to express their 
views on issues of critical importance to the public. This is akin to what many scholars studying 
agencies termed as “agency capture”, where due to its speciality on particular policy areas such as 
land administration in our cases, the agency “identify more strongly with the other specialists that 
they deal with… than with the citizens they are supposed to serve” (Pollitt et al 2005: 4). 
Fourthly, by their institutional design, the newly created land agencies are shielded from public 
scrutiny, therefore the land regulations are made without much of public participation. In all the study 
states, there was no single provision enfranchising the public to participate in the making of land 
regulations or policies. And because the public has not been enfranchised by the land laws, is not 
surprising that many officials reported that the public know very little about the operations of the land 
agencies. This finding contradicts a key explanation in the delegation literature as to why politicians 
delegate powers to independent agencies. For instance, Majone (1997) noted that in the delegation 
literature, a major reason for delegating to independent agencies is that “an agency structure may 
favour public participation” such as carrying out consultations with the public through public hearings 
which is largely absent in government departments (such as ministries) (p. 142). This is contrary to 
what we found in the laws establishing these agencies, we found no any mention of public 
consultations or hearing with regards to policy making in all the study locations.  
Furthermore, another key explanation for delegating to independent agencies in the literature is that 
they provide “greater policy continuity”, because unlike ministries which are headed by cabinet 
ministers, agencies are shielded from electoral turnovers (ibid: 143). Yet, we found that election cycles 
affected most of the cases in the study locations. For example, many officials we interviewed at the 
agencies blamed government turn overs as partly responsible for their decline and thus lack of 
performance. They argued that their performance (or success) depends on the government in power; 
if the government is interested, the agencies do well and if it is not the case, they do badly (as with 
Cross River state) or at best moderately (as is the case with Niger state). In short, officials suggested 
that the agencies are only independent on paper, but in reality, it is the government of the day that 
decides how the agencies perform.This finding seems to coincide with other studies in the literature 
such as a case study of policy reforms conducted by Verschuere, D. Vancoppenolle (2012) in Flanders 
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region of Belgium, where their findings also suggest that “reforms often unfold differently than was 
intended on paper” (p. 257, see also Christensen & Lægreid 2007; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). 
Fifthly, with exception of Cross River state, where the land agency is required to also report its 
operations to the state house of assembly (legislature), the rest of the cases (Nasarawa and Niger 
states) has no single mention of the state legislature as part of the governance structure of the 
agencies. Also, it is important note that most of time the advisory board has been largely absent in 
regulatory, policy making and oversight of the land agencies. What is surprising in all the cases we 
considered is that despite the land laws explicitly making provisions for the establishment of an 
advisory board to provide policy directions as well as oversight the activities of the land agencies, yet 
this important body remained largely absent. Even in situations where the advisory board seemed to 
have briefly existed, as was the case in Niger state, they were often side-lined by powerful officials 
where their role largely remained symbolic. Again, this finding seems to resonate with Verschuere, D. 
Vancoppenolle (2012) as cited above. 
Sixth, some sections of the land legislation are too vague such that officials resort to taking regulatory 
decisions outside of the regulations because the mandate given to agencies to implement policies are 
somewhat ambiguous and conflicting. This is alarming because institutions begin to weaken when 
relevant implementing bodies have different interpretations of the land laws and therefore 
perceptions about how to proceed with implementation (May 2012). Clarity is key here especially in 
terms of who is in charge of what role because that’s where the confusion about who is responsible 
for what sets in. For instance, when we ask officials of the land agencies to whom they think their 
agency report to, while some mentioned the governor, others mentioned the advisory board. There 
is also no strict enforcement of sanctions to ensure compliance to the provisions of the land laws. We 
also found that often when officials are found to be in breach of the regulations, they are mostly 
warned than sanctioned. Although enforcement of sanctions alone may not always compel people 
into complying with the laws, it could go a long way in reducing fraud related incidents in land 
administration. In addition, there is also the need for the land agencies tome up with innovative ideas 
in form of incentives such as rewarding good behaviour and performance as the case in Nasarawa 
state where this has evidently helped in raising staff performance. Putting staff welfare at the 
forefront through regular payment of staff salaries and entitlements, celebrating and rewarding staff 
achievements etc. are all positive incentives for inducing staff motivation. This was indeed the case in 
the implementation of the land titling reforms in Thailand where positive incentivisation of 
implementing staff was partly responsible for the success of the reforms (Bowman 2004). 
In conclusion therefore, these findings suggests that in a weak institutional context, rules and 
regulations in use are insufficient for a high-quality land administration to occur unless there is (a) 
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credible commitment by the political leadership to capacitate but also control (through regular 
oversight and swift enforcement of sanctions) implementing organizations tasked with policy 
mandate or regulations and that (b) these implementing organizations complies with the mandate by 
actively cooperating and coordinating with each other to effectively and efficiently execute this 
mandate. As Pollitt et al (2005) also note that although it is important to consider the “formal design” 
of institutions as important, but they also suggest that “the strategies pursued by [the] management, 
frequently have far more influence on how a given organization behaves than does the generality of 
its organizational form (p. 24). Or what Bach et al (2012) argued “formal and structural explanations 
must be supplemented by theoretical understandings of the informal dimensions of agency roles and 
contributions within a wider social and political context” (p. 187). Some important future research 
directions are to explore “how can agencies best be ‘steered’ by their parent ministries?” or what are 
the conditions under which agencies perform well (or badly)? (Pollitt et al 2005: 13) 
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